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Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) – Judgment

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS, ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA) JUDGMENT OF 19 DECEMBER 2005

Situation in the Great Lakes region — Task of the Court.

*
Issue of consent.
The DRC consented to presence of Ugandan troops in eastern border area in period preceding August 1998 — Protocol on Security along the Common Bor¬der of 27 April 1998 between the DRC and Uganda — No particular formalities required for withdrawal of consent by the DRC to presence of Ugandan troops — Ambiguity of statement by President Kabila published on 28 July 1998 — Any prior consent withdrawn at latest by close of Victoria Falls Summit on 8 August 1998.
Findings of fact concerning Uganda’s use of force in respect of Kitona.
Denial by Uganda that it was involved in military action at Kitona on 4 August 1998 Assessment of evidentiary materials in relation to events at Kitona — Deficiencies in evidence adduced by the DRC — Not established to the Court’s satisfaction that Uganda participated in attack on Kitona.
Findings offact concerning military action in the east of the DRC and in other areas of that country.
Determination by the Court offacts as to Ugandan presence at, and taking
of, certain locations in the DRC — Assessment of evidentiary materials — Sketch-map evidence — Testimony before Porter Commission — Statements against interest — Establishment of locations taken by Uganda and correspond¬ing “dates of capture”.
Did the Lusaka, Kampala and Harare Agreements constitute any consent of the DRC to the presence of Ugandan troops?
Contention of Uganda that the Lusaka, Kampala and Harare Agreements constituted consent to presence of Ugandan forces on Congolese territory — Nothing in provisions of Lusaka Agreement can be interpreted as affirmation that security interests of Uganda had already required the presence of Ugandan forces on territory of the DRC as from September 1998 — Lusaka Agreement represented an agreed modus operandi for the parties, providing frameworkfor orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC — The DRC did not thereby recognize situation on ground as legal — Kampala and Harare Dis¬engagement Plans did not change legal status of presence of Ugandan troops — Luanda Agreement authorized limited presence of Ugandan troops in border area — None of the aforementioned Agreements (save for limited exception in the Luanda Agreement) constituted consent by the DRC to presence of Ugan¬dan troops on Congolese territory for period after July 1999.
Self-defence in light of proven facts.
Question of whether Ugandan military action in the DRC from early August 1998 to July 1999 could be justified as action in self-defence — Ugandan High Command document of 11 September 1998 — Testimony before Porter Com¬mission of Ugandan Minister of Defence and of commander of Ugandan forces in the DRC — Uganda regarded military events of August 1998 as part of operation “Safe Haven” — Objectives of operation “Safe Haven”, as stated in Ugandan High Command document, not consonant with concept of self- defence — Examination of claim by Uganda of existence of tripartite anti- Ugandan conspiracy between the DRC, the ADF and the Sudan — Evidence adduced by Uganda lacking in relevance and probative value Article 51 of the United Nations Charter — No report made by Uganda to Security Council of events requiring it to act in self-defence — No claim by Uganda that it had been subjected to armed attack by armedforces of the DRC — No satisfactory proof of involvement of Government of the DRC in alleged ADF attacks on Uganda — Legal and factual circumstances for exercise of right of self-defence by Uganda not present.
Findings of law on the prohibition against the use of force.
Article 2, paragraph 4, of United Nations Charter — Security Council reso¬lutions 1234 (1999) and1304 (2000) —No credible evidence to support allega¬tion by DRC that MLC was created and controlled by Uganda — Obligations arising under principles of non-use of force and non-intervention violated by Uganda — Unlawful military intervention by Uganda in the DRC constitutes grave violation of prohibition on use of force expressed in Article 2, para¬graph 4, of Charter.
*
The issue of belligerent occupation.
Definition of occupation — Examination of evidence relating to the status of Uganda as occupying Power — Creation of new province of “Kibali-Ituri” by commander of Ugandan forces in the DRC — No specific evidence provided by the DRC to show that authority exercised by Ugandan armed forces in any areas other than in Ituri — Contention of the DRC that Uganda indirectly con¬trolled areas outside Ituri administered by Congolese rebel groups not upheld by the Court — Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri — Obligations of Uganda.
* *
Violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law: contentions of the Parties.
Contention of the DRC that Ugandan armed forces committed wide-scale human rights violations on Congolese territory, particularly in Ituri — Conten¬tion of Uganda that the DRC has failed to provide any credible evidentiary basis to support its allegations.
Admissibility of claims in relation to events in Kisangani.
Contention of Uganda that the Court lacks competence to deal with events in Kisangani in June 2000 in the absence ofRwanda — Jurisprudence contained in Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case applicable in current proceedings — Interests of Rwanda do not constitute “the very subject-matter” of decision to be rendered by the Court — The Court is not precludedfrom adjudicating on whether Uganda’s conduct in Kisangani is a violation of international law.
Violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law: findings of the Court.
Examination of evidence relating to violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law — Findings offact — Conduct of UPDF and of officers and soldiers of UPDF attributable to Uganda — Irrelevant whether UPDF personnel acted contrary to instructions given or
exceeded their authority — Applicable law — Violations of specific obliga¬tions under Hague Regulations of 1907 binding as customary international law — Violations of specific provisions ofinternational humanitarian law and international human rights law instruments — Uganda is internationally responsible for violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
*
Illegal exploitation of natural resources.
Contention of the DRC that Ugandan troops systematically looted and exploited the assets and natural resources of the DRC — Contention of Uganda that the DRC has failed to provide reliable evidence to corroborate its allega¬tions.
Findings of the Court concerning acts of illegal exploitation of natural resources.
Examination of evidence relating to illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources by Uganda — Findings offact — Conduct of UPDF and of officers and soldiers of UPDF attributable to Uganda — Irrelevant whether UPDFper- sonnel acted contrary to instructions given or exceeded their authority — Appli¬cable law — Principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources not applicable to this situation — Illegal acts by UPDF in violation of the jus in bello — Violation of duty of vigilance by Uganda with regard to illegal acts of UPDF— No violation of duty of vigilance by Uganda with regard to illegal acts of rebel groups outside Ituri — International responsibility of Uganda for acts of its armedforces — International responsibility of Uganda as an occupying Power.
* *
*
Legal consequences of violations of international obligations by Uganda.
The DRCs request that Uganda cease continuing internationally wrongful acts — No evidence to support allegations with regard to period after 2 June 2003 — Not established that Uganda continues to commit internationally wrongful acts specified by the DRC — The DRCs request cannot be upheld.
The DRCs request for specific guarantees and assurances of non-repetition of the wrongful acts — Tripartite Agreement on Regional Security in the Great Lakes of 26 October 2004 — Commitments assumed by Uganda under the Tri¬partite Agreement meet the DRC s request for specific guarantees and assur¬ances of non-repetition — Demand by the Court that the Parties respect their obligations under that Agreement and under general international law.
The DRC s request for reparation — Obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by an international wrongful act — Internationally wrongful acts committed by Uganda resulted in injury to the DRC and persons on its ter¬ritory — Uganda’s obligation to make reparation accordingly — Question of reparation to be determined by the Court, failing agreement between the Parties, in a subsequent phase of the proceedings.
*
Compliance with the Court’s Order on provisional measures.
Binding effect of the Court’s orders on provisional measures — No specific evidence demonstrating violations of the Order of 1 July 2000 — The Court’s previous findings of violations by Uganda of its obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law until final withdrawal of Ugandan troops on 2 June 2003 — Uganda did not comply with the Court’s Order on provisional measures of 1 July 2000 — This finding is without preju¬dice to the question as to whether the DRC complied with the Order.
Counter-claims: admissibility of objections.
Question of whether the DRC is entitled to raise objections to admissibility of counter-claims at current stage of proceedings — The Court’s Order of 29 November 2001 only settled question of a “direct connection” within the meaning of Article 80 — Question of whether objections raised by the DRC are inadmissible because they fail to conform to Article 79 of the Rules of Court — Article 79 inapplicable to the case of an objection to counter-claims joined to the original proceedings — The DRC is entitled to challenge admissibility of Uganda’s counter-claims.
action in self-defence — No evidence of supportfor anti-Ugandan rebel groups by the DRC in the third period.
* *
Second counter-claim.
Contention of Uganda that Congolese armedforces attacked the premises of the Ugandan Embassy, maltreated diplomats and other Ugandan nationals present on the premises and at Ndjili International Airport — Objections by the DRC to the admissibility of the second counter-claim — Contention of the DRC that the second counter-claim is not founded — Admissibility of the second counter-claim — Uganda is notprecludedfrom invoking the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations — With regard to diplomats Uganda claims its own rights under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations — Substance of the part of the counter-claim relating to acts of maltreatment against other per¬sons on the premises of the Embassy falls within the ambit of Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations — The part of the counter-claim relating to maltreatment of persons not enjoying diplomatic status at Ndjili International Airport is based on diplomatic protection — No evidence of Ugan¬dan nationality of persons in question — Sufficient evidence to prove attacks against the Embassy and maltreatment of Ugandan diplomats — Property and archives removed from Ugandan Embassy — Breaches of the Vienna Conven¬tion on Diplomatic Relations.
The DRC bears responsibility for violation of international law on diplomatic relations — Question of reparation to be determined by the Court, failing agree¬ment between the Parties, in a subsequent phase of the proceedings.
JUDGMENT
Present: President SHI; Vice-President RANJEVA; Judges KOROMA,
VERESHCHETIN, HIGGINS, PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOIJMANS, REZEK, AL-KHASAWNEH, BUERGENTHAL, ELARABY, OWADA, SIMMA, TOMKA,
ABRAHAM; Judges ad hoc VERHOEVEN, KATEKA; Registrar COUVREUR.
In the case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo, between
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, represented by
H.E. Mr. Honorius Kisimba Ngoy Ndalewe, Minister of Justice, Keeper of
the Seals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as Head of Delegation;
H.E. Mr. Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as Agent ;
Maitre Tshibangu Kalala, member of the Kinshasa and Brussels Bars, as Co-Agent and Advocate;
Mr. olivier Corten, Professor of International Law, Universite libre de Bruxelles,
Mr. Pierre Klein, Professor of International Law, Director of the Centre for
International Law, Universite libre de Bruxelles, Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor Emeritus, Universite libre de Bruxelles, Member of the Institute of International Law and of the Permanent Court of Arbi-tration,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, Director of the Centre for Inter¬national Courts and Tribunals, University College London, as Counsel and Advocates;
Maitre Ilunga Lwanza, Deputy Directeur de cabinet and Legal Adviser, cabi¬net of the Minister of Justice, Keeper of the Seals, Mr. Yambu A. Ngoyi, Chief Adviser to the Vice-Presidency of the Republic,
Mr. Mutumbe Mbuya, Legal Adviser, cabinet of the Minister of Justice,
Keeper of the Seals, Mr. Victor Musompo Kasongo, Private Secretary to the Minister of Justice,
Keeper of the Seals, Mr. Nsingi-zi-Mayemba, First Counsellor, Embassy of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Ms Marceline Masele, Second Counsellor, Embassy of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as Advisers ;
Maitre Mbambu wa Cizubu, member of the Kinshasa Bar, Tshibangu and Partners,
Mr. Francois Dubuisson, Lecturer, Universite libre de Bruxelles,
Maitre Kikangala Ngole, member of the Brussels Bar,
Ms Anne Lagerwal, Assistant, Universite libre de Bruxelles,
Ms Anjolie Singh, Assistant, University College London, member of the
Indian Bar,
as Assistants,
and
the Republic of Uganda, represented by
The Honourable E. Khiddu Makubuya S.C., M.P., Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Lucian Tibaruha, Solicitor General of the Republic of Uganda, as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E, Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, member of the International Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of oxford, Member of the Institute of International Law, Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bar of the United States Supreme Court, member of the Bar of the District of Columbia,
Mr. Eric Suy, Emeritus Professor, Catholic University of Leuven, former Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Mem¬ber of the Institute of International Law, The Honourable Amama Mbabazi, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Uganda,
Major General Katumba Wamala, Inspector General of Police of the Republic of Uganda,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Theodore Christakis, Professor of International Law, University of
Grenoble II (Pierre Mendes France), Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of
the Bar of the District of Columbia, as Counsel;
Captain Timothy Kanyogonya, Uganda People’s Defence Forces, as Adviser,
THE COURT,
composed as above, after deliberation,
delivers the following Judgment:
1.    On 23 June 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter “the DRC”) filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Uganda (hereinafter “Uganda”) in respect of a dispute concerning “acts of armed aggression perpetrated by Uganda on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity” (emphasis in the original).
In order to found the jurisdiction of the Court, the Application relied on the declarations made by the two Parties accepting the Court’s compulsory juris¬diction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.
2.    Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was immediately communicated to the Government of Uganda by the Registrar; and, pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article, all States entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the Application.
3.    By an Order of 21 October 1999, the Court fixed 21 July 2000 as the time- limit for the filing of the Memorial of the DRC and 21 April 2001 as the time- limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of Uganda. The DRC filed its Memorial within the time-limit thus prescribed.
4.    On 19 June 2000, the DRC submitted to the Court a request for the indi¬cation of provisional measures pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court. By an Order dated 1 July 2000, the Court, after hearing the Parties, indi¬cated certain provisional measures.
5.    Uganda filed its Counter-Memorial within the time-limit fixed for that purpose by the Court’s Order of 21 October 1999. That pleading included counter-claims.
6.    Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the Parties, each Party availed itself of its right under Article 31 of the Statute of the Court to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case. By a letter of 16 August 2000 the DRC notified the Court of its intention to choose Mr. Joe Verhoeven and by a letter of 4 October 2000 Uganda notified the Court of its intention to choose Mr. James L. Kateka. No objections having been raised, the Parties were informed by letters dated 26 September 2000 and 7 November 2000, respectively, that the case file would be transmitted to the judges ad hoc accord¬ingly.
7.    At a meeting held by the President of the Court with the Agents of the Parties on 11 June 2001, the DRC, invoking Article 80 of the Rules of Court, raised certain objections to the admissibility of the counter-claims set out in the Counter-Memorial of Uganda. During that meeting the two Agents agreed that their respective Governments would file written observations on the question of the admissibility of the counter-claims; they also agreed on the time-limits for that purpose.
On 28 June 2001, the Agent of the DRC filed his Government’s written observations on the question of the admissibility of Uganda’s counter-claims, and a copy of those observations was communicated to the Ugandan Govern¬ment by the Registrar. On 15 August 2001, the Agent of Uganda filed his Government’s written observations on the question of the admissibility of the counter-claims set out in Uganda’s Counter-Memorial, and a copy of those observations was communicated to the Congolese Government by the First Secretary of the Court, Acting Registrar. On 5 September 2001, the Agent of the DRC submitted his Government’s comments on Uganda’s written obser¬vations, a copy of which was transmitted to the Ugandan Government by the Registrar.
Having received detailed written observations from each of the Parties, the Court considered that it was sufficiently well informed of their respective posi¬tions with regard to the admissibility of the counter-claims.
8.    By an Order of 29 November 2001, the Court held that two of the three counter-claims submitted by Uganda in its Counter-Memorial were admissible as such and formed part of the current proceedings, but that the third was not. It also directed the DRC to file a Reply and Uganda to file a Rejoinder, addressing the claims of both Parties, and fixed 29 May 2002 and 29 November 2002 as the time-limits for the filing of the Reply and the Rejoinder respec¬tively. Lastly, the Court held that it was necessary, “in order to ensure strict equality between the Parties, to reserve the right of the Congo to present its views in writing a second time on the Ugandan counter-claims, in an additional pleading which [might] be the subject of a subsequent Order”. The DRC duly filed its Reply within the time-limit prescribed for that purpose.
9.    By an Order of 7 November 2002, at the request of Uganda, the Court extended the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of Uganda to 6 December 2002. Uganda duly filed its Rejoinder within the time-limit as thus extended.
10.    By a letter dated 6 January 2003, the Co-Agent of the DRC, referring to the above-mentioned Order of 29 November 2001, informed the Court that his Government wished to present its views in writing a second time on the counter-claims of Uganda, in an additional pleading. By an Order of 29 January 2003 the Court, taking account of the agreement of the Parties, authorized the submission by the DRC of an additional pleading relating solely to the counter¬claims submitted by Uganda and fixed 28 February 2003 as the time-limit for the filing of that pleading. The DRC duly filed the additional pleading within the time-limit as thus fixed and the case became ready for hearing.
11.    At a meeting held by the President of the Court with the Agents of the Parties on 24 April 2003, the Agents presented their views on the organization of the oral proceedings on the merits. Pursuant to Article 54, paragraph 1, of the Rules, the Court fixed 10 November 2003 as the date for the opening of the oral proceedings. The Registrar informed the Parties accordingly by letters of 9 May 2003.
12.    Pursuant to the instructions of the Court under Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registry sent the notification referred to in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute to all States parties to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 7 December 1944, the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar of 12 August 1949, the Addi¬tional Protocol I of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, the Interna¬tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981 and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun¬ishment of 10 December 1984.
Pursuant to the instructions of the Court under Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the Registry addressed the notifications provided for in Article 34, paragraph 3, of the Statute and communicated copies of the written proceedings to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in respect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun¬ishment ; the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organiza¬tion in respect of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation; and the President of the African Union’s Commission in respect of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The respective organizations were also asked whether they intended to present written observations within the mean¬ing ofArticle 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court. None of those organiza¬tions expressed a wish to submit any such observations.
13.    By a letter dated 2 October 2003 addressed to the Registry, the Agent of the DRC requested that Uganda provide the DRC with a number of case- related documents which were not in the public domain. Copies of the requested documents were received in the Registry on 17 October 2003 and transmitted to the Agent of the DRC. By a letter dated 13 October 2003 addressed to the Registry, the Agent of Uganda asked the DRC to furnish certain documents relevant to the issues in the case that were not in the public domain. Copies of the requested documents were received in the Registry on 31 October 2003 and transmitted to the Agent of Uganda. On 5 November 2003, the Registrar informed the Parties by letter that the Court had decided that those documents did not form part of the case file and that accordingly, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 56, they should not be referred to in oral argument, except to the extent that they “form[ed] part of a publication readily available”.
14.    On 17 October 2003, the Agent of Uganda informed the Court that his Gov¬ernment wished to submit 24 new documents, in accordance with Article 56 of the Rules of Court. As provided for in paragraph 1 of that Article, those documents were communicated to the DRC. On 29 October 2003, the Agent of the DRC informed the Court that his Government did not intend to raise any objection to the production of those new documents by Uganda. By letters of 5 November 2003, the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court had taken note that the DRC had no objection to the production of the 24 new documents and that counsel would be free to make reference to them in the course of oral argument.
15.    On 17 October 2003, the Agent of Uganda further informed the Court that his Government wished to call two witnesses in accordance with Article 57 of the Rules of Court. A copy of the Agent’s letter and the attached list of wit¬nesses was transmitted to the Agent of the DRC, who conveyed to the Court his Government’s opposition to the calling of those witnesses. On 5 November 2003, the Registrar informed the Parties by letter that the Court had decided that it would not be appropriate, in the circumstances, to authorize the calling of those two witnesses by Uganda.
16.    On 20 October 2003, the Agent of Uganda informed the Court that his Government wished, in accordance with Article 56 of the Rules of Court, to add two further documents to its request to produce 24 new documents in the case. As provided for in paragraph 1 of that Article, those documents were communicated to the DRC. On 6 November 2003, the Agent of the DRC informed the Court that his Government had no specific comments to make with regard to the additional two documents.
On 5 November 2003, the Agent of the DRC made a formal application to submit a “small number” of new documents in accordance with Article 56 of the Rules of Court, and referred to the Court’s Practice Direction IX. As pro¬vided for in paragraph 1 of Article 56, those documents were communicated to Uganda. On 5 November 2003, the Agent of Uganda indicated that his Government did not object to the submission of the new documents by the DRC.
By letters dated 12 November 2003, the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court had taken note, firstly, that the DRC did not object to the produc¬tion of the two further new documents which Uganda sought to produce in accordance with Article 56 of the Rules of Court, and secondly, that Uganda had no objection to the production of the documents submitted by the DRC on 5 November 2003, and that counsel would be free to quote from both sets of documents during the oral proceedings.
17.    On 5 November 2003, the Agent of the DRC enquired whether it might be possible to postpone to a later date, in April 2004, the opening of the hearings in the case originally scheduled for 10 November 2003, “so as to per¬mit the diplomatic negotiations engaged by the Parties to be conducted in an atmosphere of calm”. By a letter of 6 November 2003, the Agent of Uganda informed the Court that his Government “supporte[d ]the proposal and adopt[ed] the request”.
On 6 November 2003, the Registrar informed both Parties by letter that the Court, “taking account of the representations made to it by the Parties, [had] decided to postpone the opening of the oral proceedings in the case” and that the new date for the opening of the oral proceedings would be fixed in due course. By a letter of 9 September 2004, the Agent of the DRC formally requested that the Court fix a new date for the opening of the oral proceedings. By letters of 20 October 2004, the Registrar informed the Parties that the Court had decided, in accordance with Article 54 of the Rules of Court, to fix Monday 11 April 2005 for the opening of the oral proceedings in the case.
18.    On 1 February 2005, the Agent of the DRC informed the Court that his Government wished to produce certain new documents, in accordance with Article 56 of the Rules of Court. As provided for in paragraph 1 of that Article, those documents were communicated to Uganda. On 16 February 2005, the Co-Agent of Uganda informed the Court that his Government did not intend to raise any objection to the production of one of the new documents by the DRC, and presented certain observations on the remaining documents. On 21 February 2005, the Registrar informed the Parties by letter that the Court had decided to authorize the production of the document to which the Ugan¬dan Government had raised no objection, as well as the production of the other documents. With regard to those other documents, which came from the Judi¬cial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo set up by the Ugandan Government in May 2001 and headed by Justice David Porter (hereinafter “the Porter Commission”), the Parties were further informed that the Court had noted, inter alia, that only certain of them were new, whilst the remainder simply reproduced documents already submitted on 5 November 2003 and included in the case file.
19.    On 15 March 2005, the Co-Agent of Uganda provided the Registry with a new document which his Government wished to produce under Article 56 of the Rules of Court. No objection having been made by the Congolese Govern¬ment to the Ugandan request, the Registrar, on 8 April 2005, informed the Parties that the Court had decided to authorize the production of the said document.
20.    Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules, the Court, after ascer¬taining the views of the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and docu¬ments annexed would be made available to the public at the opening of the oral proceedings.
21.    Public sittings were held from 11 April to 29 April 2005, at which the Court heard the oral arguments and replies of:
For the DRC: H.E. Mr. Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza,
H.E. Mr. Honorius Kisimba Ngoy Ndalewe,
Maitre Tshibangu Kalala,
Mr. Jean Salmon,
Mr. Philippe Sands,
Mr. Olivier Corten,
Mr. Pierre Klein.
For Uganda: The Honourable E. Khiddu Makubuya, Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Mr. Ian Brownlie, The Honourable Amama Mbabazi, Mr. Eric Suy.
22. In the course of the hearings, questions were put to the Parties by Judges Vereshchetin, Kooijmans and Elaraby.
Judge Vereshchetin addressed a separate question to each Party. The DRC was asked: “What are the respective periods of time to which the concrete sub¬missions, found in the written pleadings of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, refer?”; and Uganda was asked: “What are the respective periods of time to which the concrete submissions relating to the first counter-claim, found in the written pleadings of Uganda, refer?”
Judge Kooijmans addressed the following question to both Parties:
“Can the Parties indicate which areas of the provinces of Equateur, Ori- entale, North Kivu and South Kivu were in the relevant periods in time under the control of the UPDF and which under the control of the various rebellious militias? It would be appreciated if sketch-maps would be added.”
Judge Elaraby addressed the following question to both Parties :
“The Lusaka Agreement signed on 10 July 1999 which takes effect 24 hours after the signature, provides that:
‘The final orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the national territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo shall be in accordance with Annex “B” of this Agreement.’ (Annex A, Chapter 4, para. 4.1.)
Subparagraph 17 of Annex B provides that the ‘Orderly Withdrawal of all Foreign Forces’ shall take place on ‘D-Day + 180 days’.
Uganda asserts that the final withdrawal of its forces occurred on 2 June 2003.
What are the views of the two Parties regarding the legal basis for the presence of Ugandan forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the period between the date of the ‘final orderly withdrawal’, agreed to in the Lusaka Agreement, and 2 June 2003?”
The Parties provided replies to these questions orally and in writing, pur¬suant to Article 61, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. Pursuant to Article 72 of the Rules of Court, each Party presented written observations on the written replies received from the other.
23. In its Application, the DRC made the following requests:
“Consequently, and whilst reserving the right to supplement and amplify the present request in the course of the proceedings, the Democratic Republic of the Congo requests the Court to:
Adjudge and declare that:
(a)    Uganda is guilty of an act of aggression within the meaning of Article 1 of resolution 3314 of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 14 December 1974 and of the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter;
(b)    further, Uganda is committing repeated violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, in flagrant disregard of the elementary rules of international humani¬tarian law in conflict zones, and is also guilty of massive human rights violations in defiance of the most basic customary law;
(c)    more specifically, by taking forcible possession of the Inga hydroelec¬tric dam, and deliberately and regularly causing massive electrical power cuts, in violation of the provisions of Article 56 of the Addi¬tional Protocol of 1977, Uganda has rendered itself responsible for very heavy losses of life among the 5 million inhabitants of the city of Kinshasa and the surrounding area;
(d)    by shooting down, on 9 October 1998 at Kindu, a Boeing 727 the property of Congo Airlines, thereby causing the death of 40 civilians, Uganda has also violated the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944, the Hague Conven¬tion of 16 December 1970 for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
Consequently, and pursuant to the aforementioned international legal obligations, to adjudge and declare that:
(1)    all Ugandan armed forces participating in acts of aggression shall forthwith vacate the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
(2)    Uganda shall secure the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Congolese territory of its nationals, both natural and legal persons ;
(3)    the Democratic Republic of the Congo is entitled to compensation from Uganda in respect of all acts of looting, destruction, removal of property and persons and other unlawful acts attributable to Uganda, in respect of which the Democratic Republic of the Congo reserves the right to determine at a later date the precise amount of the damage suffered, in addition to its claim for the restitution of all property removed.”
24. In the written proceedings, the following submissions were presented by the Parties :
On behalf of the Government of the DRC, in the Memorial:
“The Democratic Republic of the Congo, while reserving the right to supplement or modify the present submissions and to provide the Court with fresh evidence and pertinent new legal arguments in the context of the present dispute, requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
(1) that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military and paramilitary activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by occupying its territory and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces operating there, has violated the following principles of conventional and customary law :
—    the principle of non-use of force in international relations, includ¬ing the prohibition of aggression;
—    the obligation to settle international disputes exclusively by peace¬ful means so as to ensure that international peace and security, as well as justice, are not placed in jeopardy;
—    respect for the sovereignty of States and the rights of peoples to self-determination, and hence to choose their own political and economic system freely and without outside interference;
—    the principle of non-interference in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States, which includes refraining from extending any assistance to the parties to a civil war operating on the terri¬tory of another State;
(2)    that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources and by pillaging its assets and wealth, has violated the following principles of conventional and customary law :
—    respect for the sovereignty of States, including over their natural resources;
—    the duty to promote the realization of the principle of equality of peoples and of their right of self-determination, and consequently to refrain from exposing peoples to foreign subjugation, domina¬tion or exploitation;
—    the principle of non-interference in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States, including economic matters;
(3)    that the Republic of Uganda, by committing acts of oppression against the nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by killing, injuring, abducting or despoiling those nationals, has violated the fol¬lowing principles of conventional and customary law:
—    the principle of conventional and customary law involving the obligation to respect and ensure respect for fundamental human rights, including in times of armed conflict;
—    the entitlement of Congolese nationals to enjoy the most basic rights, both civil and political, as well as economic, social and cul¬tural ;
(4)    that, in light of all the violations set out above, the Republic of Uganda shall, to the extent of and in accordance with, the particulars set out in Chapter VI of this Memorial, and in conformity with cus-tomary international law :
—    cease forthwith any continuing internationally wrongful act, in particular its occupation of Congolese territory, its support for irregular forces operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, its unlawful detention of Congolese nationals and its exploitation of Congolese wealth and natural resources;
—    make reparation for all types of damage caused by all types of wrongful act attributable to it, no matter how remote the causal link between the acts and the damage concerned ;
—    accordingly make reparation in kind where this is still physically possible, in particular restitution of any Congolese resources, assets or wealth still in its possession;
— failing this, furnish a sum covering the whole of the damage
suffered, including, in particular, the examples mentioned in paragraph 6.65 of this Memorial;
—    further, in any event, render satisfaction for the insults inflicted by it upon the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the form of offi¬cial apologies, the payment of damages reflecting the gravity of the infringements and the prosecution of all those responsible;
—    provide specific guarantees and assurances that it will never again in the future commit any of the above-mentioned violations against the Democratic Republic of the Congo”;
in the Reply:
“The Democratic Republic of the Congo, while reserving the right to supplement or modify the present submissions and to provide the Court with fresh evidence and pertinent new legal arguments in the context of the present dispute, requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
(1)    that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military and paramilitary activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by occupying its territory and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces operating there, has violated the following principles of conventional and customary law :
—    the principle of non-use of force in international relations, includ¬ing the prohibition of aggression;
—    the obligation to settle international disputes exclusively by peace¬ful means so as to ensure that peace, international security and justice are not placed in jeopardy;
—    respect for the sovereignty of States and the rights of peoples to self-determination, and hence to choose their own political and economic system freely and without outside interference;
—    the principle of non-interference in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States, which includes refraining from extending any assistance to the parties to a civil war operating on the terri¬tory of another State;
(2)    that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources and by pillaging its assets and wealth, has violated the following principles of conventional and customary law :
—    respect for the sovereignty of States, including over their natural resources ;
—    the duty to promote the realization of the principle of equality of peoples and of their right of self-determination, and consequently to refrain from exposing peoples to foreign subjugation, domina¬tion or exploitation;
—    the principle of non-interference in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States, including economic matters;
(3)    that the Republic of Uganda, by committing abuses against nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by killing, injuring, and abducting those nationals or robbing them of their property, has vio¬lated the following principles of conventional and customary law :
—    the principle of conventional and customary law involving the obligation to respect and ensure respect for fundamental human rights, including in times of armed conflict;
—    the principle of conventional and customary law whereby it is necessary, at all times, to make a distinction in an armed con¬flict between civilian and military objectives ;
—    the entitlement of Congolese nationals to enjoy the most basic rights, both civil and political, as well as economic, social and cul¬tural ;
(4)    that, in light of all the violations set out above, the Republic of
Uganda shall, in accordance with customary international law:
—    cease forthwith all continuing internationally wrongful acts, and in particular its occupation of Congolese territory, its support for irregular forces operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its exploitation of Congolese wealth and natural resources;
—    make reparation for all types of damage caused by all types of wrongful act attributable to it, no matter how remote the causal link between the acts and the damage concerned ;
—    accordingly, make reparation in kind where this is still physically possible, in particular in regard to any Congolese resources, assets or wealth still in its possession;
—    failing this, furnish a sum covering the whole of the damage suffered, including, in particular, the examples set out in para¬graph 6.65 of the Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and restated in paragraph 1.58 of the present Reply;
—    further, in any event, render satisfaction for the injuries inflicted upon the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the form of offi¬cial apologies, the payment of damages reflecting the gravity of the violations and the prosecution of all those responsible;
—    provide specific guarantees and assurances that it will never again in the future perpetrate any of the above-mentioned violations against the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
(5)    that the Ugandan counter-claim alleging involvement by the DRC in
armed attacks against Uganda be dismissed, on the following grounds:
—    to the extent that it relates to the period before Laurent-Desire Kabila came to power, the claim is inadmissible because Uganda had previously waived its right to lodge such a claim and, in the alternative, the claim is unfounded because Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based;
—    to the extent that it relates to the period after Laurent-Desire Kabila came to power, the claim is unfounded because Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based.
(6) that the Ugandan counter-claim alleging involvement by the DRC in
an attack on the Ugandan Embassy and on Ugandan nationals in Kinshasa be dismissed, on the following grounds:
—    to the extent that Uganda is seeking to engage the responsibility of the DRC for acts contrary to international law allegedly com¬mitted to the detriment of Ugandan nationals, the claim is inad¬missible because Uganda has failed to show that the persons for whose protection it claims to provide are its nationals or that such persons have exhausted the local remedies available in the DRC; in the alternative, this claim is unfounded because Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based ;
—    that part of the Ugandan claims concerning the treatment allegedly inflicted on its diplomatic premises and personnel in Kinshasa is unfounded because Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based” ;
in the additional pleading entitled “Additional Written Observations on the Counter-Claims presented by Uganda”:
“The Democratic Republic of the Congo, while reserving the right to supplement or modify the present submissions and to provide the Court with fresh evidence and pertinent new legal arguments in the context of the present dispute, requests the Court, pursuant to the Rules of Court, to adjudge and declare:
As regards the first counter-claim presented by Uganda:
(1)    to the extent that it relates to the period before Laurent-Desire Kabila came to power, the claim is inadmissible because Uganda had previ¬ously waived its right to lodge such a claim and, in the alternative, the claim is unfounded because Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based ;
(2)    to the extent that it relates to the period from when Laurent-Desire Kabila came to power until the onset of Ugandan aggression, the claim is unfounded in fact because Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based;
(3)    to the extent that it relates to the period after the onset of Ugandan aggression, the claim is founded neither in fact nor in law because Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based, and because, from 2 August 1998, the DRC was in any event in a situation of self-defence.
As regards the second counter-claim presented by Uganda:
(1)    to the extent that it is now centred on the interpretation and applica¬tion of the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations, the claim presented by Uganda radically modifies the subject-matter of the dispute, contrary to the Statute and Rules of Court; this aspect of the claim must therefore be dismissed from the present proceedings;
(2)    the aspect of the claim relating to the inhumane treatment allegedly suffered by certain Ugandan nationals remains inadmissible, as Uganda has still not shown that the conditions laid down by interna¬tional law for the exercise of its diplomatic protection have been met;
in the alternative, this aspect of the claim is unfounded, as Uganda is still unable to establish the factual and legal bases for its claims ;
(3) the aspect of the claim relating to the alleged expropriation of Ugan¬dan public property is unfounded, as Uganda is still unable to estab¬lish the factual and legal bases for its claims.”
On behalf of the Government of Uganda, in the Counter-Memorial:
“Reserving its right to supplement or amend its requests, the Republic of Uganda requests the Court:
(1)    To adjudge and declare in accordance with international law:
(A)    that the requests of the Democratic Republic of the Congo relating to activities or situations involving the Republic of Rwanda or its agents are inadmissible for the reasons set forth in Chapter XV of the present Counter-Memorial;
(B)    that the requests of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that the Court adjudge that the Republic of Uganda is responsible for various breaches of international law, as alleged in the Applica¬tion and/or the Memorial of the Democratic Republic of Congo, are rejected ; and
(C)    that the Counter-claims presented in Chapter XVIII of the present Counter-Memorial be upheld.
(2)    To reserve the issue of reparation in relation to the Counter-claims for a subsequent stage of the proceedings” ;
in the Rejoinder:
“Reserving her right to supplement or amend her requests, the Republic of Uganda requests the Court:
1.    To adjudge and declare in accordance with international law:
(A)    that the requests of the Democratic Republic of the Congo relat¬ing to activities or situations involving the Republic of Rwanda or her agents are inadmissible for the reasons set forth in Chapter XV of the present Counter-Memorial;
(B)    that the requests of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that the Court adjudge that the Republic of Uganda is responsible for various breaches of international law, as alleged in the Memorial and/or the Reply of the Democratic Republic of Congo, are rejected ; and
(C)    that the Counter-claims presented in Chapter XVIII of the Counter-Memorial and reaffirmed in Chapter VI of the present Rejoinder be upheld.
2.    To reserve the issue of reparation in relation to the Counter-claims for a subsequent stage of the proceedings.”
25. At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were presented by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of the DRC,
at the hearing of 25 April 2005, on the claims of the DRC:
“The Congo requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
1.    That the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military and paramilitary activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by occupying its territory and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having operated there, has violated the following principles of conventional and customary law:
—    the principle of non-use of force in international relations, includ¬ing the prohibition of aggression;
—    the obligation to settle international disputes exclusively by peace¬ful means so as to ensure that international peace and security, as well as justice, are not placed in jeopardy;
—    respect for the sovereignty of States and the rights of peoples to self-determination, and hence to choose their own political and eco¬nomic system freely and without outside interference;
—    the principle of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States, including refraining from extending any assist¬ance to the parties to a civil war operating on the territory of another State.
2.    That the Republic of Uganda, by committing acts of violence against nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by killing and injuring them or despoiling them of their property, by failing to take adequate measures to prevent violations of human rights in the DRC by persons under its jurisdiction or control, and/or failing to punish persons under its jurisdiction or control having engaged in the above- mentioned acts, has violated the following principles of conventional and customary law:
—    the principle of conventional and customary law imposing an obli¬gation to respect, and ensure respect for, fundamental human rights, including in times of armed conflict, in accordance with interna¬tional humanitarian law;
—    the principle of conventional and customary law imposing an obli¬gation, at all times, to make a distinction in an armed conflict between civilian and military objectives ;
—    the right of Congolese nationals to enjoy the most basic rights, both civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural.
3.    That the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources, by pillaging its assets and wealth, by fail¬ing to take adequate measures to prevent the illegal exploitation of the resources of the DRC by persons under its jurisdiction or control, and/or failing to punish persons under its jurisdiction or control having engaged in the above-mentioned acts, has violated the following prin¬ciples of conventional and customary law:
—    the applicable rules of international humanitarian law ;
—    respect for the sovereignty of States, including over their natural resources ;
—    the duty to promote the realization of the principle of equality of peoples and of their right of self-determination, and consequently
to refrain from exposing peoples to foreign subjugation, domina¬tion or exploitation;
— the principle of non-interference in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States, including economic matters.
4.    (a) That the violations of international law set out in submissions 1,
2 and 3 constitute wrongful acts attributable to Uganda which engage its international responsibility;
(b)    that the Republic of Uganda shall cease forthwith all continuing internationally wrongful acts, and in particular its support for irregular forces operating in the DRC and its exploitation of Con¬golese wealth and natural resources ;
(c)    that the Republic of Uganda shall provide specific guarantees and assurances that it will not repeat the wrongful acts complained of;
(d)    that the Republic of Uganda is under an obligation to the Demo¬cratic Republic of the Congo to make reparation for all injury caused to the latter by the violation of the obligations imposed by international law and set out in submissions 1, 2 and 3 above;
(e)    that the nature, form and amount of the reparation shall be deter¬mined by the Court, failing agreement thereon between the Parties, and that the Court shall reserve the subsequent procedure for that purpose.
5.    That the Republic of Uganda has violated the Order of the Court on
provisional measures of 1 July 2000, in that it has failed to comply with
the following provisional measures:
‘(1) both Parties must, forthwith, prevent and refrain from any action, and in particular any armed action, which might prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of whatever judgment the Court may render in the case, or which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve;
(2)    both Parties must, forthwith, take all measures necessary to com¬ply with all of their obligations under international law, in particu¬lar those under the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and with United Nations Security Council resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000;
(3)    both Parties must, forthwith, take all measures necessary to ensure full respect within the zone of conflict for fundamental human rights and for the applicable provisions of humanitarian law'” ;
at the hearing of 29 April 2005, on the counter-claims of Uganda:
“The Congo requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
As regards the first counter-claim submitted by Uganda:
(1)    to the extent that it relates to the period before Laurent-Desire Kabila came to power, Uganda’s claim is inadmissible because Uganda had previously renounced its right to lodge such a claim: in the alternative, the claim is unfounded because Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based;
(2)    to the extent that it relates to the period from the time when Laurent- Desire Kabila came to power to the time when Uganda launched its armed attack, Uganda’s claim is unfounded in fact because Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based ;
(3)    to the extent that it relates to the period subsequent to the launching of Uganda’s armed attack, Uganda’s claim is unfounded both in fact and in law because Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based and, in any event, from 2 August 1998 the DRC was in a situation of self-defence.
As regards the second counter-claim submitted by Uganda:
(1)    to the extent that it now relates to the interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations, the claim submitted by Uganda radically changes the subject-matter of the dis¬pute, contrary to the Statute and to the Rules of Court; that part of the claim must therefore be dismissed from the present proceedings ;
(2)    that part of the claim relating to the alleged mistreatment of certain Ugandan nationals remains inadmissible because Uganda has still failed to show that the requirements laid down by international law for the exercise of its diplomatic protection were satisfied ; in the alter¬native, that part of the claim is unfounded because Uganda is still unable to establish the factual and legal bases of its claims.
(3)    that part of the claim relating to the alleged expropriation of Uganda’s public property is unfounded because Uganda is still unable to estab¬lish the factual and legal bases of its claims.”
On behalf of the Government of Uganda,
at the hearing of 27 April 2005, on the claims of the DRC and the counter¬claims of Uganda:
“The Republic of Uganda requests the Court:
(1) To adjudge and declare in accordance with international law :
(A)    that the requests of the Democratic Republic of the Congo relating to the activities or situations involving the Republic of Rwanda or her agents are inadmissible for the reasons set forth in Chapter XV of the Counter-Memorial and reaffirmed in the oral pleadings ;
(B)    that the requests of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that the Court adjudge and declare that the Republic of Uganda is responsible for various breaches of international law, as alleged in the Memorial, the Reply and/or the oral pleadings are rejected; and
(C)    that Uganda’s counter-claims presented in Chapter XVIII of the
Counter-Memorial, and reaffirmed in Chapter VI of the Rejoin¬der as well as the oral pleadings be upheld.
(2) To reserve the issue of reparation in relation to Uganda’s counter¬claims for a subsequent stage of the proceedings.”
26. The Court is aware of the complex and tragic situation which has long prevailed in the Great Lakes region. There has been much suffering by the local population and destabilization of much of the region. In par¬ticular, the instability in the DRC has had negative security implications for Uganda and some other neighbouring States. Indeed, the Summit meeting of the Heads of State in Victoria Falls (held on 7 and 8 August 1998) and the Agreement for a Ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed in Lusaka on 10 July 1999 (hereinafter “the Lusaka Agreement”) acknowledged as legitimate the security needs of the DRC’s neighbours. The Court is aware, too, that the factional conflicts within the DRC require a comprehensive settlement to the problems of the region.
However, the task of the Court must be to respond, on the basis of international law, to the particular legal dispute brought before it. As it interprets and applies the law, it will be mindful of context, but its task cannot go beyond that.
27. The Court finds it convenient, in view of the many actors referred to by the Parties in their written pleadings and at the hearing, to indicate the abbreviations which it will use for those actors in its judgment. Thus the Allied Democratic Forces will hereinafter be referred to as the ADF, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (Alli¬ance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du Congo) as the AFDL, the Congo Liberation Army (Armee de liberation du Congo) as the ALC, the Congolese Armed Forces (Forces armees congolaises) as the FAC, the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces armees rwandaises) as the FAR, the Former Uganda National Army as the FUNA, the Lord’s Resistance Army as the LRA, the Congo Liberation Movement (Mouve- ment de liberation du Congo) as the MLC, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda as the NALU, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie) as the RCD, the Congo¬lese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani (Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie-Kisangani) as the RCD-Kisangani (also known as RCD- Wamba), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie-Mouvement de liberation) as the RCD-ML, the Rwandan Patriotic Army as the RPA, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army as the SPLM/A, the Uganda
National Rescue Front II as the UNRF II, the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces as the UPDF, and the West Nile Bank Front as the WNBF.
28.    In its first submission the DRC requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
“1. That the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military and para¬military activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
by occupying its territory and by actively extending military,
logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having operated there, has violated the following principles of conventional and customary law:
–    the principle of non-use of force in international relations, including the prohibition of aggression;
—    the obligation to settle international disputes exclusively by peaceful means so as to ensure that international peace and security, as well as justice, are not placed in jeopardy;
—    respect for the sovereignty of States and the rights of peoples to self-determination, and hence to choose their own poli¬tical and economic system freely and without outside inter¬ference;
–    the principle of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States, including refraining from extending any assistance to the parties to a civil war operating on the territory of another State.”
29.    The DRC explains that in 1997 Laurent-Desire Kabila, who was at the time a Congolese rebel leader at the head of the AFDL (which was supported by Uganda and Rwanda), succeeded in overthrowing the then President of Zaire, Marshal Mobutu Ssese Seko, and on 29 May 1997 was formally sworn in as President of the renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo. The DRC asserts that, following President Kabila’s acces¬sion to power, Uganda and Rwanda were granted substantial benefits in the DRC in the military and economic fields. The DRC claims, however, that President Kabila subsequently sought a gradual reduction in the influence of these two States over the DRC’s political, military and eco¬nomic spheres. It was, according to the DRC, this “new policy of inde¬pendence and emancipation” from the two States that constituted the real reason for the invasion of Congolese territory by Ugandan armed forces in August 1998.
30.    The DRC maintains that at the end of July 1998 President Kabila learned of a planned coup d’etat organized by the Chief of Staff of the FAC, Colonel Kabarebe (a Rwandan national), and that, in an official statement published on 28 July 1998 (see paragraph 49 below), President
Kabila called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese terri¬tory. Although his address referred mainly to Rwandan troops, the DRC argues that there can be no doubt that President Kabila intended to address his message to “all foreign forces”. The DRC states that on 2 August 1998 the 10th Brigade assigned to the province of North Kivu rebelled against the central Government of the DRC, and that during the night of 2 to 3 August 1998 Congolese Tutsi soldiers and a few Rwandan soldiers not yet repatriated attempted to overthrow President Kabila. According to the DRC, Uganda began its military intervention in the DRC immediately after the failure of the coup attempt.
31.    The DRC argues that on 4 August 1998 Uganda and Rwanda organized an airborne operation, flying their troops from Goma on the eastern frontier of the DRC to Kitona, some 1,800 km away on the other side of the DRC, on the Atlantic coast. The DRC alleges that the aim was to overthrow President Kabila within ten days. According to the DRC, in the advance towards Kinshasa, Ugandan and Rwandan troops captured certain towns and occupied the Inga Dam, which supplies elec¬tricity to Kinshasa. The DRC explains that Angola and Zimbabwe came to the assistance of the Congolese Government to help prevent the cap¬ture of Kinshasa. The DRC also states that in the north-eastern part of the country, within a matter of months, UPDF troops had advanced and had progressively occupied a substantial part of Congolese territory in several provinces.
32.    The DRC submits that Uganda’s military operation against the DRC also consisted in the provision of support to Congolese armed groups opposed to President Kabila’s Government. The DRC thus main¬tains that the RCD was created by Uganda and Rwanda on 12 August 1998, and that at the end of September 1998 Uganda supported the cre¬ation of the new MLC rebel group, which was not linked to the Rwandan military. According to the DRC, Uganda was closely involved in the recruitment, education, training, equipment and supplying of the MLC and its military wing, the ALC. The DRC alleges that the close links between Uganda and the MLC were reflected in the formation of a united military front in combat operations against the FAC. The DRC maintains that in a number of cases the UPDF provided tactical support, including artillery cover, for ALC troops. Thus, the DRC contends that the UPDF and the ALC constantly acted in close co-operation during many battles against the Congolese regular army. The DRC concludes that Uganda, “in addition to providing decisive military support for sev¬eral Congolese rebel movements, has been extremely active in supplying these movements with a political and diplomatic framework”.
33. The DRC notes that the events in its territory were viewed with grave concern by the international community. The DRC claims that at the Victoria Falls Summit, which took place on 7 and 8 August 1998, and was attended by representatives of the DRC, Uganda, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe,
“member countries of the SADC [Southern African Development Community], following the submission of an application by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, unequivocally condemned the aggression suffered by the Congo and the occupation of certain parts of its national territory”.
The DRC further points out that, in an attempt to help resolve the con¬flict, the SADC, the States of East Africa and the Organization of Afri¬can Unity (OAU) initiated various diplomatic efforts, which included a series of meetings between the belligerents and the representatives of various African States, also known as the “Lusaka Process”. On 18 April 1999 the Sirte Peace Agreement was concluded, in the framework of the Lusaka peace process, between President Kabila of the DRC and Presi¬dent Museveni of Uganda. The DRC explains that, under this Agree¬ment, Uganda undertook to “cease hostilities immediately” and to with¬draw its troops from the territory of the DRC. The Lusaka Agreement was signed by the Heads of State of the DRC, Uganda and other African States (namely, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda and Zimbabwe) on 10 July 1999 and by the MLC and RCD (rebel groups) on 1 August 1999 and 31 August 1999, respectively. The DRC explains that this Agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities between the parties’ forces, the disengagement of these forces, the deployment of OAU verifiers and of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter “MONUC”), to be followed by the withdrawal of foreign forces. On 8 April 2000 and 6 December 2000 Uganda signed troop disengagement agreements known as the Kampala plan and the Harare plan.
34.    According to the DRC, following the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from its territory in June 2003, Uganda has continued to provide arms to ethnic groups confronting one another in the Ituri region, on the boundary with Uganda. The DRC further argues that Uganda “has left behind it a fine network of warlords, whom it is still supplying with arms and who themselves continue to plunder the wealth of the DRC on behalf of Ugandan and foreign businessmen”.
35.    Uganda, for its part, claims that from early 1994 through to approximately May 1997 the Congolese authorities provided military and logistical support to anti-Ugandan insurgents. Uganda asserts that from the beginning of this period it was the victim of cross-border attacks from these armed rebels in eastern Congo. It claims that, in response to these attacks, until late 1997 it confined its actions to its own side of the
Congo-Uganda border, by reinforcing its military positions along the frontier.
36.    According to Uganda, in 1997 the AFDL, made up of a loose alli¬ance of the combined forces of the various Congolese rebel groups, together with the Rwandan army, overthrew President Mobutu’s regime in Zaire. Uganda asserts that upon assuming power on 29 May 1997, President Kabila invited Uganda to deploy its own troops in eastern Congo in view of the fact that the Congolese army did not have the resources to control the remote eastern provinces, and in order to “elimi¬nate” the anti-Ugandan insurgents operating in that zone and to secure the border region. According to Uganda, it was on this understanding that Ugandan troops crossed into eastern Congo and established bases on Congolese territory. Uganda further alleges that in December 1997, at President Kabila’s further invitation, Uganda sent two UPDF battalions into eastern Congo, followed by a third one in April 1998, also at the invitation of the Congolese President. Uganda states that on 27 April 1998 the Protocol on Security along the Common Border was signed by the two Governments in order to reaffirm the invitation of the DRC to Uganda to deploy its troops in eastern Congo as well as to commit the armed forces of both countries to jointly combat the anti-Ugandan insur¬gents in Congolese territory and secure the border region. Uganda main¬tains that three Ugandan battalions were accordingly stationed in the border region of the Ruwenzori Mountains within the DRC.
37.    However, Uganda claims that between May and July 1998 Presi¬dent Kabila broke off his alliances with Rwanda and Uganda and estab¬lished new alliances with Chad, the Sudan and various anti-Ugandan insurgent groups.
With regard to the official statement by President Kabila published on 28 July 1998 calling for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congo¬lese territory, Uganda interprets this statement as not affecting Uganda, arguing that it made no mention of the Ugandan armed forces that were then in the DRC pursuant to President Kabila’s earlier invitation and to the Protocol of 27 April 1998.
38.    Uganda affirms that it had no involvement in or foreknowledge of the FAC rebellion that occurred in eastern Congo on 2 August 1998 nor of the attempted coup d’etat against President Kabila on the night of 2-3 August 1998. Uganda likewise denies that it participated in the attack on the Kitona military base. According to Uganda, on 4 August 1998 there were no Ugandan troops present in either Goma or Kitona, or on board the planes referred to by the DRC.
39.    Uganda further claims that it did not send additional troops into the DRC during August 1998. Uganda states, however, that by August- September 1998, as the DRC and the Sudan prepared to attack Ugandan forces in eastern Congo, its security situation had become untenable. Uganda submits that “[i]n response to this grave threat, and in the lawful exercise of its sovereign right of self-defence”, it made a decision on 11 September 1998 to augment its forces in eastern Congo and to gain control of the strategic airfields and river ports in northern and eastern Congo in order to stop the combined forces of the Congolese and Suda¬nese armies as well as the anti-Ugandan insurgent groups from reaching Uganda’s borders. According to Uganda, the military operations to take control of these key positions began on 20 September 1998. Uganda states that by February 1999 Ugandan forces succeeded in occupying all the key airfields and river ports that served as gateways to eastern Congo and the Ugandan border. Uganda maintains that on 3 July 1999 its forces gained control of the airport at Gbadolite and drove all Sudanese forces out of the DRC.
40.    Uganda notes that on 10 July 1999 the on-going regional peace process led to the signing of a peace agreement in Lusaka by the Heads of State of Uganda, the DRC, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, followed by the Kampala (8 April 2000) and Harare (6 December 2000) Disengagement Plans. Uganda points out that, although no immediate or unilateral withdrawal was called for, it began withdrawing five battalions from the DRC on 22 June 2000. On 20 February 2001 Uganda announced that it would withdraw two more battalions from the DRC. On 6 Sep¬tember 2002 Uganda and the DRC concluded a peace agreement in Luanda (Agreement between the Governments of the Democratic Repub¬lic of the Congo and the Republic of Uganda on Withdrawal of Ugandan Troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Co-operation and Normalisation of Relations between the two Countries, hereinafter “the Luanda Agreement”). Under its terms Uganda agreed to withdraw from the DRC all Ugandan troops, except for those expressly authorized by the DRC to remain on the slopes of Mt. Ruwenzori. Uganda claims that, in fulfilment of its obligations under the Luanda Agreement, it com-pleted the withdrawal of all of its troops from the DRC in June 2003. Uganda asserts that “[s]ince that time, not a single Ugandan soldier has been deployed inside the Congo”.
41.    As for the support for irregular forces operating in the DRC, Uganda states that it has never denied providing political and military assistance to the MLC and the RCD. However, Uganda asserts that it did not participate in the formation of the MLC and the RCD.
“[I]t was only after the rebellion had broken out and after the RCD had been created that Uganda began to interact with the RCD, and, even then, Uganda’s relationship with the RCD was strictly political until after the middle of September 1998.” (Emphasis in the original.)
According to Uganda, its military support for the MLC and for the RCD began in January 1999 and March 1999 respectively. Moreover, Uganda argues that the nature and extent of its military support for the Congo¬lese rebels was consistent with and limited to the requirements of self- defence. Uganda further states that it refrained from providing the rebels with the kind or amount of support they would have required to achieve such far-reaching purposes as the conquest of territory or the overthrow of the Congolese Government.
ISSUE OF CONSENT
42.    The Court now turns to the various issues connected with the first submission of the DRC.
43.    In response to the DRC’s allegations of military and paramilitary activities amounting to aggression, Uganda states that from May 1997 (when President Laurent-Desire Kabila assumed power in Kinshasa) until 11 September 1998 (the date on which Uganda states that it decided to respond on the basis of self-defence) it was present in the DRC with the latter’s consent. It asserts that the DRC’s consent to the presence of Ugandan forces was renewed in July 1999 by virtue of the terms of the Lusaka Agreement and extended thereafter. Uganda defends its military actions in the intervening period of 11 September 1998 to 10 July 1999 as lawful self-defence. The Court will examine each of Uganda’s arguments in turn.
44.    In a written answer to the question put to it by Judge Vereshchetin (see paragraph 22 above), the DRC clarified that its claims relate to actions by Uganda beginning in August 1998. However, as the Parties do not agree on the characterization of events in that month, the Court deems it appropriate first to analyse events which occurred a few months earlier, and the rules of international law applicable to them.
45.    Relations between Laurent-Desire Kabila and the Ugandan Gov¬ernment had been close, and with the coming to power of the former there was a common interest in controlling anti-government rebels who were active along the Congo-Uganda border, carrying out in particular cross-border attacks against Uganda. It seems certain that from mid- 1997 and during the first part of 1998 Uganda was being allowed to engage in military action against anti-Ugandan rebels in the eastern part of Congolese territory. Uganda claims that its troops had been invited into eastern Congo by President Kabila when he came to power in May 1997. The DRC has acknowledged that “Ugandan troops were present on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the con¬sent of the country’s lawful government”. It is clear from the materials put before the Court that in the period preceding August 1998 the DRC did not object to Uganda’s military presence and activities in its eastern border area. The written pleadings of the DRC make reference to author¬ized Ugandan operations from September 1997 onwards. There is refer¬ence to such authorized action by Uganda on 19 December 1997, in early February 1998 and again in early July 1998, when the DRC author¬ized the transfer of Ugandan units to Ntabi, in Congolese territory, in order to fight more effectively against the ADF.
46.    A series of bilateral meetings between the two Governments took place in Kinshasa from 11 to 13 August 1997, in Kampala from 6 to 7 April 1998 and again in Kinshasa from 24 to 27 April 1998. This last meeting culminated in a Protocol on Security along the Common Border being signed on 27 April 1998 between the two countries, making refer¬ence, inter alia, to the desire “to put an end to the existence of the rebel groups operating on either side of the common border, namely in the Ruwenzori”. The two parties agreed that their respective armies would “co-operate in order to insure security and peace along the common border”. The DRC contends that these words do not constitute an “invi¬tation or acceptance by either of the contracting parties to send its army into the other’s territory”. The Court believes that both the absence of any objection to the presence of Ugandan troops in the DRC in the pre-ceding months, and the practice subsequent to the signing of the Proto¬col, support the view that the continued presence as before of Ugandan troops would be permitted by the DRC by virtue of the Protocol. Uganda told the Court that
“[p]ursuant to the Protocol, Uganda sent a third battalion into eastern Congo, which brought her troop level up to approximately 2,000, and she continued military operations against the armed groups in the region both unilaterally and jointly with Congolese Government forces”.
The DRC has not denied this fact nor that its authorities accepted this situation.
47.    While the co-operation envisaged in the Protocol may be reason¬ably understood as having its effect in a continued authorization of Ugandan troops in the border area, it was not the legal basis for such authorization or consent. The source of an authorization or consent to the crossing of the border by these troops antedated the Protocol and this prior authorization or consent could thus be withdrawn at any time by the Government of the DRC, without further formalities being necessary.
48. The Court observes that when President Kabila came to power, the influence of Uganda and in particular Rwanda in the DRC became substantial. In this context it is worthy of note that many Rwandan offic¬ers held positions of high rank in the Congolese army and that Colonel James Kabarebe, of Rwandan nationality, was the Chief of Staff of the FAC (the armed forces of the DRC). From late spring 1998, President Kabila sought, for various reasons, to reduce this foreign influence; by mid-1998, relations between President Kabila and his former allies had deteriorated. In light of these circumstances the presence of Rwandan troops on Congolese territory had in particular become a major concern for the Government of the DRC.
49.    On 28 July 1998, an official statement by President Kabila was published, which read as follows:
“The Supreme Commander of the Congolese National Armed Forces, the Head of State of the Republic of the Congo and the Minister of National Defence, advises the Congolese people that he has just terminated, with effect from this Monday 27 July 1998, the Rwandan military presence which has assisted us during the period of the country’s liberation. Through these military forces, he would like to thank all of the Rwandan people for the solidarity they have demonstrated to date. He would also like to congratulate the demo¬cratic Congolese people on their generosity of spirit for having tolerated, provided shelter for and trained these friendly forces during their stay in our country. This marks the end of the presence of all foreign military forces in the Congo.” [Translation by the Registry.] 50.    The DRC has contended that, although there was no specific reference to Ugandan troops in the statement, the final phrase indicated that consent was withdrawn for Ugandan as well as Rwandan troops. It states that, having learned of a plotted coup, President Kabila “officially announced . . . the end of military co-operation with Rwanda and asked the Rwandan military to return to their own country, adding that this marked the end of the presence of foreign troops in the Congo”. The DRC further explains that Ugandan forces were not mentioned because they were “very few in number in the Congo” and were not to be treated in the same way as the Rwandan forces, “who in the prevailing circum¬stances, were perceived as enemies suspected of seeking to overthrow the regime”. Uganda, for its part, maintains that the President’s statement was directed at Rwandan forces alone; that the final phrase of the state¬ment was not tantamount to the inclusion of a reference to Ugandan troops; and that any withdrawal of consent for the presence of Ugandan troops would have required a formal denunciation, by the DRC, of the April 1998 Protocol.
51.    The Court notes, first, that for reasons given above, no particular formalities would have been required for the DRC to withdraw its con¬sent to the presence of Ugandan troops on its soil. As to the content of President Kabila’s statement, the Court observes that, as a purely textual matter, the statement was ambiguous.
52.    More pertinently, the Court draws attention to the fact that the consent that had been given to Uganda to place its forces in the DRC, and to engage in military operations, was not an open-ended consent. The DRC accepted that Uganda could act, or assist in acting, against rebels on the eastern border and in particular to stop them operating across the common border. Even had consent to the Ugandan military presence extended much beyond the end of July 1998, the parameters of that consent, in terms of geographic location and objectives, would have remained thus restricted.
53.    In the event, the issue of withdrawal of consent by the DRC, and that of expansion by Uganda of the scope and nature of its activities, went hand in hand. The Court observes that at the Victoria Falls Summit (see paragraph 33 above) the DRC accused Rwanda and Uganda of invading its territory. Thus, it appears evident to the Court that, what¬ever interpretation may be given to President Kabila’s statement of 28 July 1998, any earlier consent by the DRC to the presence of Ugandan troops on its territory had at the latest been withdrawn by 8 August 1998, i.e. the closing date of the Victoria Falls Summit.
54.    The Court recalls that, independent of the conflicting views as to when Congolese consent to the presence of Ugandan troops might have been withdrawn, the DRC has informed the Court that its claims against Uganda begin with what it terms an aggression commencing on 2 August 1998.
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCERNING UGANDA’S USE OF FORCE IN RESPECT OF KITONA
55.    The Court observes that the dispute about the commencement date of the military action by Uganda that was not covered by consent is, in the most part, directed at the legal characterization of events rather than at whether these events occurred. In some instances, however, Uganda denies that its troops were ever present at particular locations, the military action at Kitona being an important example. The DRC has informed the Court that from 2 August 1998 Uganda was involved in military activities in the DRC that violated international law, and that these were directed at the overthrow of President Kabila. According to the DRC, Ugandan forces (together with those of Rwanda) were involved on 4 August in heavy military action at Kitona, which lies in the west of the DRC some 1,800 km from the Ugandan frontier. Virtually simulta¬neously Uganda engaged in military action in the east, first in Kivu and then in Orientale province. The DRC contends that this was followed by an invasion of Equateur province in north-west Congo. The DRC main¬tains that “[a]fter a few months of advances, the Ugandan army had thus conquered several hundred thousand square kilometres of territory”. The DRC provided a sketch-map to illustrate the alleged scope and reach of Ugandan military activity.
56.    Uganda characterizes the situation at the beginning of August 1998 as that of a state of civil war in the DRC — a situation in which President Kabila had turned to neighbouring Powers for assistance, including, notably, the Sudan (see paragraphs 120-129 below). These events caused great security concerns to Uganda. Uganda regarded the Sudan as a long-time enemy, which now, as a result of the invitation from President Kabila, had a free rein to act against Uganda and was better placed strategically to do so. Uganda strongly denies that it engaged in military activity beyond the eastern border area until 11 Sep¬tember. That military activity by its troops occurred in the east dur¬ing August is not denied by Uganda. But it insists that it was not part of a plan agreed with Rwanda to overthrow President Kabila: it was rather actions taken by virtue of the consent given by the DRC to the opera¬tions by Uganda in the east, along their common border.
57.    In accordance with its practice, the Court will first make its own determination of the facts and then apply the relevant rules of interna¬tional law to the facts which it has found to have existed. The Court will not attempt a determination of the overall factual situation as it applied to the vast territory of the DRC from August 1998 till July 2003. It will make such findings of fact as are necessary for it to be able to respond to the first submission of the DRC, the defences offered by Uganda, and the first submissions of Uganda as regards its counter-claims. It is not the task of the Court to make findings of fact (even if it were in a position to do so) beyond these parameters.
58.    These findings of fact necessarily entail an assessment of the evi¬dence. The Court has in this case been presented with a vast amount of materials proffered by the Parties in support of their versions of the facts. The Court has not only the task of deciding which of those materials must be considered relevant, but also the duty to determine which of them have probative value with regard to the alleged facts. The greater part of these evidentiary materials appear in the annexes of the Parties to their written pleadings. The Parties were also authorized by the Court to produce new documents at a later stage. In the event, these contained important items. There has also been reference, in both the written and the oral pleadings, to material not annexed to the written pleadings but which the Court has treated as “part of a publication readily available” under Article 56, paragraph 4, of its Rules of Court. Those, too, have been examined by the Court for purposes of its determination of the rele¬vant facts.
59.    As it has done in the past, the Court will examine the facts relevant to each of the component elements of the claims advanced by the Parties. In so doing, it will identify the documents relied on and make its own clear assessment of their weight, reliability and value. In accordance with its prior practice, the Court will explain what items it should eliminate from further consideration (see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 50, para. 85; see equally the practice followed in the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3).
60. Both Parties have presented the Court with a vast amount of docu¬mentation. The documents advanced in supporting findings of fact in the present case include, inter alia, resolutions of the United Nations Secu¬rity Council, reports of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, reports and briefings of the OAU, communiques by Heads of State, letters of the Parties to the Security Council, reports of the Secretary-General on MONUC, reports of the United Nations Panels of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter “United Nations Panel reports”), the White Paper prepared by the Congolese Ministry of Human Rights, the Porter Commission Report, the Ugandan White Paper on the Porter Commission Report, books, reports by non-governmental organizations and press reports.
61. The Court will treat with caution evidentiary materials specially prepared for this case and also materials emanating from a single source. It will prefer contemporaneous evidence from persons with direct know¬ledge. It will give particular attention to reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct unfavourable to the State represented by the person making them (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nica¬ragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 41. para. 64). The Court will also give weight to evidence that has not, even before this litigation, been challenged by impartial persons for the correctness of what it contains. The Court moreover notes that evidence obtained by examination of persons directly involved, and who were subsequently cross-examined by judges skilled in examination and experienced in assessing large amounts of factual infor¬mation, some of it of a technical nature, merits special attention. The Court thus will give appropriate consideration to the Report of the Porter Commission, which gathered evidence in this manner. The Court further notes that, since its publication, there has been no challenge to the credibility of this Report, which has been accepted by both Parties.
62. The Court will embark upon its task by determining whether it has indeed been proved to its satisfaction that Uganda invaded the DRC in early August 1998 and took part in the Kitona airborne operation on 4 August 1998. In the Memorial the DRC claimed that on 4 August 1998 three Boeing aircraft from Congo Airlines and Blue Airlines, and a Con¬golese plane from Lignes Aeriennes Congolaises (LAC), were boarded by armed forces from “aggressor countries”, including Uganda, as they were about to leave Goma Airport. It was claimed that, after refuelling and taking on board ammunition in Kigali, they flew to the airbase in Kitona, some 1,800 km from Uganda’s border, where several contingents of foreign soldiers, including Ugandans, landed. It was claimed by the DRC that these forces, among which were Ugandan troops, took Kitona, Boma, Matadi and Inga, which they looted, as well as the Inga Dam. The DRC claimed that the aim of Uganda and Rwanda was to march to Kinshasa and rapidly overthrow President Kabila.
63.    Uganda for its part has denied that its forces participated in the airborne assault launched at Kitona, insisting that at the beginning of August the only UPDF troops in the DRC were the three battalions in Beni and Butembo, present with the consent of the Congolese authorities. In the oral pleadings Uganda stated that it had been invited by Rwanda to join forces with it in displacing President Kabila, but had declined to do so. No evidence was advanced by either Party in relation to this con-tention. The Court accordingly does not need to address the question of “intention” and will concentrate on the factual evidence, as such.
64.    In its Memorial the DRC relied on “testimonies of Ugandan and other soldiers, who were captured and taken prisoners in their abortive attempt to seize Kinshasa”. No further details were provided, however. No such testimonies were ever produced to the Court, either in the later written pleadings or in the oral pleadings. Certain testimonies by persons of Congolese nationality were produced, however. These include an inter¬view with the Congo airline pilot, in which he refers — in connection with the Kitona airborne operation — to the presence of both Rwandans and Ugandans at Hotel Nyira. The Court notes that this statement was prepared more than three years after the alleged events and some 20 months after the DRC lodged with the Court its Application commen¬cing proceedings. It contains no signature as such, though the pilot says he “signed on the manuscript”. The interview was conducted by the Assist¬ant Legal Adviser at the Service for the Military Detection of Unpatriotic Activities in the DRC. Notwithstanding the DRC’s position that there is nothing in this or other such witness statements to suggest that they were obtained under duress, the setting and context cannot therefore be regarded as conducive to impartiality. The same conclusion has to be reached as regards the interview with Issa Kisaka Kakule, a former rebel. Even in the absence of these deficiencies, the statement of the airline pilot cannot prove the arrival of Ugandan forces and their participation in the military operation in Kitona. The statement of Lieutenant Colonel Viala Mbeang Ilwa was more contemporaneous (15 October 1998) and is of some particular interest, as he was the pilot of the plane said to have been hijacked. In it he asserts that Ugandan officers at the hotel informed him of their plan to topple President Kabila within ten days. There is, how¬ever, no indication of how this statement was provided, or in what circumstances. The same is true of the statement of Commander Mpele- Mpele regarding air traffic allegedly indicating Ugandan participation in the Kitona operation.
65. The Court has been presented with some evidence concerning a Ugandan national, referred to by the DRC as Salim Byaruhanga, said to be a prisoner of war. The record of an interview following the visit of Ugandan Senator Aggrey Awori consists of a translation, unsigned by the translator. Later, the DRC produced for the Court a video, said to verify the meeting between Mr. Awori and Ugandan prisoners. The video shows four men being asked questions by another addressing them in a language of the region. One of these says his name is “Salim Byaru- hanga”. There is, however, no translation provided, nor any information as to the source of this tape. There do exist letters of August 2001 passing between the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Congolese Government on the exchange of Ugandan prisoners, one of whom is named as Salim Byaruhanga. However, the iCRC never refers to this person as a member of the UPDF. Uganda has also furnished the Court with a notarized affidavit of the Chief of Staff of the UPDF saying that there were no Ugandan prisoners of war in the DRC, nor any officer by the name of Salim Byaruhanga. This affidavit is stated to have been prepared in November 2002, in view of the forthcoming case before the International Court of Justice. The Court recalls that it has elsewhere observed that a member of the government of a State engaged in litiga¬tion before this Court — and especially litigation relating to armed con¬flict — “will probably tend to identify himself with the interests of his country” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 43, para. 70). The same may be said of a senior military officer of such a State, and “while in no way impugning the honour or veracity” of such a person, the Court should “treat such evidence with great reserve” (ibid.).
66.    The Court observes that, even if such a person existed and even if he was a prisoner of war, there is nothing in the ICRC letters that refers to his participation (or to the participation of other Ugandan nationals) at Kitona. Equally, the PANA Agency press communique of 17 Septem¬ber 2001 mentions Salim Byaruhanga when referring to the release of four Ugandan soldiers taken prisoner in 1998 and 1999 — but there is no reference to participation in action in Kitona.
67.    The press statements issued by the Democratic Party of Uganda on 14 and 18 September 1998, which refer to Ugandan troops being flown to western Congo from Gala Airport, make no reference to the location of Kitona or to events there on 4 August.
68. Nor can the truth about the Kitona airborne operation be estab¬lished by extracts from a few newspapers, or magazine articles, which rely on a single source (Agence France Presse, 2 September 1998); on an interested source (Integrated Regional Information Networks (herein¬after IRIN)), or give no sources at all (Pierre Barbancey, Regards 41). The Court has explained in an earlier case that press information may be useful as evidence when it is “wholly consistent and concordant as to the main facts and circumstances of the case” (United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 10, para. 13), but that particular caution should be shown in this area. The Court observes that this requirement of consistency and concordance is not present in the journalistic accounts. For example, while Professor Weiss referred to 150 Ugandan troops under the command of the Rwandan Colonel Kaberebe at Kitona in an article relating to the events in the DRC, the Belgian journalist Mrs. Braekman wrote about rebels fleeing a Ugandan battalion of several hundred men.
69. The Court cannot give weight to claims made by the DRC that a Ugandan tank was used in the Kitona operation. It would seem that a tank of the type claimed to be “Ugandan” was captured at Kasangulu. This type of tank a — T-55 — was in fact one used also by the DRC itself and by Rwanda. The DRC does not clarify in its argument whether a single tank was transported from Uganda, nor does it specify, with sup¬porting evidence, on which of the planes mentioned (a Boeing 727, Ilyushin 76, Boeing 707 or Antonov 32) it was transported from Uganda. The reference by the DRC to the picture of Mr. Bemba, the leader of the MLC, on a tank of this type in his book Le choix de la liberte, published in 2001, cannot prove its use by Ugandan forces in Kitona. Indeed, the Court finds it more pertinent that in his book Mr. Bemba makes no mention of the involvement of Ugandan troops at Kitona, but rather confirms that Rwanda took control of the military base in Kitona.
70. The Court has also noted that contemporaneous documentation clearly indicated that at the time the DRC regarded the Kitona operation as having been carried out by Rwanda. Thus the White Paper annexed to the Application of the DRC states that between 600 and 800 Rwandan soldiers were involved in the Kitona operation on 4 August. The letter sent by the Permanent Representative of the DRC on 2 September 1998 to the President of the Security Council referred to 800 soldiers from Rwanda being involved in the Kitona operation on 4 August 1998. This perception seems to be confirmed by the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in February 1999, where reference is made to Rwandan troops arriving in Kitona on 4 August in order to attack Kinshasa. The press conference given at United Nations Head¬quarters in New York by the Permanent Representative of the DRC to the United Nations on 13 August 1998 only referred to Rwandan soldiers conducting the Kitona airborne operation on 4 August, and to Ugandan troops advancing upon Bunia on 9 August.
71.    The Court thus concludes that, on the basis of the evidence before it, it has not been established to its satisfaction that Uganda participated in the attack on Kitona on 4 August 1998.
FINDINGS OF FACT: MILITARY ACTION IN THE EAST OF THE DRC AND IN OTHER AREAS OF THAT COUNTRY
72.    The Court will next analyse the claim made by the DRC of mili¬tary action by Uganda in the east of the DRC during August 1998. The facts regarding this action are relatively little contested between the Parties. Their dispute is as to how these facts should be characterized. The Court must first establish which relevant facts it regards as having been convincingly established by the evidence, and which thus fall for scrutiny by reference to the applicable rules of international law.
73.    The Court finds it convenient at this juncture to explain that its determination of the facts as to the Ugandan presence at, and taking of, certain locations is independent of the sketch-map evidence offered by the Parties in support of their claims in this regard. In the response given by the DRC to the question of Judge Kooijmans, reference was made to the sketch-map provided by the DRC (see paragraph 55 above) to con¬firm the scope of the Ugandan “invasion and occupation”. This sketch- map is based on a map of approximate deployment of forces in the DRC contained in a Report (Africa Report No. 26) prepared by International Crisis Group (hereinafter ICG), an independent, non-governmental body, whose reports are based on information and assessment from the field. On the ICG map, forces of the MLC and Uganda are shown to be “deployed” in certain positions to the north-west (Gbadolite, Zongo, Gemena, Bondo, Buta, Bumba, Lisala, Bomongo, Basankusu, and Mbandaka); and Ugandan and “RCD-Wamba” (officially known as RCD-Kisangani) forces are shown as “deployed” on the eastern frontier at Bunia, Beni and Isiro. The presence of Uganda and RCD-Wamba forces is shown at two further unspecified locations.
74.    As to the sketch-maps which Uganda provided at the request of Judge Kooijmans, the DRC argues that they are too late to be relied on and were unilaterally prepared without any reference to independent source materials.
75. In the view of the Court, these maps lack the authority and credibility, tested against other evidence, that is required for the Court to place reliance on them. They are at best an aid to the understanding of what is contended by the Parties. These sketch-maps necessarily lack pre¬cision. With reference to the ICG map (see paragraph 73 above), there is also the issue of whether MLC forces deployed in the north-west may, without yet further findings of fact and law, be treated as “Ugandan” forces for purposes of the DRC’s claim of invasion and occupation. The same is true for the RCD-Wamba forces deployed in the north-east.
76.    Uganda has stated, in its response to the question put to it during the oral proceedings by Judge Kooijmans (see paragraph 22 above), that as of 1 August 1998
“there were three battalions of UPDF troops — not exceeding 2,000 soldiers — in the eastern border areas of the DRC, particularly in the northern part of North Kivu Province (around Beni and Butembo) and the southern part of Orientale Province (around Bunia)”.
Uganda states that it “modestly augmented the UPDF presence in the Eastern border” in response to various events. It has informed the Court that a UPDF battalion went into Bunia on 13 August, and that a single battalion had been sent to Watsa “to maintain the situation between Bunia and the DRC’s border with Sudan”. Uganda further states in its response to Judge Kooijmans’ question that by the end of August 1998 there were no Ugandan forces present in South Kivu, Maniema or Kasai Oriental province; “nor were Ugandan forces present in North Kivu Province south of the vicinity of Butembo”.
77.    The DRC has indicated that Beni and Butembo were taken by Ugandan troops on 6 August 1998, Bunia on 13 August and Watsa on 25 August.
78.    The Court finds that most evidence of events in this period is indi¬rect and less reliable than that which emerges from statements made under oath before the Porter Commission. The Court has already noted that statements “emanating from high-ranking official political figures, sometimes indeed of the highest rank, are of particular probative value when they acknowledge facts or conduct unfavourable to the State rep¬resented by the person who made them” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 41, para. 64). The Court believes the same to be the case when such statements against interest are made by senior military officers given the objective circum¬stances in which those statements were taken. Accordingly, the Court finds it relevant that before the Porter Commission, Brigadier General Kazini, who was commander of the Ugandan forces in the DRC, referred
to “the capture of Beni, that was on 7 August 1998”.
79.    He also referred to 8 August 1998 as the date of capture of Beni, 7 August being the date “that was the fighting (when it took place) and our troops occupied Beni”. The Court is satisfied that Beni was taken on 7 August, and Bunia on 13 August. There is some small uncertainty about the precise date of the taking of Watsa, though none as to the fact of its being taken in this period. A report by Lieutenant Colonel Waswa (Annexure G, Porter Commission Report) asserts that the “7[th] infantry B[attalio]n operational force” entered the DRC at Aru on 10 August, leaving there on 14 August, and “went to Watsa via Duruba 250 km away from the Uganda-Congo border. The force spent one day at Duruba, i.e., 23 August 1998 and proceeded to Watsa which is 40 km where we arrived on 24 August 1998.” Twenty days were said by him to have been spent at Watsa, where the airport was secured. Notwithstanding that this report was dated 18 May 2001, the Court notes that it is detailed, specific and falls within the rubric of admission against interest to which the Court will give weight. However, Justice Porter refers to 29 August as the relevant date for Watsa; whereas, in its response to the question of Judge Kooijmans, the DRC gives the date of 25 August for the “prise de Watsa” (taking of Watsa).
80.    The Court will now consider the events of September 1998 on the basis of the evidence before it. Uganda acknowledges that it sent part of a battalion to Kisangani Airport, to guard that facility, on 1 September 1998. It has been amply demonstrated that on several later occasions, notably in August 1999 and in May and June 2000, Uganda engaged in large-scale fighting in Kisangani against Rwandan forces, which were also present there.
81.    The Court notes that a schedule was given by the Ugandan mili¬tary to the Porter Commission containing a composite listing of locations and corresponding “dates of capture”. The Court observes that the period it covers stops short of the period covered by the DRC’s claims. This evidence was put before the Court by Uganda. It includes references to locations not mentioned by the DRC, whose list, contained in the response to Judge Kooijmans’s question, is limited to places said to have been “taken”. The Court simply observes that Ugandan evidence before the Porter Commission in relation to the month of September 1998 refers to Kisangani (1 September); Munubele (17 September); Bengamisa (18 September); Banalia (19 September); Isiro (20 September); Faladje (23 September); and Tele Bridge (29 September). Kisangani (1 Septem¬ber) and Isiro (20 September) are acknowledged by Uganda as having been “taken” by its forces (and not just as locations passed through).
82.    As for the events of October 1998, Uganda has confirmed that it was at Buta on 3 October and Aketi on 6 October. The DRC lists the taking of Aketi as 8 November (response to the question put by Judge Kooijmans), but the Court sees no reason for this date to be preferred.
Both Parties agree that Buta was taken on 3 October and Dulia on 27 October. The Porter Commission was informed that Ugandan troops were present at Bafwasende on 12 October.
83.    The DRC has alleged that Kindu was taken by Ugandan troops on 20 October 1998; this was denied in some detail by Uganda in its Rejoinder. No response was made in the oral pleadings by the DRC to the reasons given by Uganda for denying it had taken Kindu. Nor is Kindu in the listing given by the Ugandan military authorities to the Porter Commission. The Court does not feel it has convincing evidence as to Kindu having been taken by Ugandan forces in October 1998.
84.    There is agreement between the Parties that Bumba was taken on 17 November 1998.
85.    Uganda claims that Lisala was taken on 12 December 1998. The list contained in the Porter Commission exhibits makes reference to the location of Benda, with the date of 13 December. Also listed are Titure (20 December) and Poko (22 December). Uganda insists it “came to” Businga on 28 December 1998 and not in early February 1999 as claimed by the DRC; and to Gemena on 25 December 1998, and not on 10 July 1999 as also claimed by the DRC.
These discrepancies do not favour the case of Uganda and the Court accepts the earlier dates claimed by Uganda.
86.    The DRC claims that Ango was taken on 5 January 1999, and this is agreed by Uganda. There also appears in the Ugandan “location/dates of capture” list, Lino-Mbambi (2 January 1999) and Lino (same date), Akula Port (4 February); Kuna (1 March); Ngai (4 March); Bonzanga (19 March); Pumtsi (31 March); Bondo (28 April); Katete (28 April); Baso Adia (17 May); Ndanga (17 May); Bongandanga (22 May); Wapinda (23 May); Kalawa Junchai (28 May); Bosobata (30 May); Boso- bolo (9 June); Abuzi (17 June); Nduu (22 June); Pimu Bridge (27 June); Busingaloko Bridge (28 June); Yakoma (30 June); and Bogbonga (30 June). All of these appear to be locations which Ugandan forces were rapidly traversing. The sole place claimed by the DRC to have been “taken” in this period was Mobeka — a precise date for which is given by Uganda (30 June 1999).
87.    The DRC claims Gbadolite to have been taken on 3 July 1999 and that fact is agreed by Uganda. The Ugandan list refers also to Mowaka (1 July); Ebonga (2 July); Pambwa Junction (2 July); Bosomera (3 July); Djombo (4 July); Bokota (4 July); Bolomudanda Junction (4 July); the crossing of Yakoma Bridge (4 July); Mabaye (4 July); Businga (7 July); Katakoli (8 July); Libenge (29 July); Zongo (30 July); and Makanza (31 July).
88.    The DRC also claims Bongandanga and Basankusu (two locations in the extreme south of Equateur province) to have been taken on 30 November 1999; Bomorge, Moboza and Dongo at unspecified dates in February 2000; Inese and Bururu in April 2000; and Mobenzene in June 2000.
89.    There is considerable controversy between the Parties over the DRC’s claim regarding towns taken after 10 July 1999. The Court recalls that on this date the Parties had agreed to a ceasefire and to all the further provisions of the Lusaka Agreement. Uganda has insisted that Gemena was taken in December 1998 and the Court finds this date more plausible. Uganda further states in its observations on the DRC’s response to the question of Judge Kooijmans that “there is no evidence that Ugan¬dan forces were ever in Mobenzene, Bururu, Bomongo, and Moboza at any time”. The Court observes that Uganda’s list before the Porter Com¬mission also makes no reference to Dongo at all during this period.
90.    Uganda limits itself to stating that equally no military offensives were initiated by Uganda at Zongo, Basankusu and Dongo during the post-Lusaka periods; rather, “the MLC, with some limited Ugandan assistance, repulsed [attacks by the FAC in violation of the Lusaka Agreement]”.
91.    The Court makes no findings as to the responsibility of each of the Parties for any violations of the Lusaka Agreement. It confines itself to stating that it has not received convincing evidence that Ugandan forces were present at Mobenzene, Bururu, Bomongo and Moboza in the period under consideration by the Court for purposes of responding to the final submissions of the DRC.
DID THE LUSAKA, KAMPALA AND HARARE AGREEMENTS CONSTITUTE ANY CONSENT OF THE DRC TO THE PRESENCE OF UGANDAN TROOPS?
92.    It is the position of Uganda that its military actions until 11 Sep¬tember 1998 were carried out with the consent of the DRC, that from 11 September 1998 until 10 July 1999 it was acting in self-defence, and that thereafter the presence of its soldiers was again consented to under the Lusaka Agreement.
The Court will first consider whether the Lusaka Agreement, the Kam¬pala and Harare Disengagement Plans and the Luanda Agreement con¬stituted consent to the presence of Ugandan troops on the territory of the DRC.
93.    The Court issued on 29 November 2001 an Order regarding counter-claims contained in the Counter-Memorial of Uganda. The Court found certain of Uganda’s counter-claims to be admissible as such. However, it found Uganda’s third counter-claim, alleging violations by the DRC of the Lusaka Agreement, to be “not directly connected with the subject-matter of the Congo’s claims”. Accordingly, the Court found this counter-claim not admissible under Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court.
94.    It does not follow, however, that the Lusaka Agreement is thereby excluded from all consideration by the Court. Its terms may certainly be examined in the context of responding to Uganda’s contention that, according to its provisions, consent was given by the DRC to the presence of Ugandan troops from the date of its conclusion (10 July 1999) until all the requirements contained therein should have been fulfilled.
95.    The Lusaka Agreement does not refer to “consent”. It confines itself to providing that “[t]he final withdrawal of all foreign forces from the national territory of the DRC shall be carried out in accordance with the Calendar in Annex ‘B’ of this Agreement and a withdrawal schedule to be prepared by the UN, the OAU and the JMC [Joint Military Com¬mission]” (Art. III, para. 12). Under the terms of Annex “B”, the Calen¬dar for the Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement was dependent upon a series of designated “Major Events” which were to follow upon the official signature of the Agreement (“D-Day”). This “Orderly With¬drawal of all Foreign Forces” was to occur on “D-Day plus 180 days”. It was provided that, pending that withdrawal, “[a]ll forces shall remain in the declared and recorded locations” in which they were present at the date of signature of the Agreement (Ann. A, Art. 11.4).
96.    The Court first observes that nothing in the provisions of the Lusaka Agreement can be interpreted as an affirmation that the security interests of Uganda had already required the presence of Ugandan forces on the territory of the DRC as from September 1998, as claimed by Uganda in the oral proceedings.
97.    The Lusaka Agreement is, as Uganda argues, more than a mere ceasefire agreement, in that it lays down various “principles” (Art. III) which cover both the internal situation within the DRC and its relations with its neighbours. The three annexes appended to the Agreement deal with these matters in some considerable detail. The Agreement goes beyond the mere ordering of the parties to cease hostilities; it provides a framework to facilitate the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces to a stable and secure environment. The Court observes that the letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the President of Uganda of 4 May 2001, calling for Uganda to adhere to the agreed timetable for orderly withdrawal, is to be read in that light. It carries no implication as to the Ugandan military presence having been accepted as lawful. The overall provisions of the Lusaka Agreement acknowledge the importance of internal stability in the DRC for all of its neighbours. However, the Court cannot accept the argument made by Uganda in the oral proceed¬ings that the Lusaka Agreement constituted “an acceptance by all parties of Uganda’s justification for sending additional troops into the DRC between mid-September 1998 and mid-July 1999”.
98. A more complex question, on which the Parties took clearly opposed positions, was whether the calendar for withdrawal and its rela¬tionship to the series of “Major Events”, taken together with the refer¬ence to the “D-Day plus 180 days”, constituted consent by the DRC to the presence of Ugandan forces for at least 180 days from 10 July 1999 — and indeed beyond that time if the envisaged necessary “Major Events” did not occur.
99. The Court is of the view that, notwithstanding the special features of the Lusaka Agreement just described, this conclusion cannot be drawn. The Agreement took as its starting point the realities on the ground. Among those realities were the major Ugandan military deployment across vast areas of the DRC and the massive loss of life over the pre¬ceding months. The arrangements made at Lusaka, to progress towards withdrawal of foreign forces and an eventual peace, with security for all concerned, were directed at these factors on the ground and at the reali¬ties of the unstable political and security situation. The provisions of the Lusaka Agreement thus represented an agreed modus operandi for the parties. They stipulated how the parties should move forward. They did not purport to qualify the Ugandan military presence in legal terms. In accepting this modus operandi the DRC did not “consent” to the presence of Ugandan troops. It simply concurred that there should be a process to end that reality in an orderly fashion. The DRC was willing to proceed from the situation on the ground as it existed and in the manner agreed as most likely to secure the result of a withdrawal of foreign troops in a stable environment. But it did not thereby recognize the situation on the ground as legal, either before the Lusaka Agreement or in the period that would pass until the fulfilment of its terms.
100.    In resolution 1234 of 9 April 1999 the Security Council had called for the “immediate signing of a ceasefire agreement” allowing for, inter alia, “the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces”. The Security Council fully appreciated that this withdrawal would entail political and security elements, as shown in paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 1234 (1999). This call was reflected three months later in the Lusaka Agreement. But these arrangements did not preclude the Security Council from continuing to identify Uganda and Rwanda as having violated the sovereignty and ter¬ritorial integrity of the DRC and as being under an obligation to with¬draw their forces “without further delay, in conformity with the timetable of the Ceasefire Agreement” (Security Council resolution 1304, 16 June 2000), i.e., without any delay to the modus operandi provisions agreed upon by the parties.
101.    This conclusion as to the effect of the Lusaka Agreement upon the legality of the presence of Ugandan troops on Congolese territory did not change with the revisions to the timetable that became necessary. The
Kampala Disengagement Plan of 8 April 2000 and the Harare Dis¬engagement Plan of 6 December 2000 provided for new schedules for withdrawal, it having become apparent that the original schedule in the Annex to the Lusaka Agreement was unrealistic. While the status of Ugandan troops remained unchanged, the delay in relation to the D-Day plus 180 days envisaged in the Lusaka Agreement likewise did not change the legal status of the presence of Uganda, all parties having agreed to these delays to the withdrawal calendar.
102.    The Luanda Agreement, a bilateral agreement between the DRC and Uganda on “withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, co-operation and normalisation of relations between the two countries”, alters the terms of the multilateral Lusaka Agreement. The other parties offered no objection.
103.    The withdrawal of Ugandan forces was now to be carried out “in accordance with the Implementation Plan marked Annex “A’ and attached thereto” (Art. 1, para. 1). This envisaged the completion of withdrawal within 100 days after signature, save for the areas of Gbado- lite, Beni and their vicinities, where there was to be an immediate with¬drawal of troops (Art. 1, para. 2). The Parties also agreed that
“the Ugandan troops shall remain on the slopes of Mt. Ruwenzori until the Parties put in place security mechanisms guaranteeing Uganda’s security, including training and co-ordinated patrol of the common border”.
104.    The Court observes that, as with the Lusaka Agreement, none of these elements purport generally to determine that Ugandan forces had been legally present on the territory of the DRC. The Luanda Agreement revised the modus operandi for achieving the withdrawal of Ugandan forces in a stable security situation. It was now agreed — without refer¬ence to whether or not Ugandan forces had been present in the area when the agreement was signed, and to whether any such presence was law¬ful — that their presence on Mount Ruwenzori should be authorized, if need be, after the withdrawal elsewhere had been completed until appro¬priate security mechanisms had been put in place. The Court observes that this reflects the acknowledgment by both Parties of Uganda’s secu¬rity needs in the area, without pronouncing upon the legality of prior Ugandan military actions there or elsewhere.
105.    The Court thus concludes that the various treaties directed to achieving and maintaining a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign forces and the stabilization of relations between the DRC and Uganda did not (save for the limited exception regarding the border region of the Ruwen- zori Mountains contained in the Luanda Agreement) constitute consent by the DRC to the presence of Ugandan troops on its territory for the period after July 1999, in the sense of validating that presence in law.
SELF-DEFENCE IN THE LIGHT OF PROVEN FACTS
106.    The Court has already said that, on the basis of the evidence before it, it has not been established to its satisfaction that Uganda par¬ticipated in the attack on Kitona on 4 August 1998 (see paragraph 71 above). The Court has also indicated that with regard to the presence of Ugandan troops on Congolese territory near to the common border after the end of July 1998, President Kabila’s statement on 28 July 1998 was ambiguous (see paragraph 51 above). The Court has further found that any earlier consent by the DRC to the presence of Ugandan troops on its territory had at the latest been withdrawn by 8 August 1998 (see para¬graph 53 above). The Court now turns to examine whether Uganda’s military activities starting from this date could be justified as actions in self-defence.
107.    The DRC has contended that Uganda invaded on 2 August 1998, beginning with a major airborne operation at Kitona in the west of the DRC, then rapidly capturing or taking towns in the east, and then, con¬tinuing to the north-west of the country. According to the DRC, some of this military action was taken by the UPDF alone or was taken in con¬junction with anti-government rebels and/or with Rwanda. It submits that Uganda was soon in occupation of a third of the DRC and that its forces only left in April 2003.
108.    Uganda insists that 2 August 1998 marked the date only of the beginning of civil war in the DRC and that, although Rwanda had invited it to join in an effort to overthrow President Kabila, it had declined. Uganda contends that it did not act jointly with Rwanda in Kitona and that it had the consent of the DRC for its military operations in the east until the date of 11 September 1998. 11 September was the date of issue of the “Position of the High Command on the Presence of the UPDF in the DRC” (hereinafter “the Ugandan High Command document”) (see paragraph 109 below). Uganda now greatly increased the number of its troops from that date on. Uganda acknowledges that its military operations thereafter can only be justified by reference to an entitlement to act in self-defence.
109.    The Court finds it useful at this point to reproduce in its entirety the Ugandan High Command document. This document has been relied on by both Parties in this case. The High Command document, although mentioning the date of 11 September 1998, in the Court’s view, provides the basis for the operation known as operation “Safe Haven”. The docu¬ment reads as follows:
“WHEREAS for a long time the DRC has been used by the enemies of Uganda as a base and launching pad for attacks against Uganda;
AND
WHEREAS the successive governments of the DRC have not been in effective control of all the territory of the Congo;
AND
WHEREAS in May 1997, on the basis of a mutual understanding the Government of Uganda deployed UPDF to jointly operate with the Congolese Army against Uganda enemy forces in the DRC;
AND
WHEREAS when an anti-Kabila rebellion erupted in the DRC the forces of the UPDF were still operating along side the Congolese Army in the DRC, against Uganda enemy forces who had fled back to the DRC;
NOW THEREFORE the High Command sitting in Kampala this 11th day of September, 1998, resolves to maintain forces of the UPDF in order to secure Uganda’s legitimate security interests which are the following:
To deny the Sudan opportunity to use the territory of the DRC to destabilize Uganda.
To enable UPDF neutralize Uganda dissident groups which have been receiving assistance from the Government of the DRC and the Sudan.
To ensure that the political and administrative vacuum, and instability caused by the fighting between the rebels and the Congolese Army and its allies do not adversely affect the security of Uganda.
To prevent the genocidal elements, namely, the Interahamwe, and ex-FAR, which have been launching attacks on the people of Uganda from the DRC, from continuing to do so.
To be in position to safeguard the territory integrity of Uganda against irresponsible threats of invasion from certain forces.”
110. In turning to its assessment of the legal character of Uganda’s activities at Aru, Beni, Bunia and Watsa in August 1998, the Court begins by observing that, while it is true that those localities are all in close proximity to the border, “as per the consent that had been given previously by President Kabila”, the nature of Ugandan action at these locations was of a different nature from previous operations along the common border. Uganda was not in August 1998 engaging in military operations against rebels who carried out cross-border raids. Rather, it was engaged in military assaults that resulted in the taking of the town of Beni and its airfield between 7 and 8 August, followed by the taking of the town of Bunia and its airport on 13 August, and the town of Watsa and its airport at a date between 24 and 29 August.
111.    The Court finds these actions to be quite outside any mutual understanding between the Parties as to Uganda’s presence on Congolese territory near to the border. The issue of when any consent may have terminated is irrelevant when the actions concerned are so clearly beyond co-operation “in order to ensure peace and security along the common border”, as had been confirmed in the Protocol of 27 April 1998.
112.    The Court observes that the Ugandan operations against these eastern border towns could therefore only be justified, if at all, as actions in self-defence. However, at no time has Uganda sought to justify them on this basis before the Court.
113.    Operation “Safe Haven”, by contrast, was firmly rooted in a claimed entitlement “to secure Uganda’s legitimate security interests” rather than in any claim of consent on the part of the DRC. The Court notes, however, that those most intimately involved in its execution regarded the military actions throughout August 1998 as already part and parcel of operation “Safe Haven”.
114.    Thus Mr. Kavuma, the Minister of State for Defence, informed the Porter Commission that the UPDF troops first crossed the border at the beginning of August 1998, at the time of the rebellion against Presi¬dent Kabila, “when there was confusion inside the DRC” (Porter Com¬mission document CW/01/02 23/07/01, p. 23). He confirmed that this “entry” was “to defend our security interests”. The commander of the Ugandan forces in the DRC, General Kazini, who had immediate control in the field, informing Kampala and receiving thereafter any further orders, was asked “[w]hen was ‘Operation Safe Haven’? When did it commence?” He replied “[i]t was in the month of August. That very month of August 1998. ‘Safe Haven’ started after the capture of Beni, that was on 7 August 1998.” (CW/01/03 24/07/01, p. 774.) General Kazini emphasized that the Beni operation was the watershed: “So before that… ‘Operation Safe Haven’ had not started. It was the normal UPDF opera¬tions — counter-insurgency operations in the Rwenzoris before that date of 7 August, 1998.” (CW/01/03 24/07/01, p. 129.) He spoke of “the earlier plan” being that both Governments, in the form of the UPDF and the FAC, would jointly deal with the rebels along the border. “But now this new phenomenon had developed: there was a mutiny, the rebels were taking control of those areas. So we decided to launch an offensive together with the rebels, a special operation we code-named ‘Safe Haven’.” General Kazini was asked by Justice Porter what was the objec¬tive of this joint offensive with the rebels. General Kazini replied “[t]o crush the bandits together with their FAC allies” and confirmed that by “FAC” he meant the “Congolese Government Army” (CW/01/03 24/07/ 01, p. 129).
115.    It is thus clear to the Court that Uganda itself actually regarded the military events of August 1998 as part and parcel of operation “Safe Haven”, and not as falling within whatever “mutual understandings” there had previously been.
116.    The Court has noted that within a very short space of time Ugan¬dan forces had moved rapidly beyond these border towns. It is agreed by all that by 1 September 1998 the UPDF was at Kisangani, very far from the border. Furthermore, Lieutenant Colonel Magenyi informed the Porter Commission, under examination, that he had entered the DRC on 13 August and stayed there till mid-February 1999. He was based at Isiro, some 580 km from the border. His brigade had fought its way there: “we were fighting the ADFs who were supported by the FAC”.
117.    Accordingly, the Court will make no distinction between the events of August 1998 and those in the ensuing months.
118.    Before this Court Uganda has qualified its action starting from mid-September 1998 as action in self-defence. The Court will thus exam¬ine whether, throughout the period when its forces were rapidly advan¬cing across the DRC, Uganda was entitled to engage in military action in self-defence against the DRC. For these purposes, the Court will not examine whether each individual military action by the UPDF could have been characterized as action in self-defence, unless it can be shown, as a general proposition, that Uganda was entitled to act in self-defence in the DRC in the period from August 1998 till June 2003.
119.    The Court first observes that the objectives of operation “Safe Haven”, as stated in the Ugandan High Command document (see para¬graph 109 above), were not consonant with the concept of self-defence as understood in international law.
120.    Uganda in its response to the question put to it by Judge Kooij- mans (see paragraph 22 above) confirms that the changed policies of President Kabila had meant that co-operation in controlling insurgency in the border areas had been replaced by “stepped-up cross-border attacks against Uganda by the ADF, which was being re-supplied and re-equipped by the Sudan and the DRC Government”. The Court considers that, in order to ascertain whether Uganda was entitled to engage in military action on Congolese territory in self-defence, it is first necessary to exam¬ine the reliability of these claims. It will thus begin by an examination of the evidence concerning the role that the Sudan was playing in the DRC at the relevant time.
121.    Uganda claimed that there was a tripartite conspiracy in 1998 between the DRC, the ADF and the Sudan; that the Sudan provided military assistance to the DRC’s army and to anti-Ugandan rebel groups; that the Sudan used Congo airfields to deliver materiel; that the Sudan airlifted rebels and its own army units around the country; that Sudanese aircraft bombed the UPDF positions at Bunia on 26 August 1998; that a
Sudanese brigade of 2,500 troops was in Gbadolite and was preparing to engage the UPDF forces in eastern Congo; and that the DRC encour¬aged and facilitated stepped-up cross border attacks from May 1998 onwards.
122.    The Court observes, more specifically, that in its Counter-Memo¬rial Uganda claimed that from 1994 to 1997 anti-Ugandan insurgents “received direct support from the Government of Sudan” and that the latter trained and armed insurgent groups, in part to destabilize Uganda’s status as a “good example” in Africa. For this, Uganda relied on a Human Rights Watch (hereinafter HRW) report. The Court notes that this report is on the subject of slavery in the Sudan and does not assist with the issue before the Court. It also relied on a Ugandan political report which simply claimed, without offering supporting evidence, that the Sudan was backing groups launching attacks from the DRC. It further relies on an HRW report of 2000 stating that the Sudan was pro¬viding military and logistical assistance to the LRA, in the north of Uganda, and to the SPLM/A (by which Uganda does not claim to have been attacked). The claims relating to the LRA, which are also contained in the Counter-Memorial of Uganda, have no relevance to the present case. No more relevant is the HRW report of 1998 criticizing the use of child soldiers in northern Uganda.
123.    The Court has next examined the evidence advanced to support the assertion that the Sudan was supporting anti-Ugandan groups which were based in the DRC, namely FUNA, UNRF II and NALU. This con¬sists of a Ugandan political report of 1998 which itself offers no evidence, and an address by President Museveni of 2000. These documents do not constitute probative evidence of the points claimed.
124.    Uganda states that President Kabila entered into an alliance with the Sudan, “which he invited to occupy and utilise airfields in north¬eastern Congo for two purposes: delivering arms and other supplies to the insurgents; and conducting aerial bombardment of Uganda towns and villages”. Only President Museveni’s address to Parliament is relied on. Certain assertions relating to the son of Idi Amin, and the role he was being given in the Congolese military, even were they true, prove nothing as regards the specific allegations concerning the Sudan.
125. Uganda has informed the Court that a visit was made by Presi¬dent Kabila in May 1998 to the Sudan, in order to put at the Sudan’s disposal all the airfields in northern and eastern Congo, and to deliver arms and troops to anti-Ugandan insurgents along Uganda’s border. Uganda offered as evidence President Museveni’s address to Parliament, together with an undated, unsigned internal Ugandan military intelli¬gence document. Claims as to what was agreed as a result of any such meeting that might have taken place remain unproven.
126. Uganda informed the Court that Uganda military intelligence reported that in August 1998 the Sudan airlifted insurgents from the WNBF and LRA to fight alongside Congolese forces against RPA and RCD rebels. The Court observes that, even were that proven (which in the Court’s view is not the case), the DRC was entitled so to have acted. This invitation could not of itself have entitled Uganda to use force in self-defence. The Court has not been able to verify from concordant evi¬dence the claim that the Sudan transported an entire Chadian brigade to Gbadolite (whether to join in attacks on Uganda or otherwise).
127.    The Court further observes that claims that the Sudan was train¬ing and transporting FAC troops, at the request of the Congolese Government, cannot entitle Uganda to use force in self-defence, even were the alleged facts proven. In the event, such proof is not provided by the unsigned Ugandan military intelligence document, nor by a political report that Uganda relies on.
128.    Article 51 of the Charter refers to the right of “individual or col¬lective” self-defence. The Court notes that a State may invite another State to assist it in using force in self-defence. On 2 August 1998 civil war had broken out in the DRC and General Kazini later testified to the Por¬ter Commission that operation “Safe Haven” began on 7-8 August 1998. The Ugandan written pleadings state that on 14 August 1998 Brigadier Khalil of the Sudan delivered three planeloads of weapons to the FAC in Kinshasa, and that the Sudan stepped up its training of FAC troops and airlifted them to different locations in the DRC. Once again, the evidence offered to the Court as to the delivery of the weapons is the undated, unsigned, internal Ugandan military intelligence report. This was accom¬panied by a mere political assertion of Sudanese backing for troops launching attacks on Uganda from the DRC. The evidentiary situation is exactly the same as regards the alleged agreement by President Kabila with the Sudanese Vice-President for joint military measures against Uganda. The same intelligence report, defective as evidence that the Court can rely on, is the sole source for the claims regarding the Suda¬nese bombing with an Antonov aircraft of UPDF positions in Bunia on 26 August 1998; the arrival of the Sudanese brigade in Gbadolite shortly thereafter; the deployment of Sudanese troops, along with those of the DRC, on Uganda’s border on 14 September; and the pledges made on 18 September for the deployment of more Sudanese troops.
129. It was said by Uganda that the DRC had effectively admitted the threat to Uganda’s security posed by the Sudan, following the claimed series of meetings between President Kabila and Sudanese officials in May, August and September 1998. In support of these claims Uganda referred the Court to a 1999 ICG report, “How Kabila Lost His Way”; although not provided in the annexes, this report was in the public domain and the Court has ascertained its terms. Reliance is also placed on a political statement by the Ugandan High Command. The Court observes that this does not constitute reliable evidence and in any event it speaks only of the reason for the mid-September deployment of troops. The Court has also found that it cannot rely as persuasive evidence on a further series of documents said to support these various claims relating to the Sudan, all being internal political documents. The Court has exam¬ined the notarized affidavit of 2002 of the Ugandan Ambassador to the DRC, which refers to documents that allegedly were at the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa, showing that “the Sudanese government was supplying ADF rebels”. While a notarized affidavit is entitled to a certain respect, the Court must observe that it is provided by a party in the case and provides at best indirect “information” that is unverified.
130.    The Court observes that it has not been presented with evidence that can safely be relied on in a court of law to prove that there was an agreement between the DRC and the Sudan to participate in or support military action against Uganda; or that any action by the Sudan (of itself factually uncertain) was of such a character as to justify Uganda’s claim that it was acting in self-defence.
131.    The Court has also examined, in the context of ascertaining whether Uganda could have been said to have acted in self-defence, the evidence for Uganda’s claims that from May 1998 onwards the fre¬quency, intensity and destructiveness of cross-border attacks by the ADF “increased significantly”, and that this was due to support from the DRC and from the Sudan.
132.    The Court is convinced that the evidence does show a series of attacks occurring within the relevant time-frame, namely: an attack on Kichwamba Technical School of 8 June 1998, in which 33 students were killed and 106 abducted; an attack near Kichwamba, in which five were killed; an attack on Benyangule village on 26 June, in which 11 persons were killed or wounded; the abduction of 19 seminarians at Kiburara on 5 July; an attack on Kasese town on 1 August, in which three persons were killed. A sixth attack was claimed at the oral hearings to have occurred at Kijarumba, with 33 fatalities. The Court has not been able to ascertain the facts as to this latter incident.
133. The DRC does not deny that a number of attacks took place, but its position is that the ADF alone was responsible for them. The docu¬ments relied on by Uganda for its entitlement to use force in self-defence against the DRC include a report of the interrogation of a captured ADF rebel, who admits participating in the Kichwamba attack and refers to an “intention” to obtain logistical support and sanctuary from the Congo¬lese Government; this report is not signed by the person making the statement, nor does it implicate the DRC. Uganda also relies on a docu¬ment entitled “Chronological Illustration of Acts of Destabilisation by Sudan and Congo Based Dissidents”, which is a Ugandan military docu¬ment. Further, some articles in newspapers relied on by Uganda in fact blame only the ADF for the attacks. A very few do mention the Sudan. Only some internal documents, namely unsigned witness statements, make any reference to Congolese involvement in these acts.
134. The Court observes that this is also the case as regards the docu¬ments said to show that President Kabila provided covert support to the ADF. These may all be described as internal documents, often with no authenticating features, and containing unsigned, unauthenticated and sometimes illegible witness statements. These do not have the quality or character to satisfy the Court as to the matters claimed.
135. In oral pleadings Uganda again referred to these “stepped up attacks”. Reference was made to an ICG report of August 1998, “North Kivu, into the Quagmire”. Although not provided in the annexes, this report was in the public domain and the Court has ascertained its terms. It speaks of the ADF as being financed by Iran and the Sudan. It further states that the ADF is “[e]xploiting the incapacity of the Congolese Armed Forces” in controlling areas of North Kivu with neighbour Uganda. This independent report does seem to suggest some Sudanese support for the ADF’s activities. It also implies that this was not a matter of Congolese policy, but rather a reflection of its inability to control events along its border.
136. Uganda relies on certain documents annexed by the DRC to its Reply. However, the Court does not find this evidence weighty and con¬vincing. It consists of a bundle of news reports of variable reliability, which go no further than to say that unconfirmed reports had been received that the Sudan was flying military supplies to Juba and Dungu. The Court has therefore not found probative such media reports as the IRIN update for 12 to 14 September 1998, stating that Hutu rebels were being trained in southern Sudan, and the IRIN update for 16 September 1998, stating that “rebels claim Sudan is supporting Kabila at Kindu”.
Neither has the Court relied on the (unreferenced and unsourced) claim that President Kabila made a secret visit to Khartoum on 25 August 1998 nor on the extract from Mr. Bemba’s book Le choix de la liberte stating that 108 Sudanese soldiers were in the DRC, under the command of the Congolese army, to defend the area around Gbadolite.
137.    Nor has the Court been able to satisfy itself as to certain internal military intelligence documents, belatedly offered, which lack explana¬tions as to how the information was obtained (e.g. Revelations of Com¬mander Junju Juma (former commanding officer in the ADF) of 17 May 2000, undated Revelations by Issa Twatera (former commanding officer in the ADF)).
138.    A further “fact” relied on by Uganda in this case as entitling it to act in self-defence is that the DRC incorporated anti-Ugandan rebel groups and Interahamwe militia into the FAC. The Court will examine the evidence and apply the law to its findings.
139.    In its Counter-Memorial, Uganda claimed that President Kabila had incorporated into his army thousands of ex-FAR and Interahamwe genocidaires in May 1998. A United States State Department statement in October 1998 condemned the DRC’s recruitment and training of former perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, thus giving some credence to the reports internal to Uganda that were put before the Court, even though these lacked signatures or particulars of sources relied on. But this claim, even if true, seems to have relevance for Rwanda rather than Uganda.
140.    Uganda in its oral pleadings repeated the claims of incorporation of former Rwandan soldiers and Interahamwe into special units of the Congolese army. No sources were cited, nor was it explained to the Court how this might give rise to a right of self-defence on the part of Uganda.
141.    In the light of this assessment of all the relevant evidence, the Court is now in a position to determine whether the use of force by Uganda within the territory of the DRC could be characterized as self- defence.
142.    Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provides:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and secu¬rity. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self- defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore interna¬tional peace and security.”
143. The Court recalls that Uganda has insisted in this case that operation “Safe Haven” was not a use of force against an anticipated attack. As was the case also in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) case, “reliance is placed by the Parties only on the right of self-defence in the case of an armed attack which has already occurred, and the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack has not been raised” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 103, para. 194). The Court there found that “[accordingly [it] expresses no view on that issue”. So it is in the present case. The Court feels constrained, however, to observe that the wording of the Ugandan High Command document on the position regarding the presence of the UPDF in the DRC makes no reference whatever to armed attacks that have already occurred against Uganda at the hands of the DRC (or indeed by persons for whose action the DRC is claimed to be responsible). Rather, the position of the High Command is that it is necessary “to secure Uganda’s legitimate security interests”. The specified security needs are essentially preventative — to ensure that the political vacuum does not adversely affect Uganda, to prevent attacks from “genocidal elements”, to be in a position to safeguard Uganda from irresponsible threats of invasion, to “deny the Sudan the opportunity to use the territory of the DRC to destabilize Uganda”. Only one of the five listed objectives refers to a response to acts that had already taken place — the neutralization of “Uganda dissident groups which have been receiving assistance from the Government of the DRC and the Sudan”.
144.    While relying heavily on this document, Uganda nonetheless insisted to the Court that after 11 September 1998 the UPDF was acting in self-defence in response to attacks that had occurred. The Court has already found that the military operations of August in Beni, Bunia and Watsa, and of 1 September at Kisangani, cannot be classified as coming within the consent of the DRC, and their legality, too, must stand or fall by reference to self-defence as stated in Article 51 of the Charter.
145.    The Court would first observe that in August and early Septem¬ber 1998 Uganda did not report to the Security Council events that it had regarded as requiring it to act in self-defence.
146.    It is further to be noted that, while Uganda claimed to have acted in self-defence, it did not ever claim that it had been subjected to an armed attack by the armed forces of the DRC. The “armed attacks” to which reference was made came rather from the ADF. The Court has found above (paragraphs 131-135) that there is no satisfactory proof of the involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the Govern¬ment of the DRC. The attacks did not emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC or on behalf of the DRC, within the sense of Article 3 (g) of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the definition of aggression, adopted on 14 December 1974. The Court is of the view that, on the evidence before it, even if this series of deplorable attacks could be regarded as cumulative in character, they still remained non-attributable to the DRC.
147. For all these reasons, the Court finds that the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of a right of self-defence by Uganda against the DRC were not present. Accordingly, the Court has no need to respond to the contentions of the Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of self- defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces. Equally, since the preconditions for the exercise of self-defence do not exist in the circum¬stances of the present case, the Court has no need to enquire whether such an entitlement to self-defence was in fact exercised in circumstances of necessity and in a manner that was proportionate. The Court cannot fail to observe, however, that the taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometres from Uganda’s border would not seem propor¬tionate to the series of transborder attacks it claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence, nor to be necessary to that end.
FINDINGS OF LAW ON THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE
148. The prohibition against the use of force is a cornerstone of the United Nations Charter. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter requires that:
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
Article 51 of the Charter may justify a use of force in self-defence only within the strict confines there laid down. It does not allow the use of force by a State to protect perceived security interests beyond these parameters. Other means are available to a concerned State, including, in particular, recourse to the Security Council.
149.    The Court has found that, from 7 August 1998 onwards, Uganda engaged in the use of force for purposes and in locations for which it had no consent whatever. The Court has also found that the events attested to by Uganda did not justify recourse to the use of force in self-defence.
150.    The long series of resolutions passed by the Security Council (1234 (1999), 1258 (1999), 1273 (1999), 1279 (1999), 1291 (2000), 1304 (2000), 1316 (2000), 1323 (2000), 1332 (2000), 1341 (2001), 1355 (2001), 1376 (2001), 1399 (2002), 1417 (2002), 1445 (2002), 1457 (2003), 1468 (2003), 1484 (2003), 1489 (2003), 1493 (2003), 1499 (2003), 1501 (2003), 1522 (2004), 1533 (2004), 1552 (2004), 1555 (2004), 1565 (2004), 1592 (2005), 1596 (2005), 1616 (2005) and 1621 (2005)) and the need for the United Nations to deploy MONUC, as well as the prolonged efforts by the United Nations to restore peace in the region and full sovereignty to the DRC over its territory, testify to the magnitude of the military events and the attendant suffering. The same may be said of the need to appoint a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights, a Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for that region, and the establishment of a panel (later reconstituted) to report on certain of the categories of facts relating to natural resources.
151.    The Court recalls that on 9 April 1999 the Security Council deter¬mined the conflict to constitute a threat to peace, security and stability in the region. In demanding an end to hostilities and a political solution to the conflict (which call was to lead to the Lusaka Agreement of 10 July 1999), the Security Council deplored the continued fighting and presence of foreign forces in the DRC and called for the States concerned “to bring to an end the presence of these uninvited forces” (United Nations doc. S/RES/1234, 9 April 1999).
152.    The United Nations has throughout this long series of carefully balanced resolutions and detailed reports recognized that all States in the region must bear their responsibility for finding a solution that would bring peace and stability. The Court notes, however, that this widespread responsibility of the States of the region cannot excuse the unlawful mili¬tary action of Uganda.
153.    The evidence has shown that the UPDF traversed vast areas of the DRC, violating the sovereignty of that country. It engaged in military operations in a multitude of locations, including Bunia, Kisangani, Gbadolite and Ituri, and many others. These were grave violations of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.
154.    The Court notes that the Security Council, on 16 June 2000, expressed “outrage at renewed fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani”, and condemned it as a “violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (United Nations doc. S/RES/1304 (2000)).
155.    The Court further observes that Uganda — as is clear from the evidence given by General Kazini and General Kavuma to the Porter Commission (see above, paragraph 114) — decided in early August 1998 to launch an offensive together with various factions which sought to overthrow the Government of the DRC. The DRC has in particular claimed that, from September 1998 onwards, Uganda both created and controlled the MLC rebel group led by Mr. Bemba.
156.    The DRC also points to the book written by Mr. Bemba (see para¬graph 69 above) to support this contention, as well as to the fact that in the Harare Disengagement Plan the MLC and UPDF are treated as a single unit.
157.    For its part, Uganda acknowledges that it assisted the MLC dur¬ing fighting between late September 1998 and July 1999, while insisting that its assistance to Mr. Bemba “was always limited and heavily condi¬tioned”. Uganda has explained that it gave “just enough” military sup¬port to the MLC to help Uganda achieve its objectives of driving out the Sudanese and Chadian troops from the DRC, and of taking over the air¬fields between Gbadolite and the Ugandan border; Uganda asserts that it did not go beyond this.
158.    The Court observes that the pages cited by the DRC in Mr. Bemba’s book do not in fact support the claim of “the creation” of the MLC by Uganda, and cover the later period of March-July 1999. The Court has noted the description in Mr. Bemba’s book of the training of his men by Ugandan military instructors and finds that this accords with statements he made at that time, as recorded in the ICG report of 20 August 1999. The Court has equally noted Mr. Bemba’s insistence, in November 1999, that, while he was receiving support, it was he who was in control of the military venture and not Uganda. The Court is equally of the view that the Harare Disengagement Plan merely sought to identify locations of the various parties, without passing on their relationships to each other.
159. The Court has not relied on various other items offered as evi¬dence on this point by the DRC, finding them, uncorroborated, based on second-hand reports, or not in fact saying what they are alleged to say by the DRC, or even in some cases partisan. The Court has for such reasons set aside the ICG report of 17 November, the HRW Report of March 2001, passages from the Secretary-General’s report on MONUC of 4 Sep¬tember 2000 (where reliance on second-hand reports is acknowledged); articles in the IRIN bulletin and Jeune Afrique; and the statement of a deserter who was co-operating with the Congolese military commission in preparing a statement for purposes of the present proceedings.
160.    The Court concludes that there is no credible evidence to suggest that Uganda created the MLC. Uganda has acknowledged giving train¬ing and military support and there is evidence to that effect. The Court has not received probative evidence that Uganda controlled, or could control, the manner in which Mr. Bemba put such assistance to use. In the view of the Court, the conduct of the MLC was not that of “an organ” of Uganda (Article 4, International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, 2001), nor that of an entity exercising elements of governmental authority on its behalf (Art. 5). The Court has considered whether the MLC’s conduct was “on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of” Uganda (Art. 8) and finds that there is no probative evidence by reference to which it has been persuaded that this was the case. Accord¬ingly, no issue arises in the present case as to whether the requisite tests are met for sufficiency of control of paramilitaries (see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 62-65, paras. 109-115).
161.    The Court would comment, however, that, even if the evidence does not suggest that the MLC’s conduct is attributable to Uganda, the training and military support given by Uganda to the ALC, the military wing of the MLC, violates certain obligations of international law.
162.    Thus the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter “the Declaration on Friendly Relations”) provides that:
“Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its terri¬tory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.” (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.)
The Declaration further provides that
“no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State” (ibid.).
These provisions are declaratory of customary international law.
163.    The Court considers that the obligations arising under the prin¬ciples of non-use of force and non-intervention were violated by Uganda even if the objectives of Uganda were not to overthrow President Kabila, and were directed to securing towns and airports for reason of its per¬ceived security needs, and in support of the parallel activity of those engaged in civil war.
164.    In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Court made it clear that the principle of non-intervention prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal opposition in another State” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 108, para. 206). The Court notes that in the present case it has been presented with probative evidence as to military intervention. The Court further affirms that acts which breach the principle of non-intervention “will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations” (ibid., pp. 109-110, para. 209).
165.    In relation to the first of the DRC’s final submissions, the Court accordingly concludes that Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also the territorial integrity of the DRC. Uganda’s actions equally constituted an interference in the internal affairs of the DRC and in the civil war there raging. The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and duration that the Court considers it to be a grave viola¬tion of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in Article 2, para¬graph 4, of the Charter.
166.    Before turning to the second and third submissions of the DRC, dealing with alleged violations by Uganda of its obligations under inter¬national human rights law and international humanitarian law and the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC, it is essential for the Court to consider the question as to whether or not Uganda was an occupying Power in the parts of Congolese territory where its troops were present at the relevant time.
THE ISSUE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
167. The DRC asserts that the border regions of eastern Congo were attacked by Ugandan forces between 7 and 8 August 1998, and that more areas fell under the control of Ugandan troops over the following months with the advance of the UPDF into Congolese territory. It further points out that “the territories occupied by Uganda have varied in size as the conflict has developed”: the area of occupation initially covered Orien- tale province and part of North Kivu province; in the course of 1999 it increased to cover a major part of Equateur province. The DRC specifies that the territories occupied extended from Bunia and Beni, close to the eastern border, to Bururu and Mobenzene, in the far north-western part of the DRC; and that “the southern boundary of the occupied area [ran] north of the towns of Mbandaka westwards, then [extended] east to Kisangani, rejoining the Ugandan border between Goma and Butembo”. According to the DRC, the occupation of its territory ended with the withdrawal of the Ugandan army on 2 June 2003.
168. The DRC contends that “the UPDF set up an occupation zone, which it administered both directly and indirectly”, in the latter case by way of the creation of and active support for various Congolese rebel fac¬tions. As an example of such administration, the DRC refers to the cre¬ation of a new province within its territory. In June 1999, the Ugandan authorities, in addition to the existing ten provinces, created an 11th province in the north-east of the DRC, in the vicinity of the Ugandan frontier. The “Kibali-Ituri” province thus created was the result of merging the districts of Ituri and Haut-Uele, detached from Orientale province. On 18 June 1999 General Kazini, commander of the Ugandan forces in the DRC, “appointed Ms Adele Lotsove, previously Deputy Governor of Orientale Province, to govern this new province”. The DRC further asserts that acts of administration by Uganda of this province continued until the withdrawal of Ugandan troops. In support of this contention, the DRC states that Colonel Muzoora, of the UPDF, exer¬cised de facto the duties of governor of the province between January and May 2001, and that “at least two of the five governors who suc¬ceeded Ms Lotsove up until 2003 were relieved of their duties by the Ugandan military authorities, sometimes under threat of force”. The DRC claims that the Ugandan authorities were directly involved “in the political life of the occupied regions” and, citing the Ugandan daily news¬paper New Vision, that “Uganda has even gone so far as to supervise local elections”. The DRC also refers to the Sixth report of the Secretary- General on MONUC, which describes the situation in Bunia (capital of Ituri district) in the following terms: “[s]ince 22 January, MONUC mili¬tary observers in Bunia have reported the situation in the town to be tense but with UPDF in effective control”.
169. Finally, according to the DRC, the fact that Ugandan troops were not present in every location in the vast territory of the north and east of the DRC “in no way prevents Uganda from being considered an occupying power in the localities or areas which were controlled by its armed forces”. The DRC claims that the notion of occupation in inter¬national law, as reflected in Article 42 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Con¬vention of 18 October 1907 (hereinafter “the Hague Regulations of 1907”), is closely tied to the control exercised by the troops of the State operating on parts, extensive or not, of the territory of the occupied State. Thus, “rather than the omnipresence of the occupying State’s armed forces, it is that State’s ability to assert its authority which the Hague Regulations look to as the criterion for defining the notion of occupying State”.
170. For its part, Uganda denies that it was an occupying Power in the areas where UPDF troops were present. It argues that, in view of the small number of its troops in the territory of the DRC, i.e. fewer than 10,000 soldiers “at the height of the deployment”, they could not have occupied vast territories as claimed by the DRC. In particular, Uganda maintains that its troops “were confined to the regions of eastern Congo adjacent to the Uganda border and to designated strategic locations, especially airfields, from which Uganda was vulnerable to attack by the DRC and her allies”. Thus, there was “no zone of Ugandan military occupation and there [was] no Ugandan military administration in place”. Uganda points out, moreover, that it “ensured that its troops refrained from all interferences in the local administration, which was run by the Congolese themselves”. Uganda further notes that “it was the rebels of the Congo Liberation Movement (MLC) and of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RDC) which controlled and administered these territories, exercising de facto authority”.
171. As for the appointment of a governor of Ituri district, which Uganda characterizes as “the only attempt at interference in this local administration by a Ugandan officer”, Uganda states that this action was “motivated by the desire to restore order in the region of Ituri in the interests of the population”. Furthermore, Uganda emphasizes that this step was “immediately opposed and disavowed by the Ugandan authori¬ties” and that the officer in question, General Kazini, was firmly repri¬manded by his superiors, who instituted disciplinary measures against him.
172. The Court observes that, under customary international law, as reflected in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, territory is con¬sidered to be occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised (see Legal Con¬sequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 167, para. 78, and p. 172, para. 89).
173.    In order to reach a conclusion as to whether a State, the military forces of which are present on the territory of another State as a result of an intervention, is an “occupying Power” in the meaning of the term as understood in the jus in bello, the Court must examine whether there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the said authority was in fact established and exercised by the intervening State in the areas in ques¬tion. In the present case the Court will need to satisfy itself that the Ugandan armed forces in the DRC were not only stationed in particular locations but also that they had substituted their own authority for that of the Congolese Government. In that event, any justification given by Uganda for its occupation would be of no relevance; nor would it be relevant whether or not Uganda had established a structured military administration of the territory occupied.
174.    The Court will now ascertain whether parts of the territory of the DRC were placed under the authority of the Ugandan army in the sense of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907. In this regard, the Court first observes that the territorial limits of any zone of occupation by Uganda in the DRC cannot be determined by simply drawing a line con¬necting the geographical locations where Ugandan troops were present, as has been done on the sketch-map presented by the DRC (see para¬graphs 55 and 73 above).
175.    It is not disputed between the Parties that General Kazini, com¬mander of the Ugandan forces in the DRC, created the new “province of Kibali-Ituri” in June 1999 and appointed Ms Adele Lotsove as its Gov¬ernor. Various sources of evidence attest to this fact, in particular a letter from General Kazini dated 18 June 1999, in which he appoints Ms Adele Lotsove as “provisional Governor” and gives suggestions with regard to questions of administration of the new province. This is also supported by material from the Porter Commission. The Court further notes that the Sixth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2001/128 of 12 February 2001) states that, according to MONUC military observers, the UPDF was in effective control in Bunia (capital of Ituri district).
176.    The Court considers that regardless of whether or not General Kazini, commander of the Ugandan forces in the DRC, acted in viola¬tion of orders and was punished as a result, his conduct is clear evidence of the fact that Uganda established and exercised authority in Ituri as an occupying Power.
177.    The Court observes that the DRC makes reference to “indirect administration” through various Congolese rebel factions and to the supervision by Ugandan officers over local elections in the territories under UPDF control. However, the DRC does not provide any specific evidence to show that authority was exercised by Ugandan armed forces in any areas other than in Ituri district. The Court further notes that, although Uganda recognized that as of 1 September 1998 it exercised “administrative control” at Kisangani Airport, there is no evidence in the case file which could allow the Court to characterize the presence of Ugandan troops stationed at Kisangani Airport as occupation in the sense of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907. Neither can the Court uphold the DRC’s contention that Uganda was an occupying Power in areas outside Ituri controlled and administered by Congolese rebel movements. As the Court has already indicated, the evidence does not support the view that these groups were “under the control” of Uganda (see paragraph 160 above).
178.    The Court thus concludes that Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant time. As such it was under an obligation, accord¬ing to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, to take all the meas¬ures in its power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in the occupied area, while respecting, unless absolutely pre¬vented, the laws in force in the DRC. This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such vio¬lence by any third party.
179.    The Court, having concluded that Uganda was an occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant time, finds that Uganda’s responsibility is engaged both for any acts of its military that violated its international obligations and for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account.
180.    The Court notes that Uganda at all times has responsibility for all actions and omissions of its own military forces in the territory of the DRC in breach of its obligations under the rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law which are relevant and applicable in the specific situation.
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
181. It is recalled (see paragraph 25 above) that in its second submis¬sion the DRC requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
“2. That the Republic of Uganda, by committing acts of violence against nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by killing and injuring them or despoiling them of their property, by failing to take adequate measures to prevent violations of human rights in the DRC by persons under its jurisdiction or control, and/or failing to punish persons under its jurisdiction or control having engaged in the above-mentioned acts, has vio¬lated the following principles of conventional and customary law:
—    the principle of conventional and customary law imposing an obligation to respect, and ensure respect for, fundamen¬tal human rights, including in times of armed conflict, in accordance with international humanitarian law;
—    the principle of conventional and customary law imposing an obligation, at all times, to make a distinction in an armed conflict between civilian and military objectives;
—    the right of Congolese nationals to enjoy the most basic rights, both civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural.”
182. The DRC cites various sources of evidence in support of its claims, including the 2004 MONUC report on human rights violations in Ituri, reports submitted by the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and testimony gathered on the ground by a number of Congolese and international non-governmental organi¬zations. The DRC argues that it has “presented abundant evidence of violations of human rights attributable to Uganda, based on reliable, varied and concordant sources”. In particular, it notes that many of the grave accusations are the result of careful fieldwork carried out by MONUC experts, and attested to by other independent sources.
183.    The DRC claims that the Ugandan armed forces perpetrated wide-scale massacres of civilians during their operations in the DRC, in particular in the Ituri region, and resorted to acts of torture and other forms of inhumane and degrading treatment. The DRC claims that soldiers of the UPDF carried out acts of reprisal directed against the civilian inhabitants of villages presumed to have harboured anti- Ugandan fighters. In the specific context of the conflict in Ituri, the DRC argues that the findings of the 2004 MONUC report on human rights violations in Ituri clearly establish the fact that the Ugandan armed forces participated in the mass killings of civilians.
184.    The DRC maintains that, in the areas occupied by the UPDF, Ugandan soldiers plundered civilian property for their “personal profit” and engaged in the deliberate destruction of villages, civilian dwellings and private property. With regard to the clashes between Uganda and Rwanda in the city of Kisangani in 1999 and 2000, the DRC refers, in particular, to Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), in which the Council deplored, inter alia, “the damage to property inflicted by the forces of Uganda and Rwanda on the Congolese population”. The DRC also alleges that the property and resources of the civilian populations in the eastern Congolese regions occupied by the Ugandan army were destroyed on certain occasions by UPDF soldiers as part of a “scorched earth” policy aimed at combating ADF rebels.
185.    The DRC claims that several hundred Congolese children were forcibly recruited by the UPDF and taken to Uganda for ideological and military training in the year 2000. In particular, according to the DRC, many children were abducted in August 2000 in the areas of Bunia, Beni and Butembo and given military training at the Kyankwanzi camp in Uganda with a view to incorporating them into the Ugandan armed forces. The DRC maintains that the abducted children were only able to leave the Kyankwanzi training camp for final repatriation to the DRC at the beginning of July 2001 after persistent efforts by UNICEF and the United Nations to ensure their release.
186.    The DRC contends that the Ugandan armed forces failed to pro¬tect the civilian population in combat operations with other belligerents. Thus it alleges that attacks were carried out by the UPDF without any distinction being made between combatants and non-combatants. In this regard, the DRC makes specific reference to fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani in 1999 and 2000, causing widespread loss of life within the civilian population and great damage to the city’s infrastructure and housing. In support of its claims, the DRC cites vari¬ous reports of Congolese and international non-governmental organiza¬tions and refers extensively to the June 2000 MONUC Report and to the December 2000 report by the United Nations inter-agency assessment mission, which went to Kisangani pursuant to Security Council resolu¬tion 1304 (2000). The DRC notes that the latter report referred to “sys¬tematic violations of international humanitarian law and indiscriminate attacks on civilians” committed by Uganda and Rwanda as they fought each other.
187. The DRC claims that Ugandan troops were involved in ethnic conflicts between groups in the Congolese population, particularly between Hema and Lendu in the Ituri region, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties. According to the DRC, UPDF forces openly sided with the Hema ethnic group because of “alleged ethnic links between its members and the Ugandan population”. In one series of cases, the DRC alleges that Ugandan armed forces provided direct military support to Congolese factions and joined with them in perpetrating massacres of civilians. The DRC further claims that Uganda not only supported one of the groups but also provided training and equipment for other groups over time, thereby aggravating the local conflicts.
188.    The DRC also asserts that, on several occasions, Ugandan forces passively witnessed atrocities committed by the members of local militias in Ituri. In this connection, the DRC refers to various incidents attested to by reports emanating from the United Nations and MONUC, and from Congolese and international non-governmental organizations. In particular, the DRC refers to a massacre of ethnic Lendu carried out by ethnic Hema militias in Bunia on 19 January 2001. The DRC states that similar events occurred in other localities.
189.    The DRC charges that Uganda breached its obligation of vigi¬lance incumbent upon it as an occupying Power by failing to enforce respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the occu¬pied regions, and particularly in Ituri. The DRC argues that the need to ensure full respect for fundamental rights in the territories occupied by the Ugandan army was similarly emphasized by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
190.    The DRC argues that, by its actions, Uganda has violated provi¬sions of the Hague Regulations of 1907; the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Pro¬tocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.
191.    Uganda contends that the DRC has consistently failed to provide any credible evidentiary basis to support its allegations of the involve¬ment of Ugandan troops in massacres, torture and ill-treatment of Con¬golese civilians, supposed acts of plunder and scorched earth policy, destruction of Congolese villages and civilian dwellings, and looting of private property. In this regard, Uganda refers to each of the incidents alleged by the DRC and argues that the documentation relied upon by the DRC to prove its claims either fails to show that the incident occurred, or fails to show any involvement of Ugandan troops. In more general terms, Uganda points to the unreliability of the evidence adduced by the DRC, claiming that it does not distinguish between the various armies operating in eastern Congo during the relevant period. Uganda also maintains that the DRC relies on partisan sources of information, such as the Association africaine des droits de l’homme (ASADHO), which Uganda describes as a pro-Congolese non-governmental organiza¬tion. Uganda further asserts that the 2004 MONUC report on human rights violations in Ituri, heavily relied on by the DRC to support its vari¬ous claims in connection with the conflict in Ituri, “is inappropriate as a form of assistance in any assessment accompanied by judicial rigour”. Uganda states, inter alia, that in its view, “MONUC did not have a mis¬sion appropriate to investigations of a specifically legal character” and that “both before and after deployment of the multinational forces in June 2003, there were substantial problems of access to Ituri”.
192.    Uganda contends that the DRC’s allegations regarding the forced recruitment of child soldiers by Uganda are “framed only in general terms” and lack “evidentiary support”. According to Uganda, the children “were rescued” in the context of ethnic fighting in Bunia and a mutiny within the ranks of the RCD-ML rebel group, and taken to the Kyankwanzi Leadership Institute for care and counselling in 2001. Uganda states that the children were subsequently repatriated under the auspices of UNICEF and the Red Cross. In support of its claims, Uganda refers to the Fifth and Sixth reports on MONUC of the Secre¬tary-General of the United Nations. Uganda also maintains that it received expressions of gratitude from UNICEF and from the United Nations for its role in assisting the children in question.
193.    Uganda reserves its position on the events in Kisangani in 2000 and, in particular, on the admissibility of issues of responsibility relating to these events (see paragraphs 197-198 below).
194.    Uganda claims that the DRC’s assertion that Ugandan forces incited ethnic conflicts among groups in the Congolese population is false and furthermore is not supported by credible evidence.
195.    Uganda argues that no evidence has been presented to establish that Uganda had any interest in becoming involved in the civil strife in Ituri. Uganda asserts that, from early 2001 until the final departure of its troops in 2003, Uganda did what it could to promote and maintain a peaceful climate in Ituri. Uganda believes that its troops were insufficient to control the ethnic violence in that region, “and that only an interna¬tional force under United Nations auspices had any chance of doing so”.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CLAIMS IN RELATION TO EVENTS IN KISANGANI
196. Before considering the merits of the DRC’s allegations of viola¬tions by Uganda of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, the Court must first deal with a question raised by Uganda concerning the admissibility of the DRC’s claims relating to Uganda’s responsibility for the fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani in June 2000.
197.    Uganda submits that
“the Court lacks competence to deal with the events in Kisangani in June 2000 in the absence of consent on the part of Rwanda, and, in the alternative, even if competence exists, in order to safeguard the judicial function the Court should not exercise that competence”.
Moreover, according to Uganda, the terms of the Court’s Order of 1 July 2000 indicating provisional measures were without prejudice to issues of fact and imputability; neither did the Order prejudge the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the case.
198.    Concerning the events in Kisangani, Uganda maintains that Rwanda’s legal interests form “the very subject-matter” of the decision which the DRC is seeking, and that consequently a decision of the Court covering these events would infringe the “indispensable third party” prin¬ciple referred to in the cases concerning Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom and United States of America) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 19, and East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90). According to Uganda, the circumstances in the present case produce the same type of dilemma faced by the Court in those cases. In particular, Uganda states that “[t]he culpability or otherwise of Uganda, as a consequence of the conduct of its armed forces, can only be assessed on the basis of appropriate legal standards if the conduct of the armed forces of Rwanda is assessed at the same time”. Uganda further argues that, “[i]n the absence of evidence as to the role of Rwanda, it is impossible for the Court to know whether the justification of self-defence is available to Uganda or, in respect of the quantum of damages, how the role of Rwanda is to be taken into account”. Uganda contends that, “[i]f the conflict was provoked by Rwanda, this would materially and directly affect the responsibility of Uganda vis-a-vis the DRC”. Uganda also claims that the necessity to safeguard the judicial function of the Court, as referred to in the case concerning Northern Cameroons (Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1963, pp. 33-34, 37, 38), would preclude the Court from exercising any jurisdiction it might have in relation to the events that occurred in Kisangani.
199.    With reference to the objection raised by Uganda regarding the Court’s jurisdiction to rule on the events in Kisangani in the absence of Rwanda from the proceedings, the DRC asserts that “Rwanda’s absence from these proceedings is totally irrelevant and cannot prevent the Court from ruling on the question of Uganda’s responsibility”. According to the DRC,
“[t]he purpose of the DRC’s claim is simply to secure recognition of Uganda’s sole responsibility for the use of force by its own armed forces in Congolese territory … in and around Kisangani, as well as for the serious violations of essential rules of international humani¬tarian law committed on those occasions” (emphasis in original).
200.    The DRC argues that the Court is competent to adjudicate on the events in Kisangani “without having to consider the question of whether it should be Rwanda or Uganda that is held responsible for initiating the hostilities that led to the various clashes”. The DRC refers to the case concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) in support of its contention that there is nothing to prevent the Court from “exercising its jurisdiction with regard to a respondent State, even in the absence of other States implicated in the Application”. The DRC argues that the Monetary Gold and East Timor cases, relied on by Uganda to support its arguments, are fundamentally different from the present case. According to the DRC, the application which it filed against Uganda “is entirely autonomous and independent” and does not bear on any sepa¬rate proceedings instituted by the DRC against other States. The DRC maintains that “[i]t is Uganda’s responsibility which is the subject-matter of the Congolese claim, and there is no other ‘indispensable party’ whose legal interests would form ‘the very subject-matter of the decision’, as in the Monetary Gold or East Timor precedents”.
201.    The DRC points out that the Court, in its Order of 1 July 2000 indicating provisional measures, “refused to accept Uganda’s reasoning and agreed to indicate certain measures specifically relating to the events in Kisangani despite the absence of Rwanda from the proceedings”.
202.    In light of the above considerations, the DRC argues that Uganda’s objection must be rejected.
203.    The Court has had to examine questions of this kind on previous occasions. In the case concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), the Court observed that it is not precluded from adjudicating upon the claims submitted to it in a case in which a third State “has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the deci¬sion in the case”, provided that “the legal interests of the third State which may possibly be affected do not form the very subject-matter of the decision that is applied for”. The Court further noted that:
“In the present case, the interests of New Zealand and the United Kingdom do not constitute the very subject-matter of the judgment to be rendered on the merits of Nauru’s Application and the situa¬tion is in that respect different from that with which the Court had to deal in the Monetary Gold case. In the latter case, the determina¬tion of Albania’s responsibility was a prerequisite for a decision to be taken on Italy’s claims. In the present case, the determination of the responsibility of New Zealand or the United Kingdom is not a prerequisite for the determination of the responsibility of Australia, the only object of Nauru’s claim … In the Monetary Gold case the link between, on the one hand, the necessary findings regarding, Albania’s alleged responsibility and, on the other, the decision requested of the Court regarding the allocation of the gold, was not purely temporal but also logical . . .
In the present case, a finding by the Court regarding the existence or the content of the responsibility attributed to Australia by Nauru might well have implications for the legal situation of the two other States concerned, but no finding in respect of that legal situation will be needed as a basis for the Court’s decision on Nauru’s claims against Australia. Accordingly the Court cannot decline to exercise its jurisdiction.” (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Aus¬tralia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 261-262, para. 55.)
204. The Court considers that this jurisprudence is applicable in the current proceedings. In the present case, the interests of Rwanda clearly do not constitute “the very subject-matter” of the decision to be rendered by the Court on the DRC’s claims against Uganda, nor is the determina¬tion of Rwanda’s responsibility a prerequisite for such a decision. The fact that some alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by Uganda occurred in the course of hostilities between Uganda and Rwanda does not impinge on this finding. Thus it is not necessary for Rwanda to be a party to this case for the Court to be able to determine whether Uganda’s conduct was a violation of these rules of international law.
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: FINDINGS OF THE COURT
205.    The Court will now examine the allegations by the DRC concern¬ing violations by Uganda of its obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law during its military inter¬vention in the DRC. For these purposes, the Court will take into consid¬eration evidence contained in certain United Nations documents to the extent that they are of probative value and are corroborated, if necessary, by other credible sources.
In order to rule on the DRC’s claim, it is not necessary for the Court to make findings of fact with regard to each individual incident alleged.
206.    The Court first turns to the DRC’s claims that the Ugandan armed forces caused loss of life to the civilian population, committed acts of torture and other forms of inhumane treatment, and destroyed villages and dwellings of civilians. The Court observes that the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights of 18 January 2000 (E/CN/4/2000/42, para. 112) refers to massacres carried out by Ugandan troops in Beni on 14 November 1999. The Secretary-General in his Third Report on MONUC concluded that Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces “should be held accountable for the loss of life and the property damage they inflicted on the civilian population of Kisangani” (doc. S/2000/566 of 12 June 2000, para. 79). Security Council resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000 deplored “the loss of civilian lives, the threat to the civilian population and the damage to property inflicted by the forces of Uganda and Rwanda on the Congolese population”. Several incidents of atrocities committed by Ugandan troops against the civilian population, including torture and killings, are referred to in the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights of 1 Feb-ruary 2001 (E/CN/4/2001/40, paras. 112, 148-151). MONUC’s special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003 (doc. S/2004/ 573 of 16 July 2004, paras. 19, 42-43, 62) contains much evidence of direct involvement by UPDF troops, in the context of the Hema-Lendu ethnic conflict in Ituri, in the killings of civilians and the destruction of their houses. In addition to particular incidents, it is stated that “[h]undreds of localities were destroyed by UPDF and the Hema South militias” (para. 21); “UPDF also carried out widespread bombing and destruction of hundreds of villages from 2000 to 2002” (para. 27).
207. The Court therefore finds the coincidence of reports from credible sources sufficient to convince it that massive human rights violations and grave breaches of international humanitarian law were committed by the UPDF on the territory of the DRC.
208. The Court further finds that there is sufficient evidence of a reli¬able quality to support the DRC’s allegation that the UPDF failed to protect the civilian population and to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in the course of fighting against other troops, espe¬cially the FAR. According to the report of the inter-agency assessment mission to Kisangani (established pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1304 (2000) (doc. S/2000/1153 of 4 December 2000, paras. 15-16)), the armed conflict between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani led to
“fighting spreading into residential areas and indiscriminate shelling occurring for 6 days . . .
Over 760 civilians were killed, and an estimated 1,700 wounded. More than 4,000 houses were partially damaged, destroyed or made uninhabitable. Sixty-nine schools were shelled, and other public buildings were badly damaged. Medical facilities and the cathedral were also damaged during the shelling, and 65,000 residents were forced to flee the fighting and seek refuge in nearby forests.”
MONUC’s special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003 (doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004, para. 73) states that on 6 and 7 March 2003,
“during and after fighting between UPC [Union des patriotes con- golais] and UPDF in Bunia, several civilians were killed, houses and shops were looted and civilians were wounded by gunshots. . . Stray bullets reportedly killed several civilians; others had their houses shelled.” (Para. 73.)
In this context, the Court notes that indiscriminate shelling is in itself a grave violation of humanitarian law.
209. The Court considers that there is also persuasive evidence that the UPDF incited ethnic conflicts and took no action to prevent such con¬flicts in Ituri district. The reports of the Special Rapporteur of the Com¬mission on Human Rights (doc. A/55/403 of 20 September 2000, para. 26 and E/CN/4/2001/40 of 1 February 2001, para. 31) state that the Ugan¬dan presence in Ituri caused a conflict between the Hema (of Ugandan origin) and the Lendu. According to these reports, land was seized from the Lendu by the Hema with the encouragement and military support of Ugandan soldiers. The reports also state that the confrontations in August 2000 resulted in some 10,000 deaths and the displacement of some 50,000 people, and that since the beginning of the conflict the UPDF had failed to take action to put an end to the violence. The Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (doc. S/2001/128 of 12 February 2001, para. 56) stated that “UPDF troops stood by during the killings and failed to protect the civilians”. It is also indicated in MONUC’s special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003 (doc. S/2004/ 573 of 16 July 2004, para. 6), that
“Ugandan army commanders already present in Ituri, instead of try¬ing to calm the situation, preferred to benefit from the situation and support alternately one side or the other according to their political and financial interests”.
The above reports are consistent in the presentation of facts, support each other and are corroborated by other credible sources, such as the HRW Report “Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo”, July 2003 (available at http://hrw.org/reports/ 2003/ituri0703/).
210. The Court finds that there is convincing evidence of the training in UPDF training camps of child soldiers and of the UPDF’s failure to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers in areas under its control. The Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (doc. S/2000/1156 of 6 December 2000, para. 75) refers to the confirmed “cross-border depor¬tation of recruited Congolese children from the Bunia, Beni and Butembo region to Uganda”. The Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (doc. S/2002/621 of 5 June 2002, para. 47) points out that the local UPDF authorities in and around Bunia in Ituri district “have failed to prevent the fresh recruitment or re-recruitment of children” as child soldiers. MONUC’s special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002- December 2003 (doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004, para. 148) refers to several incidents where Congolese children were transferred to UPDF training camps for military training.
211. Having examined the case file, the Court considers that it has credible evidence sufficient to conclude that the UPDF troops committed acts of killing, torture and other forms of inhumane treatment of the civilian population, destroyed villages and civilian buildings, failed to dis¬tinguish between civilian and military targets and to protect the civilian population in fighting with other combatants, incited ethnic conflict and took no steps to put an end to such conflicts, was involved in the training of child soldiers, and did not take measures to ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the occupied territories.
212. With regard to the claim by the DRC that Uganda carried out a deliberate policy of terror, confirmed in its view by the almost total impu¬nity of the soldiers and officers responsible for the alleged atrocities com¬mitted on the territory of the DRC, the Court, in the absence of specific evidence supporting this claim, does not consider that this allegation has been proven. The Court, however, wishes to stress that the civil war and foreign military intervention in the DRC created a general atmosphere of
terror pervading the lives of the Congolese people.
*
213.    The Court turns now to the question as to whether acts and omis¬sions of the UPDF and its officers and soldiers are attributable to Uganda. The conduct of the UPDF as a whole is clearly attributable to Uganda, being the conduct of a State organ. According to a well-estab¬lished rule of international law, which is of customary character, “the conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded as an act of that State” (Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rap-porteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 87, para. 62). The conduct of individual soldiers and officers of the UPDF is to be considered as the conduct of a State organ. In the Court’s view, by virtue of the military status and function of Ugandan soldiers in the DRC, their conduct is attributable to Uganda. The contention that the persons concerned did not act in the capacity of persons exercising governmental authority in the particular circumstances, is therefore without merit.
214.    It is furthermore irrelevant for the attribution of their conduct to Uganda whether the UPDF personnel acted contrary to the instructions given or exceeded their authority. According to a well-established rule of a customary nature, as reflected in Article 3 of the Fourth Hague Con¬vention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 as well as in Article 91 of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, a party to an armed conflict shall be responsible for all acts by persons forming part of its armed forces.
*
215.    The Court, having established that the conduct of the UPDF and of the officers and soldiers of the UPDF is attributable to Uganda, must now examine whether this conduct constitutes a breach of Uganda’s international obligations. In this regard, the Court needs to determine the rules and principles of international human rights law and international humanitarian law which are relevant for this purpose.
216.    The Court first recalls that it had occasion to address the issues of the relationship between international humanitarian law and interna¬tional human rights law and of the applicability of international human rights law instruments outside national territory in its Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In this Advisory Opinion the Court found that
“the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclu-sively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law.” (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 178, para. 106.)
It thus concluded that both branches of international law, namely inter¬national human rights law and international humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consideration. The Court further concluded that international human rights instruments are applicable “in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own terri¬tory”, particularly in occupied territories (ibid., pp. 178-181, paras. 107¬113).
217. The Court considers that the following instruments in the fields of international humanitarian law and international human rights law are applicable, as relevant, in the present case:
—    Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 18 October 1907. Neither the DRC nor Uganda are parties to the Convention. How-ever, the Court reiterates that “the provisions of the Hague Regula¬tions have become part of customary law” (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 172, para. 89) and as such are binding on both Parties;
—    Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949. The DRC’s (at the time Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)) notification of succession dated 20 February 1961 was deposited on 24 February 1961, with retroactive effect as from 30 June 1960, the date on which the DRC became independent; Uganda acceded on 18 May 1964;
– International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966. The DRC (at the time Republic of Zaire) acceded to the Covenant on 1 November 1976; Uganda acceded on 21 June 1995;
—    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. The DRC (at the time Republic of
Zaire) acceded to the Protocol on 3 June 1982; Uganda acceded on 13 March 1991;
—    African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981. The DRC (at the time Republic of Zaire) acceded to the Charter on 20 July 1987; Uganda acceded on 10 May 1986;
–    Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989. The DRC (at the time Republic of Zaire) ratified the Convention on 27 September 1990 and Uganda on 17 August 1990;
–    Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict of 25 May 2000. The Protocol entered into force on 12 February 2002. The DRC ratified the Protocol on 11 November 2001; Uganda acceded on 6 May 2002.
218.    The Court moreover emphasizes that, under common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
“[i]n addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”
219.    In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the acts committed by the UPDF and officers and soldiers of the UPDF (see paragraphs 206¬211 above) are in clear violation of the obligations under the Hague Regulations of 1907, Articles 25, 27 and 28, as well as Articles 43, 46 and 47 with regard to obligations of an occupying Power. These obligations are binding on the Parties as customary international law. Uganda also violated the following provisions of the international humanitarian law and international human rights law instruments, to which both Uganda and the DRC are parties:
—    Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 27 and 32 as well as Article 53 with regard to obligations of an occupying Power;
—    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 6, para¬graph 1, and 7;
—    First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Articles 48, 51, 52, 57, 58 and 75, paragraphs 1 and 2;
—    African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Articles 4 and 5;
—    Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 38, paragraphs 2 and 3 ;
—    Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 1, 2, 3, paragraph 3, 4, 5 and 6.
220. The Court thus concludes that Uganda is internationally respon¬sible for violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law committed by the UPDF and by its members in the territory of the DRC and for failing to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri in respect of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the occupied territory.
221. The Court finally would point out that, while it has pronounced on the violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law committed by Ugandan military forces on the territory of the DRC, it nonetheless observes that the actions of the various parties in the complex conflict in the DRC have contributed to the immense suf¬fering faced by the Congolese population. The Court is painfully aware that many atrocities have been committed in the course of the conflict. It is incumbent on all those involved in the conflict to support the peace process in the DRC and other peace processes in the Great Lakes area, in order to ensure respect for human rights in the region.
ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
222. In its third submission the DRC requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
“3. That the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in the illegal exploi¬tation of Congolese natural resources, by pillaging its assets and wealth, by failing to take adequate measures to prevent the ille¬gal exploitation of the resources of the DRC by persons under its jurisdiction or control, and/or failing to punish persons under its jurisdiction or control having engaged in the above-men¬tioned acts, has violated the following principles of conventional and customary law:
—    the applicable rules of international humanitarian law;
—    respect for the sovereignty of States, including over their natural resources;
—    the duty to promote the realization of the principle of equal¬ity of peoples and of their right of self-determination, and consequently to refrain from exposing peoples to foreign subjugation, domination or exploitation;
– the principle of non-interference in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States, including economic mat¬ters.”
223. The DRC alleges that, following the invasion of the DRC by
Uganda in August 1998, the Ugandan troops “illegally occupying” Con¬golese territory, acting in collaboration with Congolese rebel groups supported by Uganda, systematically looted and exploited the assets and natural resources of the DRC. According to the DRC, after the system¬atic looting of natural resources, the Ugandan military and the rebel groups which it supported “moved on to another phase in the expropria¬tion of the wealth of Congo, by direct exploitation of its resources” for their own benefit. The DRC contends that the Ugandan army took out¬right control of the entire economic and commercial system in the occu¬pied areas, with almost the entire market in consumer goods being con-trolled by Ugandan companies and businessmen. The DRC further claims that UDPF forces have engaged in hunting and plundering of protected species. The DRC charges that the Ugandan authorities did nothing to put an end to these activities and indeed encouraged the UPDF, Ugan¬dan companies and rebel groups supported by Uganda to exploit natural resources on Congolese territory.
224.    The DRC maintains that the highest Ugandan authorities, includ¬ing President Museveni, were aware of the UPDF forces’ involvement in the plundering and illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC. Moreover, the DRC asserts that these activities were tacitly supported or even encouraged by the Ugandan authorities, “who saw in them a way of financing the continuation of the war in the DRC, ‘rewarding’ the military involved in this operation and opening up new markets to Ugandan companies”.
225.    The DRC claims that the illegal exploitation, plundering and looting of the DRC’s natural resources by Uganda have been confirmed in a consistent manner by a variety of independent sources, among them the Porter Commission Report, the United Nations Panel reports and reports of national organs and non-governmental organizations. Accord¬ing to the DRC, the facts which it alleges are also corroborated by the economic data analysed in various reports by independent experts.
226.    The DRC contends that illegal exploitation, plundering and loot¬ing of the DRC’s natural resources constitute violations by Uganda of “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, more specifically of the DRC’s sovereignty over its natural resources”. In this regard the DRC refers to the right of States to their natural resources and cites Gen¬eral Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, adopted on 14 December 1962; the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order contained in United Nations General Assembly resolution 3201 (S.VI) of 1 May 1974 and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974.
227.    The DRC claims that Uganda in all circumstances is responsible for acts of plunder and illegal exploitation of the resources of the DRC committed by officers and soldiers of the UPDF as an organ of the Republic of Uganda. For the DRC it is not relevant whether members of the Ugandan army acted under, or contrary to, official orders from their Government or in an official or private capacity.
228.    Turning to the duty of vigilance, the DRC argues that, in relation to the obligation to respect the sovereignty of States over their natural resources, this duty implies that a State should take adequate measures to ensure that its military forces, nationals or groups that it controls do not engage in illegal exploitation of natural resources on the territory of another State. The DRC claims that all activities involving exploitation of natural resources conducted by Ugandan companies and nationals and rebel movements supported by Uganda were acts of illegal exploita¬tion. The DRC further contends that Uganda took no proper steps to bring to an end the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC by members of Ugandan military, private companies or nationals and by the Congolese rebel movements that it controlled and supported, thus violating its duty of vigilance.
229.    The DRC asserts that, by engaging in the illegal exploitation, plundering and looting of the DRC’s natural resources, Uganda also vio¬lated its obligations as an occupying Power under the jus in bello. According to the DRC, “the detailed rules of the law of armed conflict in relation to the exploitation of natural resources have to be considered against the background of this fundamental principle of permanent sov¬ereignty over natural resources”. This principle, in the view of the DRC, continues to apply at all times, including during armed conflict and occu¬pation.
230.    For its part, Uganda maintains that the DRC has not provided reliable evidence to corroborate its allegations regarding the looting and illegal exploitation of natural resources of the DRC by Uganda. It claims that neither the United Nations Panel reports nor the Porter Commission Report can be considered as supporting the DRC’s allegations. More¬over, according to Uganda, the limited nature of its intervention is inconsistent with the DRC’s contention that Uganda occupied the eastern Congo in order to exploit natural resources. Nor, in view of this fact, could Uganda exercise the pervasive economic control required to exploit the areas as alleged by the DRC.
231.    Uganda further denies that it has violated the principle of the Congolese people’s sovereignty over its natural resources. It maintains that this principle, “which was shaped in a precise historical context (that of decolonization) and has a very precise purpose”, cannot be applicable in the context of the present case. Uganda claims that individual acts of members of the Ugandan military forces committed in their private capacity and in violation of orders and instructions cannot serve as basis for attributing to Uganda a wrongful act violating the principle of the permanent sovereignty of Congolese people over their natural resources.
232.    Uganda likewise denies that it violated its duty of vigilance with regard to acts of illegal exploitation in the territories where its troops were present. Uganda does not agree with the contention that it had a duty of vigilance with regard to the Congolese rebel groups, asserting that it did not control those groups and had no power over their admin¬istrative acts. Uganda also maintains that, “within the limits of its capa¬bilities, it exercised a high degree of vigilance to ensure that its nationals did not, through their actions, infringe the Congolese people’s right to control their natural resources”.
233.    Uganda also contests the view that the alleged breach of its “duty of vigilance” is founded on Uganda’s failure to prohibit trade “between its nationals and the territories controlled by the rebels in eastern Congo”. In Uganda’s view, the de facto authority of Congolese rebel movements established in eastern Congo could not affect the commercial relations between the eastern Congo, Uganda and several other States, which were maintained in the interests of the local populations and essential to the populations’ survival, and therefore “did not impose an obligation to apply commercial sanctions”.
234.    Uganda states that the DRC’s contentions that Uganda failed to take action against illegal activity are without merit. In this regard it refers to a radio broadcast by President Museveni in December 1998, which made “it clear that no involvement of the members of the Ugan¬dan armed forces in commercial activities in eastern Congo would be tolerated”. Furthermore, Uganda points out that “the Porter Commission found that there was no Ugandan governmental policy to exploit the DRC’s natural resources”. It maintains that the Porter Commission con¬firmed that the Ugandan Government’s policy was to forbid its officers and soldiers from engaging in any business or commercial activities in the DRC. However, in cases where the Porter Commission found that there was evidence to support allegations that individual soldiers engaged in commercial activities and looting “acting in a purely private capacity for their personal enrichment”, the Government of Uganda accepted the Commission’s recommendations to initiate criminal investigations against the alleged offenders.
235. Uganda recognizes that, as found by the Porter Commission, there were instances of illegal commercial activities or looting committed by certain members of the Ugandan military forces acting in their private capacity and in violation of orders and instructions given to them “by the highest State authorities”. However, Uganda maintains that these indi¬vidual acts cannot be characterized as “internationally wrongful acts” of
Uganda. For Uganda, violations by Ugandan nationals of the internal law of Uganda or of certain Congolese rules and practices in the territo¬ries where rebels exercised de facto administrative authority, referred to by the Porter Commission, do not necessarily constitute an internation¬ally wrongful act, “for it is well known that the originating act giving rise to international responsibility is not an act characterized as ‘illegal’ by the domestic law of the State but an ‘internationally wrongful act’ imputable to a State”.
236. Finally, Uganda asserts that the DRC neither specified precisely the wrongful acts for which it seeks to hold Uganda internationally responsible nor did it demonstrate that “it suffered direct injury as a result of acts which it seeks to impute to Uganda”. In this regard Uganda refers to the Porter Commission, which, according to Uganda, concluded that “the overwhelming majority, if not all, of the allegations concerning the exploitation of the DRC’s forest and agricultural resources by Uganda or by Ugandan soldiers”, were not proven; that several allegations of looting were also unfounded; and that Uganda “had at no time intended to exploit the natural resources of the DRC or to use those resources to ‘finance the war’ and that it did not do so”.
FINDINGS OF THE COURT CONCERNING ACTS OF ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
237.    The Court observes that in order to substantiate its allegations the DRC refers to the United Nations Panel reports and to the Porter Commission Report. The Court has already expressed its view with regard to the evidentiary value of the Porter Commission materials in general (see paragraph 61 above) and considers that both the Porter Commission Report, as well as the United Nations Panel reports, to the extent that they have later proved to be probative, furnish sufficient and convincing evidence for it to determine whether or not Uganda engaged in acts of looting, plundering and illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natu¬ral resources. Taking this into account, in order to rule on the third sub¬mission of the DRC, the Court will draw its conclusions on the basis of the evidence it finds reliable.
In reaching its decision on the DRC’s claim, it is not necessary for the Court to make findings of fact with regard to each individual incident alleged.
238.    According to the Porter Commission Report, the written message sent by General Kazini in response to the radio message broadcast by the Ugandan President in December 1998 demonstrated that the General was aware of problems of conduct of some UPDF officers, that he did not take any “real action until the matter became public” and that he did not inform the President. The Commission further states that it follows from General Kazini’s message that he, in point of fact, admitted that the allegation that “some top officers in the UPDF were planning from the beginning to do business in Congo was generally true”; “that Comman¬ders in business partnership with Ugandans were trading in the DRC, about which General Kazini took no action”; and that Ugandan “mili¬tary aircraft were carrying Congolese businessmen into Entebbe, and carrying items which they bought in Kampala back to the Congo”. The Commission noted that, while certain orders directed against the use of military aircraft by businessmen were made by General Kazini, that prac¬tice nonetheless continued. The Commission also referred to a radio mes¬sage of General Kazini in which he said that “officers in the Colonel Peter Kerim sector, Bunia and based at Kisangani Airport were engaging in business contrary to the presidential radio message”. The Commission further stated that General Kazini was aware that officers and men of the UPDF were involved in gold mining and trade, smuggling and looting of civilians.
239.    The Commission noted that General Kazini’s radio messages in response to the reports about misconduct of the UPDF did not intend, in point of fact, to control this misconduct. It stated as follows:
“There is no doubt that his purpose in producing these messages was to try to show that he was taking action in respect of these problems. . . There appears to have been little or no action taken as a result of these messages … all this correspondence was intended by General Kazini to cover himself, rather than to prompt action. There also appears to be litle or no follow up to the orders given.”
240.    The Commission found that General Kazini was “an active sup¬porter in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of Victoria, an organiza¬tion engaged in smuggling diamonds through Uganda: and it is difficult to believe that he was not profiting for himself from the operation”. The Commission explained that the company referred to as “Victoria” in its Report dealt “in diamonds, gold and coffee which it purchased from Isiro, Bunia, Bumba, Bondo, Buta and Kisangani” and that it paid taxes to the MLC.
241.    The Commission further recognized that there had been exploita¬tion of the natural resources of the DRC since 1998, and indeed from before that. This exploitation had been carried out, inter alia, by senior army officers working on their own and through contacts inside the DRC; by individual soldiers taking advantage of their postings; by cross- border trade and by private individuals living within Uganda. There were instances of looting, “about which General Kazini clearly knew as he sent a radio message about it. This Commission is unable to exclude the pos¬sibility that individual soldiers of the UPDF were involved, or that they were supported by senior officers.” The Commission’s investigations “reveal that there is no doubt that both RCD and UPDF soldiers were imposing a gold tax, and that it is very likely that UPDF soldiers were involved in at least one mining accident”.
242.    Having examined the case file, the Court finds that it does not have at its disposal credible evidence to prove that there was a govern¬mental policy of Uganda directed at the exploitation of natural resources of the DRC or that Uganda’s military intervention was carried out in order to obtain access to Congolese resources. At the same time, the Court considers that it has ample credible and persuasive evidence to conclude that officers and soldiers of the UPDF, including the most high- ranking officers, were involved in the looting, plundering and exploita¬tion of the DRC’s natural resources and that the military authorities did not take any measures to put an end to these acts. (Such acts are referred to in a number of paragraphs in the Porter Commission Report, in particular, paragraphs 13.1. “UPDF Officers conducting business”, 13.2. “Gold Mining”, 13.4. “Looting”, 13.5. “Smuggling”, 14.4. “Alle¬gations against top UPDF Officers”, 14.5. “Allegations against General Kazini”, 15.7. “Organised Looting”, 20.3. “General James Kazini” and 21.3.4. “The Diamond Link: General Kazini”.)
243.    As the Court has already noted (see paragraph 213 above), Uganda is responsible both for the conduct of the UPDF as a whole and for the conduct of individual soldiers and officers of the UPDF in the DRC. The Court further recalls (see paragraph 214 above) that it is also irrelevant for the purposes of attributing their conduct to Uganda whether UPDF officers and soldiers acted contrary to instructions given or exceeded their authority. Thus the Court must now examine whether acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources by officers and soldiers of the UPDF and the failure of the Ugandan authorities to take adequate measures to ensure that such acts were not committed constitute a breach of Uganda’s international obligations.
244. The Court finds that it cannot uphold the contention of the DRC that Uganda violated the principle of the DRC’s sovereignty over its natural resources (see paragraph 226 above). The Court recalls that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is expressed in General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 and further elaborated in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (General Assembly resolution 3201 (S.VI) of 1 May 1974) and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974). While recognizing the importance of this principle, which is a principle of cus¬tomary international law, the Court notes that there is nothing in these General Assembly resolutions which suggests that they are applicable to the specific situation of looting, pillage and exploitation of certain natu¬ral resources by members of the army of a State militarily intervening in another State, which is the subject-matter of the DRC’s third submission. The Court does not believe that this principle is applicable to this type of situation.
245.    As the Court has already stated (see paragraph 180 above), the acts and omissions of members of Uganda’s military forces in the DRC engage Uganda’s international responsibility in all circumstances, whether it was an occupying Power in particular regions or not. Thus, whenever members of the UPDF were involved in the looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the territory of the DRC, they acted in violation of the jus in bello, which prohibits the commission of such acts by a foreign army in the territory where it is present. The Court notes in this regard that both Article 47 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibit pillage.
The Court further observes that both the DRC and Uganda are parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981, which in paragraph 2 of Article 21, states that “[i]n case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation”.
246.    The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to support the DRC’s claim that Uganda violated its duty of vigilance by not taking adequate measures to ensure that its military forces did not engage in the looting, plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources. As already noted, it is apparent that, despite instructions from the Ugandan President to ensure that such misconduct by UPDF troops cease, and despite assurances from General Kazini that he would take matters in hand, no action was taken by General Kazini and no verification was made by the Ugandan Government that orders were being followed up (see paragraphs 238-239 above). In particular the Court observes that the Porter Commission stated in its Report that
“[t]he picture that emerges is that of a deliberate and persistent indiscipline by commanders in the field, tolerated, even encouraged and covered by General Kazini, as shown by the incompetence or total lack of inquiry and failure to deal effectively with breaches of discipline at senior levels”.
(Also of relevance in the Porter Commission Report are paragraphs 13.1 “UPDF Officers conducting business”, 13.5 “Smuggling” and 14.5 “Alle¬gations against General Kazini”). It follows that by this failure to act Uganda violated its international obligations, thereby incurring its inter¬national responsibility. In any event, whatever measures had been taken by its authorities, Uganda’s responsibility was nonetheless engaged by the fact that the unlawful acts had been committed by members of its
armed forces (see paragraph 214 above).
247.    As for the claim that Uganda also failed to prevent the looting, plundering and illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources by rebel groups, the Court has already found that the latter were not under the control of Uganda (see paragraph 160 above). Thus, with regard to the illegal activities of such groups outside of Ituri, it cannot conclude that Uganda was in breach of its duty of vigilance.
248.    The Court further observes that the fact that Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri district (see paragraph 178 above) extends Uganda’s obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent the looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory to cover private persons in this district and not only members of Ugan¬dan military forces. It is apparent from various findings of the Porter Commission that rather than preventing the illegal traffic in natural resources, including diamonds, high-ranking members of the UPDF facili¬tated such activities by commercial entities. In this regard, the Report of the Commission mentions a company referred to as “Victoria” (see para¬graph 240 above), which operated, inter alia, in Bunia. In particular the Report indicates that “General Kazini gave specific instructions to UPDF Commanders in Isiro, Bunia, Beni, Bumba, Bondo and Buta to allow the Company to do business uninterrupted in the areas under their command”. (Also of relevance in the Report of the Commission are paragraphs 18.5.1 “Victoria Group”, 20.3 “General James Kazini” and 21.3 “The Diamond Link”.)
249.    Thus the Court finds that it has been proven that Uganda has not complied with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri district. The Court would add that Uganda’s argument that any exploitation of natural resources in the DRC was carried out for the benefit of the local population, as permitted under humanitarian law, is not supported by any reliable evidence.
250.    The Court concludes that it is in possession of sufficient credible evidence to find that Uganda is internationally responsible for acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources committed by members of the UPDF in the territory of the DRC, for violating its obligation of vigilance in regard to these acts and for failing to comply with its obligations under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 as an occupying Power in Ituri in respect of all acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied terri¬tory.
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS BY
UGANDA
251.    The Court, having established that Uganda committed interna¬tionally wrongful acts entailing its international responsibility (see para¬graphs 165, 220 and 250 above), turns now to the determination of the legal consequences which such responsibility involves.
252.    In its fourth submission the DRC requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
“4. (a)    ;
(b)    that the Republic of Uganda shall cease forthwith all continu¬ing internationally wrongful acts, and in particular its support for irregular forces operating in the DRC and its exploitation of Congolese wealth and natural resources;
(c)    that the Republic of Uganda shall provide specific guarantees and assurances that it will not repeat the wrongful acts com¬plained of;
(d)    that the Republic of Uganda is under an obligation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to make reparation for all injury caused to the latter by the violation of the obligations imposed by international law and set out in submissions 1, 2 and 3 above;
(e)    that the nature, form and amount of the reparation shall be determined by the Court, failing agreement thereon between the Parties, and that the Court shall reserve the subsequent pro-cedure for that purpose.”
253.    The DRC claims that, as the first legal consequence of the estab¬lishment of Uganda’s international responsibility, the latter is under an obligation to cease forthwith all continuing internationally wrongful acts. According to the DRC’s Memorial, this obligation of cessation covers, in particular, the occupation of Congolese territory, the support for irregu¬lar forces operating in the DRC, the unlawful detention of Congolese nationals and the exploitation of Congolese wealth and natural resources. In its Reply the DRC refers to the occupation of Congolese territory, the support for irregular forces operating in the DRC and the exploitation of Congolese wealth and natural resources. In its final submission presented at the end of the oral proceedings, the DRC, in view of the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the territory of the DRC, asks that Uganda cease from providing support for irregular forces operating in the DRC and cease from exploiting Congolese wealth and natural resources.
254. In answer to the question by Judge Vereshchetin (see para¬graph 22 above), the DRC explained that, while its claims relating to the occupation of the territory of the DRC covered the period from 6 August 1998 to 2 June 2003, other claims including those of new military actions, new acts of support to irregular forces, as well as continuing illegal exploitation of natural resources, covered the period from 2 August 1998 until the end of the oral proceedings. The Court notes, however, that it has not been presented with evidence to support allegations with regard to the period after 2 June 2003.
In particular, the Court observes that there is no evidence in the case file which can corroborate the DRC’s allegation that at present Uganda supports irregular forces operating in the DRC and continues to be involved in the exploitation of Congolese natural resources. Thus, the Court does not find it established that Uganda, following the withdrawal of its troops from the territory of the DRC in June 2003, continues to commit the internationally wrongful acts specified by the DRC. The Court thus concludes that the DRC’s request that Uganda be called upon to cease the acts referred to in its submission 4 (b) cannot be upheld.
255. The DRC further requests the Court to rule that Uganda provide specific guarantees and assurances of non-repetition of the wrongful acts complained of. The DRC claims that this request is justified by “the threats which accompanied the troop withdrawal in May 2003”. In this regard it alleges that in April 2003 Mr. James Wapakhabulo, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uganda, made a statement “according to which ‘the withdrawal of our troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo does not mean that we will not return there to defend our security!'”. As to the form of the guarantees and assurances of non- repetition, the DRC, referring to existing international practice, requests from Uganda “a solemn declaration that it will in future refrain from pursuing a policy that violates the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the rights of its population”; in addition, it “demands that specific instructions to that effect be given by the Ugandan authorities to their agents”.
256. In this respect the Court has taken judicial notice of the Tripartite Agreement on Regional Security in the Great Lakes, signed on 26 Octo¬ber 2004 by the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. In the Preamble of this Agreement the Parties emphasize “the need to ensure that the principles of good neighbourliness, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states are respected, particularly in the region”. Article I indicates that one of the objectives of the Agreement is to “[e]nsure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region and cessation of any support for armed groups or militias, in accordance with relevant reso¬lutions of the United Nations and other rules of international law”. Finally, in paragraph 1 of Article II, “[t]he Parties reiterate their commit¬ment to fulfil their obligations and undertakings under existing agree¬ments and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Coun¬cil”. The Parties further agreed to establish a Tripartite Joint Commission, which, inter alia, “shall implement the terms of this Agreement and ensure that the objectives of this Agreement are being met”.
257. The Court considers that, if a State assumes an obligation in an international agreement to respect the sovereignty and territorial integ¬rity of the other States parties to that agreement (an obligation which exists also under general international law) and a commitment to co¬operate with them in order to fulfil such obligation, this expresses a clear legally binding undertaking that it will not repeat any wrongful acts. In the Court’s view, the commitments assumed by Uganda under the Tri¬partite Agreement must be regarded as meeting the DRC’s request for specific guarantees and assurances of non-repetition. The Court expects and demands that the Parties will respect and adhere to their obligations under that Agreement and under general international law.
258. The DRC also asks the Court to adjudge and declare that Uganda is under an obligation to make reparation to the DRC for all injury caused by the violation by Uganda of its obligations under international law. The DRC contends that the internationally wrongful acts attri¬butable to Uganda which engaged the latter’s international responsi¬bility, namely “years of invasion, occupation, fundamental human rights violations and plundering of natural resources”, caused “massive war damage” and therefore entail an obligation to make reparation. The DRC acknowledges that “for the purposes of determining the extent of repara¬tion it must specify the nature of the injury and establish the causal link with the initial wrongful act”. However, at this stage of the proceedings the DRC requests a general declaration by the Court establishing the principle that reparation is due, with the determination of the exact amount of the damages and the nature, form and amount of the repara¬tion, failing agreement between the Parties, being deferred until a later stage in the proceedings. The DRC points out that such a procedure is “in accordance with existing international jurisprudence” and refers, in particular, to the Court’s Judgment on the merits in the case concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicara¬gua v. United States of America).
259.    The Court observes that it is well established in general interna¬tional law that a State which bears responsibility for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by that act (see Factory at Chorzow, Jurisdiction, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 21; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slova¬kia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 81, para. 152; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 59, para. 119). Upon examination of the case file, given the character of the internationally wrongful acts for which Uganda has been found responsible (illegal use of force, violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, military intervention, occupation of Ituri, viola¬tions of international human rights law and of international humani¬tarian law, looting, plunder and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources), the Court considers that those acts resulted in injury to the DRC and to persons on its territory. Having satisfied itself that this injury was caused to the DRC by Uganda, the Court finds that Uganda has an obligation to make reparation accordingly.
260.    The Court further considers appropriate the request of the DRC for the nature, form and amount of the reparation due to it to be deter¬mined by the Court, failing agreement between the Parties, in a subse¬quent phase of the proceedings. The DRC would thus be given the opportunity to demonstrate and prove the exact injury that was suffered as a result of specific actions of Uganda constituting internationally wrongful acts for which it is responsible. It goes without saying, however, as the Court has had the opportunity to state in the past, “that in the phase of the proceedings devoted to reparation, neither Party may call in question such findings in the present Judgment as have become res judi- cata” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 143, para. 284).
261.    The Court also notes that the DRC has stated its intention to seek initially to resolve the issue of reparation by way of direct negotia¬tions with Uganda and to submit the question to the Court only “failing agreement thereon between the parties”. It is not for the Court to deter¬mine the final result of these negotiations to be conducted by the Parties. In such negotiations, the Parties should seek in good faith an agreed solu¬tion based on the findings of the present Judgment.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT’S ORDER ON PROVISIONAL MEASURES
262.    In its fifth submission the DRC requests the Court to adjudge and declare
“5. That the Republic of Uganda has violated the Order of the Court on provisional measures of 1 July 2000, in that it has failed to comply with the following provisional measures:
“(1) both Parties must, forthwith, prevent and refrain from any action, and in particular any armed action, which might prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of what¬ever judgment the Court may render in the case, or which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve;
(2)    both Parties must, forthwith, take all measures necessary to comply with all of their obligations under international law, in particular those under the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and with United Nations Security Council resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000;
(3)    both Parties must, forthwith, take all measures necessary to ensure full respect within the zone of conflict for funda¬mental human rights and for the applicable provisions of humanitarian law’.”
263.    The Court observes that its “orders on provisional measures under Article 41 [of the Statute] have binding effect” (LaGrand (Ger¬many v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 506, para. 109). The Court recalls that the purpose of provisional measures is to protect the rights of either party, pending the determina¬tion of the merits of the case. The Court’s Order of 1 July 2000 on pro¬visional measures created legal obligations which both Parties were required to comply with.
264.    with regard to the question whether Uganda has complied with the obligations incumbent upon it as a result of the Order of 1 July 2000, the Court observes that the Order indicated three provisional measures, as referred to in the DRC’s fifth submission. The Court notes that the DRC put forward no specific evidence demonstrating that after July 2000 Uganda committed acts in violation of each of the three provisional measures indicated by the Court. The Court however observes that in the present Judgment it has found that Uganda is responsible for acts in vio¬lation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law carried out by its military forces in the territory of the DRC (see para-graph 220 above). The evidence shows that such violations were com¬mitted throughout the period when Ugandan troops were present in the DRC, including the period from 1 July 2000 until practically their final withdrawal on 2 June 2003 (see paragraphs 206-211 above). The Court thus concludes that Uganda did not comply with the Court’s Order on provisional measures of 1 July 2000.
265. The Court further notes that the provisional measures indicated in the Order of 1 July 2000 were addressed to both Parties. The Court’s finding in paragraph 264 is without prejudice to the question as to whether the DRC did not also fail to comply with the provisional measures indicated by the Court.
COUNTER-CLAIMS : ADMISSIBILITY OF OBJECTIONS
266. It is recalled that, in its Counter-Memorial, Uganda submitted three counter-claims (see paragraph 5 above). Uganda’s counter-claims were presented in Chapter XVIII of the Counter-Memorial. Uganda’s first counter-claim related to acts of aggression allegedly committed by the DRC against Uganda. Uganda contended that the DRC had acted in violation of the principle of the non-use of force incorporated in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and found in custom¬ary international law, and of the principle of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Uganda’s second counter-claim related to attacks on Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel in Kin¬shasa, and on Ugandan nationals, for which the DRC is alleged to be responsible. Uganda contended that the acts of the DRC amounted to an illegal use of force, and were in breach of certain rules of conventional or customary international law relating to the protection of persons and property. Uganda’s third counter-claim related to alleged violations by the DRC of specific provisions of the Lusaka Agreement. Uganda also requested that the Court reserve the issue of reparation in relation to the counter-claims for a subsequent stage of the proceedings (see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 664, para. 4).
267. By an Order of 29 November 2001 the Court found, with regard to the first and second counter-claims, that the Parties’ respective claims in both cases related to facts of the same nature and formed part of the same factual complex, and that the Parties were moreover pursuing the same legal aims. The Court accordingly concluded that these two counter-claims were admissible as such (I.C.J. Reports2001, pp. 678-682, paras. 38-41, 45 and 51). By contrast, the Court found that Uganda’s third counter-claim was inadmissible as such, since it was not directly connected with the subject-matter of the DRC’s claims (ibid., pp. 680¬682, paras. 42-43, 45 and 51).
*
268. The DRC maintains that the joinder of Uganda’s first and second counter-claims to the proceedings does not imply that preliminary objec¬tions cannot be raised against them. The DRC contends that it is there¬fore entitled to raise objections to the admissibility of the counter-claims at this stage of the proceedings. Furthermore, the DRC states that it had “clearly indicated in its written observations on Uganda’s counter-claims, in June 2001, that is to say prior to the Order made by the Court in November 2001, that it reserved the right to submit preliminary objec¬tions in its Reply” (emphasis in the original). As it was unable to comply literally with Article 79, which does not expressly contemplate the sub¬mission of preliminary objections in respect of counter-claims, the DRC states that it applied the principle of that provision, mutatis mutandis, to the situation with which it was confronted, i.e. it submitted the objections in the first written pleading following both the submission of counter¬claims by Uganda in its Counter-Memorial and the Order whereby the Court ruled on the admissibility of those claims as counter-claims. According to the DRC, the Court only ruled in its Order of 29 November 2001 “on the admissibility of this claim as a counter-claim, without pre¬judging any other question which might arise with respect to it” (empha¬sis in the original). The DRC further argues that the Court’s decision is limited to the context of Article 80 of its Rules, and in no way “consti¬tutes a ruling on the admissibility of the counter-claims as new claims joined to the proceedings”.
*
269. Uganda asserts that the DRC is no longer entitled at this stage of the proceedings to plead the inadmissibility of the counter-claims, since the Court’s Order of 29 November 2001 is a definitive determination on counter-claims under Article 80 of the Rules of Court and precludes any discussion on the admissibility of the counter-claims themselves. Uganda further contends that the DRC never submitted its preliminary objections in the form or within the time-limit prescribed by Article 79 of the Rules of Court.
270.    In its consideration of the counter-claims submitted by Uganda, the Court must first address the question whether the DRC is entitled to challenge at this stage of the proceedings the admissibility of the counter¬claims.
271.    The Court notes that in the Oil Platforms case it was called upon to resolve the same issue now raised by Uganda. In that case, the Court concluded that Iran was entitled to challenge the admissibility of the United States counter-claim in general, even though the counter-claim had previously been found admissible under Article 80 of the Rules (Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judg¬ment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 210, para. 105). Discussing its prior Order, the Court declared:
“When in that Order the Court ruled on the ‘admissibility’ of the counter-claim, the task of the Court at that stage was only to verify whether or not the requirements laid down by Article 80 of the Rules of Court were satisfied, namely, that there was a direct connection of the counter-claim with the subject-matter of the [principal] claims …” (Ibid.)
272.    There is nothing in the facts of the present case that compels a different conclusion. On the contrary, the language of the Court’s Order of 29 November 2001 clearly calls for the same outcome as the Court reached in the Oil Platforms case. After finding the first and second counter-claim admissible under the Article 80 connection test, the Court emphasized in its Order of 29 November 2001 that “a decision given on the admissibility of a counter-claim taking account of the requirements of Article 80 of the Rules of Court in no way prejudges any question with which the Court would have to deal during the remainder of the proceed¬ings” (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Repub¬lic of the Congo v. Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 681, para. 46).
273.    The enquiry under Article 80 as to admissibility is only in regard to the question whether a counter-claim is directly connected with the subject-matter of the principal claim; it is not an over-arching test of admissibility. Thus the Court, in its Order of 29 November 2001, intended only to settle the question of a “direct connection” within the meaning of Article 80. At that point in time it had before it only an objection to admissibility founded on the absence of such a connection.
274.    With regard to Uganda’s contention that the preliminary objec¬tions of the DRC are inadmissible because they failed to conform to Article 79 of the Rules of Court, the Court would observe that Article 79 concerns the case of an “objection by the respondent to the jurisdiction of the Court or to the admissibility of the application, or other objection the decision upon which is requested before any further proceedings on the merits”. It is inapplicable to the case of an objection to counter¬claims which have been joined to the original proceedings. The Court notes that nonetheless, the DRC raised objections to the counter-claims in its Reply, i.e., the first pleading following the submission of Uganda’s Counter-Memorial containing its counter-claims.
275. In light of the findings above, the Court concludes that the DRC is still entitled, at this stage of the proceedings, to challenge the admissi- bility of Uganda’s counter-claims.
* *
FIRST COUNTER-CLAIM
276.    In its first counter-claim, Uganda contends that, since 1994, it has been the victim of military operations and other destabilizing activities carried out by hostile armed groups based in the DRC (which between 1971 and 1997 was called Zaire) and either supported or tolerated by suc¬cessive Congolese governments. Uganda asserts that elements of these anti-Ugandan armed groups were supported by the Sudan and fought in co-operation with the Sudanese and Congolese armed forces. Uganda further claims that the DRC cultivated its military alliance with the Government of the Sudan, pursuant to which the Sudanese army occu¬pied airfields in north-eastern Congo for the purpose of delivering arms, supplies and troops to the anti-Ugandan rebels.
277.    Uganda maintains that actions taken in support of the anti- Ugandan insurgents on the part of the Congolese authorities constitute a violation of the general rule forbidding the use of armed force in inter¬national relations, as well as a violation of the principle of non-interven¬tion in the internal affairs of a State. Uganda recalls in particular that
“[i]n the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice pointed out that ‘every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States’ is a ‘general and well-recognized principle’ (I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 22-23)”.
In Uganda’s view, from this principle there flows not only a duty to refrain from providing any support to groups carrying out subversive or terrorist activities against another State, but also a duty of vigilance to ensure that such activities are not tolerated. In the present case, Uganda contends that “the DRC not only tolerated the anti-Ugandan rebels, but also supported them very effectively in various ways, before simply incorporating some of them into its armed forces”.
278.    In the context of the DRC’s alleged involvement in supporting anti-Ugandan irregular forces from May 1997 to August 1998, Uganda contends that it is not necessary to prove the involvement of the DRC in each attack; it suffices to prove that “President Kabila and his govern¬ment were co-ordinating closely with the anti-Ugandan rebels prior to August 1998”.
279.    According to Uganda, the DRC’s support for anti-Ugandan armed irregular forces cannot be justified as a form of self-defence in response to the alleged armed aggression by Uganda, since the DRC’s military alliances with the rebel groups and the Sudan and their activities preceded Uganda’s decision of 11 September 1998 to send its troops into the DRC (see paragraphs 37, 39 and 121 above).
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280. In rebutting Uganda’s first counter-claim, the DRC divides it into three periods of time, corresponding to distinct factual and legal situa¬tions: (a) the period prior to President Laurent-Desire Kabila coming to power; (b) the period starting from the accession to power of President Kabila until 2 August 1998, the date on which Uganda’s military attack was launched; and (c) the period subsequent to 2 August 1998. It sub¬mits that, in so far as the alleged claim that the DRC was involved in armed attacks against Uganda covers the first period, it is inadmissible and, in the alternative, groundless. It further asserts that the claim has no basis in fact for the second period and that it is not founded in fact or in law regarding the third period.
281.    With regard to the first period, before President Kabila came to power in May 1997, the DRC contends that the Ugandan counter-claim is inadmissible on the basis that Uganda renounced its right to invoke the international responsibility of the DRC (Zaire at the time) in respect of acts dating back to that period. In particular, the DRC contends that “Uganda never expressly imputed international responsibility to Zaire” and did not “express any intention of formally invoking such responsi¬bility”. The DRC further states that the close collaboration between the two States after President Kabila came to power, including in the area of security, justifiably led the Congolese authorities to believe that “Uganda had no intention of resurrecting certain allegations from the period con¬cerned and of seeking to engage the Congo’s international responsibility on that basis”.
282.    In the alternative, the DRC claims that the first Ugandan counter-claim in respect of this period is devoid of foundation, since the documents presented in support of Uganda’s contention, “emanating unilaterally from Uganda, fail to meet the judicial standard of proof” and that Uganda has made no efforts to provide further proof.
283.    In any event, the DRC denies having breached any duty of vigi¬lance, during the period when Marshal Mobutu was in power, by having failed to prevent Ugandan rebel groups from using its territory to launch attacks in Uganda. The DRC also denies having provided political and military support to those groups during the period concerned.
284.    Regarding the second period, from May 1997 to early August 1998, the DRC reiterates that it has always denied having provided mili¬tary support for Ugandan rebel groups or having participated in their military operations. According to the DRC, Uganda has failed to demonstrate not only that the rebel groups were its de facto agents, but also that the DRC had planned, prepared or participated in any attack or that the DRC had provided support to Ugandan irregular forces.
285.    The DRC further contends that no evidence has been adduced to support the claim that, in early August 1998, the DRC entered into a military alliance with the Sudan. In the view of the DRC, Uganda has failed to provide proof either of the alleged meeting which was said to have taken place between the President of the DRC and the President of the Sudan in May 1998, or of the alleged agreement concluded between the DRC and the Sudan that same month and designed to destabilize Uganda.
286.    With regard to the third period, the DRC maintains that the documents presented by Uganda, which were prepared by the Ugandan authorities themselves, are not sufficient to establish that the DRC was involved in any attacks against Uganda after the beginning of August 1998. Likewise, the DRC states that the allegations of general support by the DRC for the anti-Ugandan rebels cannot be substantiated by the documents submitted by Uganda.
287.    The DRC argues in the alternative that, in any event, from a legal perspective it was in a position of self-defence from that date onwards; and that, in view of the involvement of the UPDF in the airborne opera¬tion at Kitona on 4 August 1998, the DRC would have been entitled to use force to repel the aggression against it, as well as to seek support from other States.
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288.    In response to the foregoing arguments of the DRC as set out in paragraphs 280 to 281 above, Uganda states the following.
289.    It disagrees that the first counter-claim should be divided into three historical periods, namely, from 1994 to 1997 (under Mobutu’s presidency), from May 1997 to 2 August 1998, and the period beginning on 2 August 1998. Uganda argues that in its Order of 29 November 2001 the Court found that “Uganda’s counter-claim satisfied the direct con¬nection requirement laid down by Article 80 of the Rules of Court and did so for the entire period since 1994”. In Uganda’s view, this shows that the Court “refuses to accept the DRC’s argument that three periods should be distinguished in the history of recent relations between the Congo and Uganda”. Uganda further asserts that by attempting to “slice” a continuing wrongful act into separate periods the DRC is seek¬ing to “limit Uganda’s counter-claim”. Uganda maintains that Zaire and the DRC “are not distinct entities” and that “by virtue of the State con-tinuity principle, it is precisely the same legal person” which is respon¬sible for the acts complained of in the first counter-claim.
290. With reference to the objection raised by the DRC that Uganda is precluded from filing a claim in relation to alleged violations of its terri¬torial sovereignty on the grounds that it renounced its right to do so, Uganda argues that the conditions required in international law for the waiver of an international claim to be recognized are not satisfied in the present case. In terms of fact, Uganda asserts that, during the Mobutu years, it repeatedly protested against Zaire’s passive and active support of anti-Ugandan forces directly to Zaire and to the United Nations. Uganda also repeatedly informed the United Nations of Zaire’s joint efforts with the Sudan to destabilize Uganda. Uganda further argues that its co-operation with Laurent-Desire Kabila’s AFDL movement, aimed at improving security along the common border area, did not amount to a waiver of any earlier claims against Zaire. In terms of law, Uganda asserts that in any event the absence of protest does not validate illegal acts and that any failure to address complaints to the Security Council should not be regarded as a cause of inadmissibility. Uganda concludes that the DRC’s objections to its first counter-claim should therefore be dismissed.
Rules, nor does it deal with the merits of the first counter-claim. Neither does the Order prejudge any question as to the possibility of dividing this counter-claim according to specific periods of time. The Court is not therefore precluded, if it is justified by the circumstances of the case, from considering the first counter-claim following specific time periods. In the present case, in view of the fact that the historical periods identi¬fied by the DRC indeed differ in their factual context and are clearly distinguishable, the Court does not see any obstacle to examining Uganda’s first counter-claim following these three periods of time and for practical purposes deems it useful to do so.
292.    The Court now turns to the question of admissibility of the part of the first counter-claim of Uganda relating to the period prior to May 1997. The Court observes that the DRC has not presented any evidence showing an express renunciation by Uganda of its right to bring a counter-claim in relation to facts dating back to the Mobutu regime. Rather, it argues that Uganda’s subsequent conduct amounted to an implied waiver of whatever claims it might have had against the DRC as a result of the actions or inaction of the Mobutu regime.
293.    The Court observes that waivers or renunciations of claims or rights must either be express or unequivocally implied from the conduct of the State alleged to have waived or renounced its right. In the case concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), the Court rejected a similar argument of waiver put forth by Australia, which argued that Nauru had renounced certain of its claims; noting the absence of any express waiver, the Court furthermore considered that a waiver of those claims could not be implied on the basis of the conduct of Nauru (Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 247¬250, paras. 12-21). Similarly, the International Law Commission, in its commentary on Article 45 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, points out that “[a]lthough it may be possible to infer a waiver from the conduct of the States con-cerned or from a unilateral statement, the conduct or statement must be unequivocal” (ILC report, doc. A/56/10, 2001, p. 308). In the Court’s view, nothing in the conduct of Uganda in the period after May 1997 can be considered as implying an unequivocal waiver of its right to bring a counter-claim relating to events which occurred during the Mobutu regime.
294.    The period of friendly relations enjoyed between the DRC and Uganda between May 1997 and July 1998 does nothing to affect this out¬come. A period of good or friendly relations between two States should not, without more, be deemed to prevent one of the States from raising a pre-existing claim against the other, either when relations between the two States have again deteriorated or even while the good relations continue. The political climate between States does not alter their legal rights.
295.    The Court further observes that, in a situation where there is a delay on the part of a State in bringing a claim, it is “for the Court to determine in the light of the circumstances of each case whether the pas¬sage of time renders an application inadmissible” (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 254, para. 32). In the circumstances of the present case, the long period of time between the events at stake during the Mobutu regime and the filing of Uganda’s counter-claims has not rendered inadmissible Uganda’s first counter-claim for the period prior to May 1997.
296.    The Court accordingly finds that the DRC’s objection cannot be upheld.
297.    Regarding the merits of Uganda’s first counter-claim for the period prior to May 1997, Uganda alleges that the DRC breached its duty of vigilance by allowing anti-Ugandan rebel groups to use its territory to launch attacks on Uganda, and by providing political and military support to those groups during this period.
298.    The Court considers that Uganda has not produced sufficient evi¬dence to show that the Zairean authorities were involved in providing political and military support for specific attacks against Ugandan terri¬tory. The bulk of the evidence submitted consists of uncorroborated Ugandan military intelligence material and generally fails to indicate the sources from which it is drawn. Many such statements are unsigned. In addition, many documents were submitted as evidence by Uganda, such as the address by President Museveni to the Ugandan Parliament on 28 May 2000, entitled “Uganda’s Role in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, and a document entitled “Chronological Illustration of Acts of Destabilization by Sudan and Congo based Dissidents”. In the circum¬stances of this case, these documents are of limited probative value to the extent that they were neither relied on by the other Party nor corrobo¬rated by impartial, neutral sources. Even the documents that purportedly relate eyewitness accounts are vague and thus unconvincing. For example, the information allegedly provided by an ADF deserter, reproduced in Annex 60 to the Counter-Memorial, is limited to the following: “In 1996 during Mobutu era before Mpondwe attack, ADF received several weapons from Sudan government with the help of Zaire government.” The few reports of non-governmental organizations put forward by Uganda (e.g. a report by HRW) are too general to support a claim of Congolese involvement rising to a level engaging State responsibility.
299. In sum, none of the documents submitted by Uganda, taken separately or together, can serve as a sound basis for the Court to con¬clude that the alleged violations of international law occurred. Thus Uganda has failed to discharge its burden of proof with regard to its allegation that Zaire provided political and military support to anti- Ugandan rebel groups operating in its territory during the Mobutu regime.
300.    As to the question of whether the DRC breached its duty of vigi¬lance by tolerating anti-Ugandan rebels on its territory, the Court notes that this is a different issue from the question of active support for the rebels, because the Parties do not dispute the presence of the anti- Ugandan rebels on the territory of the DRC as a factual matter. The DRC recognized that anti-Ugandan groups operated on the territory of the DRC from at least 1986. Under the Declaration on Friendly Relations, “every State has the duty to refrain from . . . acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts” (e.g., terrorist acts, acts of internal strife) and also “no State shall.. . tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State . . .”.As stated earlier, these provisions are declaratory of customary international law (see paragraph 162 above).
301.    The Court has noted that, according to Uganda, the rebel groups were able to operate “unimpeded” in the border region between the DRC and Uganda “because of its mountainous terrain, its remoteness from Kinshasa (more than 1,500 km), and the almost complete absence of central government presence or authority in the region during President Mobutu’s 32-year term in office”.
During the period under consideration both anti-Ugandan and anti- Zairean rebel groups operated in this area. Neither Zaire nor Uganda were in a position to put an end to their activities. However, in the light of the evidence before it, the Court cannot conclude that the absence of action by Zaire’s Government against the rebel groups in the border area is tantamount to “tolerating” or “acquiescing” in their activities. Thus, the part of Uganda’s first counter-claim alleging Congolese responsibility for tolerating the rebel groups prior to May 1997 cannot be upheld.
302.    With regard to the second period, from May 1997 until 2 August 1998, the DRC does not contest the admissibility of Uganda’s counter¬claim. Rather, it argues simply that the counter-claim has no basis in
fact.
303.    In relation to this period, the Court finds that Uganda has failed to provide conclusive evidence of actual support for anti-Ugandan rebel groups by the DRC. Whereas in the first period the counter-claim suf¬fered from a general lack of evidence showing the DRC’s support for anti-Ugandan rebels, the second period is marked by clear action by the DRC against the rebels. Relations between the DRC and Uganda during this second period improved and the two Governments undertook joint actions against the anti-Ugandan rebels. The DRC consented to the deployment of Ugandan troops in the border area. In April 1998 the DRC and Uganda even concluded an agreement on security along the common border (see paragraph 46 above). The DRC was thus acting against the rebels, not in support of them. It appears, however, that, due to the difficulty and remoteness of the terrain discussed in relation to the first period, neither State was capable of putting an end to all the rebel activities despite their efforts in this period. Therefore, Uganda’s counter¬claim with respect to this second period also must fail.
304. In relation to the third period, following 2 August 1998, the Court has already found that the legal situation after the military inter¬vention of the Ugandan forces into the territory of the DRC was, after 7 August, essentially one of illegal use of force by Uganda against the DRC (see paragraph 149 above). In view of the finding that Uganda engaged in an illegal military operation against the DRC, the Court con¬siders that the DRC was entitled to use force in order to repel Uganda’s attacks. The Court also notes that it has never been claimed that this use of force was not proportionate nor can the Court conclude this from the evidence before it. It follows that any military action taken by the DRC against Uganda during this period could not be deemed wrongful since it would be justified as action taken in self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, the Court has already found that the facts alleged by Uganda in its counter-claim in respect of this period, namely the participation of DRC regular troops in attacks by anti- Ugandan rebels against the UPDF and the training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying of anti-Ugandan insurgents, cannot be con¬sidered as proven (see paragraphs 121-147 above). Consequently, Uganda’s first counter-claim cannot be upheld as regards the period following 2 August 1998.
305. The Court thus concludes that the first counter-claim submitted by Uganda fails in its entirety.
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SECOND COUNTER-CLAIM
306. In its second counter-claim, Uganda claims that Congolese armed forces carried out three separate attacks on the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa in August, September and November 1998; confiscated property belonging to the Government of Uganda, Ugandan diplomats and Ugandan nationals; and maltreated diplomats and other Ugandan nationals present on the premises of the mission.
307.    In particular, Uganda contends that on or around 11 August 1998 Congolese soldiers stormed the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa, threatened the ambassador and other diplomats, demanding the release of certain Rwandan nationals. According to Uganda, the Congolese soldiers also stole money found in the Chancery. Uganda alleges that, despite protests by Ugandan Embassy officials, the Congolese Govern¬ment took no action.
308.    Uganda further asserts that, prior to their evacuation from the DRC on 20 August 1998, 17 Ugandan nationals and Ugandan diplomats were likewise subjected to inhumane treatment by FAC troops stationed at Ndjili International Airport. Uganda alleges that, before releasing the Ugandans, the FAC troops confiscated their money, valuables and brief¬cases. Uganda states that a Note of protest with regard to this incident was sent by the Embassy of Uganda to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRC on 21 August 1998.
309.    Uganda claims that in September 1998, following the evacuation of the remaining Ugandan diplomats from the DRC, FAC troops forcibly seized the Ugandan Chancery and the official residence of the Ugandan Ambassador in Kinshasa. Uganda maintains that the Congolese troops stole property from the premises, including four embassy vehicles. According to Uganda, on 23 November 1998 FAC troops again forcibly entered the Ugandan Chancery and the official residence of the Ugandan Ambassador in Kinshasa and stole property, including embassy furni¬ture, household and personal effects belonging to the Ambassador and to other diplomatic staff, embassy office equipment, Ugandan flags and four vehicles belonging to Ugandan nationals. Uganda alleges that the Congolese army also occupied the Chancery and the official residence of the Ugandan Ambassador.
310.    Uganda states that on 18 December 1998 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uganda sent a Note of protest to the Ministry of Foreign affairs of the DRC, in which it referred to the incidents of September 1998 and 23 November 1998 and demanded, inter alia, that the Govern¬ment of the DRC return all the property taken from the Embassy premises, that all Congolese military personnel vacate the two buildings and that the mission be protected from any further intrusion.
311.    Uganda alleges, moreover, that “[t]he Congolese government permitted WNBF commander Taban Amin, the son of former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, to occupy the premises of the Uganda Embassy in Kinshasa and establish his official headquarters and residence at those facilities”. In this regard, Uganda refers to a Note of protest dated 21 March 2001, whereby the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uganda requested that the Government of the DRC ask Mr. Taban Amin to vacate the Ugandan Embassy’s premises in Kinshasa.
312.    Uganda further refers to a visit on 28 September 2002 by a joint delegation of Ugandan and Congolese officials to the Chancery and the official residence of the Ambassador of Uganda in Kinshasa. Uganda notes that the Status Report, signed by the representatives of both Parties following the visit, indicates that “at the time of the inspection, both premises were occupied” and that the joint delegation “did not find any movable property belonging to the Uganda embassy or its former offi¬cials”. Uganda states that the joint delegation also “found the buildings in a state of total disrepair”. As a result of that situation, Uganda claims that it was recently obliged to rent premises for its diplomatic and con-sular mission in Kinshasa.
313.    Uganda argues that the DRC’s actions are in breach of interna¬tional diplomatic and consular law, in particular Articles 22 (inviolability of the premises of the mission), 29 (inviolability of the person of diplo¬matic agents), 30 (inviolability of the private residence of a diplomatic agent) and 24 (inviolability of archives and documents of the mission) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, Uganda contends that,
“[t]he inhumane treatment and threats to the security and freedom of nationals of Uganda . . . constitute a series of breaches of the international minimum standard relating to the treatment of foreign nationals lawfully on State territory, which standard forms a part of customary or general international law”;
and that, in respect of the seizure of the Embassy of Uganda, the official residence of the Ambassador and official cars of the mission, these actions constitute an unlawful expropriation of the public property of Uganda.
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314.    The DRC contends that Uganda’s second counter-claim is par¬tially inadmissible on the ground that Uganda has ascribed new legal bases in its Rejoinder to the DRC’s responsibility by including claims based on the violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela¬tions. According to the DRC, Uganda thus breaks the connection with the principal claim, which refers to “the violation of the United Nations Charter provisions on the use of force and on non-intervention, as well as the Hague and Geneva Conventions on the protection of persons and property in time of occupation and armed conflict”. The DRC also asserts that the alleged modification of the subject-matter of this part of the dispute is manifestly incompatible with the Court’s Order of 29 November 2001.
315. The DRC further argues that the claim based on the inhumane treatment of Ugandan nationals cannot be admitted, because the require¬ments for admissibility of a diplomatic protection claim are not satisfied. As for the first condition relating to the nationality of the alleged victims, the DRC claims that Uganda has not shown that the persons on whose behalf it is claiming to act are of Ugandan nationality and not Rwandan or of any dual nationality. Regarding the second condition relating to the exhaustion of local remedies, the DRC contends that,
“since it seems that these individuals left the Democratic Republic of the Congo in a group in August 1998 and that is when they allegedly suffered the unspecified, unproven injuries, it would not appear that the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies has been satisfied”.
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316.    Uganda, for its part, claims that Chapter XVIII of its Counter- Memorial “clearly shows, with no possibility of doubt, that since the beginning of the dispute Uganda has invoked violation of the 1961 Vienna Convention in support of its position on the responsibility of the Congo”. Uganda further notes that in its Order of 29 November 2001, in the context of Uganda’s second counter-claim, the Court concluded that the Parties were pursuing the same legal aims by seeking “to establish the responsibility of the other by invoking, in connection with the alleged illegal use of force, certain rules of conventional or customary interna¬tional law relating to the protection of persons and property” (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 679, para. 40). Uganda contends that the reference to “conventional. . . law” must necessarily relate to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, “the only conventional instrument expressly named in that part of the Counter-Memorial devoted to the second claim”. Thus Uganda argues that it has not changed the subject-matter of the dispute.
317.    As to the inadmissibility of the part of the claim relating to the alleged maltreatment of certain Ugandan nationals, according to Uganda it is not linked to any claims of Ugandan nationals; its claim is based on violations by the DRC, directed against Uganda itself, of general rules of international law relating to diplomatic relations, of which Ugandan nationals present in the premises of the mission were indirect victims. Uganda considers that local remedies need not be exhausted when the individual is only the indirect victim of a violation of a State-to-State obligation. Uganda states that “[t]he breaches of the Convention also constitute direct injury to Uganda and the local remedies rule is therefore inapplicable”. Uganda contends that, even assuming that this aspect of the second claim could be interpreted as the exercise by Uganda of diplomatic protection, the local remedies rule would not in any event be applicable because the principle is that the rule can only apply when effective remedies are available in the national system. In this regard, Uganda argues that any remedy before Congolese courts would be ineffective, due to the lack of impartiality within the Congolese justice system. Additionally, Uganda contends that
“[t]he inhumane treatment and threats to the security and freedom of nationals of Uganda . . . constitute a series of breaches of the international minimum standard relating to the treatment of foreign nationals lawfully on State territory, which standard forms a part of
customary or general international law”.
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318.    As to the merits of the second counter-claim, the DRC, without prejudice to its arguments on the inadmissibility of the second counter¬claim, argues that in any event Uganda has been unable to establish the factual and legal bases of its claims. According to the DRC, “none of these accusations made against [the DRC] by the Respondent has any serious and credible factual basis”. The DRC also challenges the eviden¬tiary value “in law” of the documents adduced by Uganda to support its claims.
319.    The DRC denies having subjected Ugandan nationals to inhumane treatment during an alleged attack on the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa on 11 August 1998 and denies that further attacks occurred in September and November 1998. According to the DRC, the Ugandan diplomatic buildings in Kinshasa were never seized or expropriated, nor has the DRC ever sought to prevent Uganda from reoccupying its prop¬erty. The DRC further states that it did not expropriate Ugandan public property in Kinshasa in August 1998, nor did it misappropriate the vehicles of the Ugandan diplomatic mission in Kinshasa, or remove the archives or seize movable property from those premises.
320.    The DRC likewise contests the assertion that it allowed the com¬mander of the WNBF to occupy the premises of the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa and to establish his official headquarters and residence there. The DRC also refutes the allegation that on 20 August 1998 various Ugandan nationals were maltreated by the FAC at Ndjili International Airport in Kinshasa.
321.    The DRC contends that the part of the claim relating to the alleged expropriation of Uganda’s public property is unfounded because Uganda has been unable to establish the factual and legal bases of its claims. According to the DRC, Uganda has not adduced any credible evidence to show that either the two buildings (the Embassy and the
Ambassador’s residence) or the four official vehicles were seized by the DRC.
*
322.    The Court will first turn to the DRC’s challenge to the admissi- bility of the second counter-claim on the grounds that, by formally invoking the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations for the first time in its Rejoinder of 6 December 2002, Uganda has “[sought] improp¬erly to enlarge the subject-matter of the dispute, contrary to the Statute and Rules of Court” and contrary to the Court’s Order of 29 November 2001.
323.    The Court first recalls that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations continues to apply notwithstanding the state of armed conflict that existed between the Parties at the time of the alleged maltreatment. The Court recalls that, according to Article 44 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations:
“The receiving State must, even in case of armed conflict, grant facilities in order to enable persons enjoying privileges and immuni¬ties, other than nationals of the receiving State, and members of the families of such persons irrespective of their nationality, to leave at the earliest possible moment. It must, in particular, in case of need, place at their disposal the necessary means of transport for them¬selves and their property.”
324.    Further, Article 45 of the Vienna Convention provides as follows:
“If diplomatic relations are broken off between two States, or if a mission is permanently or temporarily recalled:
(a)    the receiving State must, even in case of armed conflict, respect and protect the premises of the mission, together with its property and archives;
(b)    the sending State may entrust the custody of the premises of the mission, together with its property and archives, to a third State acceptable to the receiving State;
(c)    the sending State may entrust the protection of its interests and those of its nationals to a third State acceptable to the receiving State.”
In the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the Court emphasized that
“[e]ven in the case of armed conflict or in the case of a breach in diplomatic relations those provisions require that both the inviola¬bility of the members of a diplomatic mission and of the premises,… must be respected by the receiving State” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 40, para. 86).
325.    In relation to the DRC’s claim that the Court’s Order of 29 November 2001 precludes the subsequent invocation of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Court recalls the language of this Order:
“each Party holds the other responsible for various acts of oppres¬sion allegedly accompanying an illegal use of force . . . each Party seeks to establish the responsibility of the other by invoking, in con¬nection with the alleged illegal use of force, certain rules of conven¬tional or customary international law relating to the protection of persons and property” (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 679, para. 40; emphasis added).
326. The Court finds this formulation sufficiently broad to encompass claims based on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, taking note that the new claims are based on the same factual allegation, i.e. the alleged illegal use of force. The Court was entirely aware, when making its Order, that the alleged attacks were on Embassy premises. Later reference to specific additional legal elements, in the context of an alleged illegal use of force, does not alter the nature or subject-matter of the dispute. It was the use of force on Embassy premises that brought this counter-claim within the scope of Article 80 of the Rules, but that does not preclude examination of the special status of the Embassy. As the jurisprudence of the Court reflects, counter-claims do not have to rely on identical instruments to meet the “connection” test of Article 80 (see Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 318-319).
327.    The Court therefore finds that Uganda’s second counter-claim is not rendered inadmissible in so far as Uganda has subsequently invoked Articles 22, 24, 29, and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela¬tions.
328.    The Court will now consider the DRC’s challenge to the admis- sibility of the second counter-claim on the ground that it is in reality a claim founded on diplomatic protection and as such fails, as Uganda has not shown that the requirements laid down by international law for the exercise of diplomatic protection have been satisfied.
329.    The Court notes that Uganda relies on two separate legal bases in its allegations concerning the maltreatment of persons. With regard to diplomats, Uganda relies on Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Dip¬lomatic Relations. With regard to other Ugandan nationals not enjoying diplomatic status, Uganda grounds its claim in general rules of interna¬tional law relating to diplomatic relations and in the international mini¬mum standard relating to the treatment of foreign nationals who are present on a State’s territory. The Court will now address both of these bases in turn.
330.    First, as to alleged acts of maltreatment committed against Ugan¬dan diplomats finding themselves both within embassy premises and else¬where, the Court observes that Uganda’s second counter-claim aims at obtaining reparation for the injuries suffered by Uganda itself as a result of the alleged violations by the DRC of Article 29 of the Vienna Conven¬tion on Diplomatic Relations. Therefore Uganda is not exercising diplo¬matic protection on behalf of the victims but vindicating its own rights under the Vienna Convention. Accordingly, the Court finds that the failure to exhaust local remedies does not pose a barrier to Uganda’s counter-claim under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and the claim is thus admissible.
331.    As to acts of maltreatment committed against other persons on the premises of the Ugandan Embassy at the time of the incidents, the Court observes that the substance of this counter-claim currently before the Court as a direct claim, brought by Uganda in its sovereign capacity, concerning its Embassy in Kinshasa, falls within the ambit of Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Consequently, the objection advanced by the DRC to the admissibility of this part of Uganda’s second counter-claim cannot be upheld, and this part of the counter-claim is also admissible.
332.    The Court turns now to the part of Uganda’s second counter¬claim which concerns acts of maltreatment by FAC troops of Ugandan nationals not enjoying diplomatic status who were present at Ndjili Inter¬national Airport as they attempted to leave the country.
333.    The Court notes that Uganda bases this part of the counter-claim on the international minimum standard relating to the treatment of for¬eign nationals who are present on a State’s territory. The Court thus con¬siders that this part of Uganda’s counter-claim concerns injury to the particular individuals in question and does not relate to a violation of an international obligation by the DRC causing a direct injury to Uganda. The Court is of the opinion that in presenting this part of the counter¬claim Uganda is attempting to exercise its right to diplomatic protec¬tion with regard to its nationals. It follows that Uganda would need to meet the conditions necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection as recognized in general international law, namely the requirement of Ugandan nationality of the claimants and the prior exhaustion of local remedies. The Court observes that no specific documentation can be found in the case file identifying the individuals concerned as Ugandan nationals. The Court thus finds that, this condition not being met, Uganda’s counter-claim concerning the alleged maltreatment of its nationals not enjoying diplomatic status at Ndjili International Airport is inadmissible.
334.    Regarding the merits of Uganda’s second counter-claim, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to prove that there were attacks against the Embassy and acts of maltreatment against Ugandan diplo¬mats at Ndjili International Airport.
335.    The Court observes that various Ugandan diplomatic Notes addressed to the Congolese Foreign Ministry or to the Congolese Embassy in Kampala make reference to attacks by Congolese troops against the premises of the Ugandan Embassy and to the occupation by the latter of the buildings of the Chancery. In particular, the Court considers impor¬tant the Note of 18 December 1998 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uganda to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, protesting against Congolese actions in detriment of the Ugandan Chancery and property therein in September and November 1998, in violation of inter¬national law and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This Note deserves special attention because it was sent in duplicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Secretary- General of the OAU, requesting them to urge the DRC to meet its obligations under the Vienna Convention. The Court takes particular note of the fact that the DRC did not reject this accusation at the time at which it was made.
336.    Although some of the other evidence is inconclusive or appears to have been prepared unilaterally for purposes of litigation, the Court was particularly persuaded by the Status Report on the Residence and Chan¬cery, jointly prepared by the DRC and Uganda under the Luanda Agree¬ment. The Court has given special attention to this report, which was prepared on site and was drawn up with the participation of both Parties. Although the report does not offer a clear picture regarding the alleged attacks, it does demonstrate the resulting long-term occupation of the Ugandan Embassy by Congolese forces.
337.    Therefore, the Court finds that, as regards the attacks on Uganda’s diplomatic premises in Kinshasa, the DRC has breached its obligations under Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
338.    Acts of maltreatment by DRC forces of persons within the Ugan¬dan Embassy were necessarily consequential upon a breach of the invio¬lability of the Embassy premises prohibited by Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This is true regardless of whether the persons were or were not nationals of Uganda or Ugandan diplo¬mats. In so far as the persons attacked were in fact diplomats, the DRC further breached its obligations under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention.
339.    Finally, there is evidence that some Ugandan diplomats were maltreated at Ndjili International Airport when leaving the country. The
Court considers that a Note of Protest sent by the Embassy of Uganda to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRC on 21 August 1998, i.e. on the day following the incident, which at the time did not lead to a reply by the DRC denying the incident, shows that the DRC committed acts of maltreatment of Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport. The fact that the assistance of the dean of the diplomatic corps (Ambassador of Switzerland) was needed in order to organize an orderly departure of Ugandan diplomats from the airport is also an indication that the DRC failed to provide effective protection and treatment required under inter¬national law on diplomatic relations. The Court therefore finds that, through acts of maltreatment inflicted on Ugandan diplomats at the air¬port when they attempted to leave the country, the DRC acted in viola¬tion of its obligations under international law on diplomatic relations.
340. In summary, the Court concludes that, through the attacks by members of the Congolese armed forces on the premises of the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa, and their maltreatment of persons who found themselves at the Embassy at the time of the attacks, the DRC breached its obligations under Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Court further concludes that by the maltreatment by members of the Congolese armed forces of Ugandan diplomats on Embassy premises and at Ndjili International Airport, the DRC also breached its obligations under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention.
341.    As to the claim concerning Ugandan public property, the Court notes that the original wording used by Uganda in its Counter-Memorial was that property belonging to the Government of Uganda and Ugandan diplomats had been “confiscated”, and that later pleadings referred to “expropriation” of Ugandan public property. However, there is nothing to suggest that in this case any confiscation or expropriation took place in the technical sense. The Court therefore finds neither term suitable in the present context. Uganda appears rather to be referring to an illegal appropriation in the general sense of the term. The seizures clearly con¬stitute an unlawful use of that property, but no valid transfer of the title to the property has occurred and the DRC has not become, at any point in time, the lawful owner of such property.
342.    Regarding evidentiary issues, the Status Report on the Residence and Chancery, jointly prepared by the DRC and Uganda under the Luanda Agreement, provides sufficient evidence for the Court to con¬clude that Ugandan property was removed from the premises of the offi¬cial residence and Chancery. It is not necessary for the Court to make a determination as to who might have removed the property reported miss¬ing. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations not only prohibits any infringements of the inviolability of the mission by the receiving State itself but also puts the receiving State under an obligation to prevent others — such as armed militia groups — from doing so (see United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, pp. 30-32, paras. 61-67). Therefore, although the evidence available is insufficient to identify with precision the individuals who removed Ugandan property, the mere fact that items were removed is enough to establish that the DRC breached its obligations under the Vienna Con¬vention on Diplomatic Relations. At this stage, the Court considers that it has found sufficient evidence to hold that the removal of Ugandan property violated the rules of international law on diplomatic relations, whether it was committed by actions of the DRC itself or by the DRC’s failure to prevent such acts on the part of armed militia groups. Simi¬larly, the Court need not establish a precise list of items removed — a point of disagreement between the Parties — in order to conclude at this stage of the proceedings that the DRC breached its obligations under the relevant rules of international law. Although these issues will become important should there be a reparation stage, they are not rele¬vant for the Court’s finding on the legality or illegality of the acts of the DRC.
343. In addition to the issue of the taking of Ugandan public property described in paragraph 309, above, Uganda has specifically pleaded that the removal of “almost all of the documents in their archives and work¬ing files” violates Article 24 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The same evidence discussed in paragraph 342 also supports this contention, and the Court accordingly finds the DRC in violation of its obligations under Article 24 of the Vienna Convention.
344. The Court notes that, at this stage of the proceedings, it suffices for it to state that the DRC bears responsibility for the breach of the inviolability of the diplomatic premises, the maltreatment of Ugandan diplomats at the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa, the maltreatment of Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport, and for attacks on and seizure of property and archives from Ugandan diplomatic premises, in violation of international law on diplomatic relations. It would only be at a subsequent phase, failing an agreement between the Parties, that the specific circumstances of these violations as well as the precise damage suffered by Uganda and the extent of the reparation to which it is entitled would have to be demonstrated.
345. For these reasons,
THE COURT,
(1)    By sixteen votes to one,
Finds that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the latter’s territory, by occupying Ituri and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka, Abraham; Judge ad hoc Verhoeven;
AGAINST: Judge ad hoc Kateka;
(2)    Unanimously,
Finds admissible the claim submitted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo relating to alleged violations by the Republic of Uganda of its obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the course of hostilities between Ugandan and Rwandan military forces in Kisangani;
(3)    By sixteen votes to one,
Finds that the Republic of Uganda, by the conduct of its armed forces, which committed acts of killing, torture and other forms of inhumane treatment of the Congolese civilian population, destroyed villages and civilian buildings, failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets and to protect the civilian population in fighting with other com¬batants, trained child soldiers, incited ethnic conflict and failed to take measures to put an end to such conflict; as well as by its failure, as an occupying Power, to take measures to respect and ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in Ituri district, violated its obligations under international human rights law and inter¬national humanitarian law;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka, Abraham; Judge ad hoc Verhoeven; AGAINST: Judge ad hoc Kateka;
(4) By sixteen votes to one,
Finds that the Republic of Uganda, by acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources committed by members of the Ugandan armed forces in the territory of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and by its failure to comply with its obligations as an occu¬pying Power in Ituri district to prevent acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources, violated obligations owed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under international law;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka, Abraham; Judge ad hoc Verhoeven;
AGAINST: Judge ad hoc Kateka;
(5)    Unanimously,
Finds that the Republic of Uganda is under obligation to make repara¬tion to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the injury caused;
(6)    Unanimously,
Decides that, failing agreement between the Parties, the question of reparation due to the Democratic Republic of the Congo shall be settled by the Court, and reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case;
(7)    By fifteen votes to two,
Finds that the Republic of Uganda did not comply with the Order of the Court on provisional measures of 1 July 2000;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka, Abraham; Judge ad hoc Verhoeven;
AGAINST: Judge Kooijmans; Judge ad hoc Kateka;
(8)    Unanimously,
Rejects the objections of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the admissibility of the first counter-claim submitted by the Republic of Uganda;
(9)    By fourteen votes to three,
Finds that the first counter-claim submitted by the Republic of Uganda cannot be upheld;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Abraham; Judge ad hoc Verhoeven;
AGAINST: Judges Kooijmans, Tomka; Judge ad hoc Kateka;
(10)    Unanimously,
Rejects the objection of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the
admissibility of the part of the second counter-claim submitted by the Republic of Uganda relating to the breach of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961;
(11)    By sixteen votes to one,
Upholds the objection of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the admissibility of the part of the second counter-claim submitted by the Republic of Uganda relating to the maltreatment of individuals other than Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport on 20 August 1998;
IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka, Abraham; Judge ad hoc Verhoeven;
AGAINST: Judge ad hoc Kateka;
(12)    Unanimously,
Finds that the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by the conduct of its armed forces, which attacked the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa, maltreated Ugandan diplomats and other individuals on the Embassy premises, maltreated Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport, as well as by its failure to provide the Ugandan Embassy and Ugandan diplomats with effective protection and by its failure to prevent archives and Ugandan property from being seized from the premises of the Ugan¬dan Embassy, violated obligations owed to the Republic of Uganda under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961;
(13)    Unanimously,
Finds that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is under obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Uganda for the injury caused;
(14)    Unanimously,
Decides that, failing agreement between the Parties, the question of reparation due to the Republic of Uganda shall be settled by the Court, and reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this nineteenth day of December, two thou¬sand and five, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Demo¬cratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Uganda, respectively.
(Signed) SHI Jiuyong, President.
(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR, Registrar.
Judge KOROMA appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judges PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOIJMANS, ELARABY and SIMMA append separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court; Judge TOMKA and Judge ad hoc VERHOEVEN append declarations to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ad hoc KATEKA appends a dissenting opinion to the Judg¬ment of the Court.
(Initialled) J.Y.S.
(Initialled) Ph.C.
DECLARATION OF JUDGE KOROMA
The Court has found Uganda in violation of a wide range of legal instruments to which it is a party — Rejection of claim of self-defence — Article 3 (g) of the Definition of Aggression of 1974 (XXIX) — Non-attributability of attacks by rebel groups reaffirms the Court’s earlier jurisprudence and is consistent with Article 51 of the Charter — Customary law character of General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 — Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 — Findings of the Court are in general accordance with determinations made by the Security Council in its resolutions on this dispute — Principle of pacta sunt servanda.
1.    The circumstances and consequences of this case involving the loss of between three and four million human lives and other suffering have made it one of the most tragic and compelling to come before this Court.
2.    Uganda stands accused by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) of an act of aggression within the meaning of Article I of the Definition of Aggression set out in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, and in contravention of Article 2, para¬graph 4, of the United Nations Charter. Uganda is further accused of committing repeated violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 in flagrant disregard of the elementary rules of international humanitarian law and of committing massive viola¬tion of human rights in the conflict zones in breach of international human rights law.
3.    The Court has found that the Republic of Uganda:
—    by engaging in military activities against the DRC and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregu¬lar forces having operated on the territory of the Congo, violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the prin¬ciple of non-intervention;
—    by the conduct of its armed forces, which committed acts of killing, torture and other forms of inhumane treatment of the Congolese civilian population, destroyed villages and civilian buildings, failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets and to protect the civilian population in fighting with other combatants, trained child soldiers, incited ethnic conflict and failed to take measures to put an end to such conflict, as well as by its failure to take measures to respect and ensure respect for human rights and international humani¬tarian law in the Congo, violated its obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law; and
— by acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources committed by members of Ugandan armed forces in the territory of the DRC, and by its failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri District to prevent acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources, violated obligations owed to the DRC under international law.
4. These violations found by the Court are very serious breaches of international law and are compounded by the gravity of this case and the human tragedy underlying it. In effect, the Court’s findings confirm that Uganda has been in violation of its obligations under the following inter¬national legal instruments: Article 2, paragraph 4 , of the United Nations Charter, prohibiting the use of force by States in their international rela¬tions; the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which obliges all States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one another, to resolve disputes between them by peaceful means, and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs; the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 18 October 1907; the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949; Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981; the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 Novem¬ber 1989; and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, all of which are binding on Uganda.
5. More specifically, the Court found that acts committed by the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) itself and by officers and soldiers in it were in clear violation of the provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights instruments to which both Uganda and the Congo are parties, as well as of international customary law, in particular:
—    the Hague Regulations, Articles 25, 27, 28, 43, 46 and 47, with regard to the obligations of an occupying Power;
—    the Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 27, 32 and 53, also with regard to the obligations of an occupying Power;
—    the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 6, paragraph 1, and 7;
—    the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Articles 48, 51, 52, 57, 58 and 75, paragraphs 1 and 2;
—    the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Articles 4 and 5;
—    the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 38, paragraphs 2 and 3 ;
—    the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 1, 2, 3, paragraph 3, 4, 5 and 6.
In a nutshell, Uganda has been found responsible for illegal use of force, violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, military intervention, violation of human rights and international humanitarian law, looting, plunder and exploitation of the Congo’s natural resources, causing injury to the Congo as well as to Congolese citizens. Thus Uganda has been found in breach of a wide range of legal instruments to which it is a party and, according to the evidence before the Court, the violations gave rise to the most egregious of consequences. The non-fulfilment of obligations by a State entails international responsibility.
6. Not only are the international Conventions violated by Uganda binding on it, but they are intended to uphold the rule of law between neighbouring States and constitute the foundation on which the existing international legal order is constructed. They oblige States to conduct their relations in accordance with civilized behaviour and modern values — to refrain from the use of military force, to respect territorial integrity, to solve international disputes by peaceful means, and to respect human rights, human dignity, and international humanitarian law. Under the international humanitarian law and international human rights instru¬ments mentioned above, Uganda was obliged to refrain from carrying out attacks against civilians, to ensure humane treatment of them and even of combatants caught up in military conflict, and to respect the most basic of their rights, the right to life. In this regard, Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates that: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Con¬vention in all circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) Article 2 of the Conven¬tion provides that:
“In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” (Emphasis added.)
Article 27 states:
“Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights . . . They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected . .. against all acts of violence . . .
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape … or any form of indecent assault.”
According to Article 51 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
“1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military opera¬tions . . .
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the pri¬mary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian popu¬lation are prohibited.
4. Indiscriminate attacks [against civilians] are prohibited …”
In other words, in the course of a military conflict, civilians should be spared unnecessary violence, including massacres and other atrocities such as those allegedly perpetrated by the UPDF. Furthermore, accord¬ing to Article 3 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Uganda is also a party, in all actions concerning children, the pri¬mary consideration must be the best interests of the child. Article 19 pro¬vides that States parties agree to take all appropriate measures to protect the child from all forms of physical and mental violence, while Article 38 of the Convention provides that States parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the rules of international humanitarian law appli¬cable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child. States parties to the Convention must take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 15 years do not take part in direct hostilities. Yet, according to the evidence before the Court, these obligations were wantonly flouted during the UPDF’s military campaign in the Congo, as children were recruited as child soldiers to take part in the fighting.
7.    The Court thus reached the justifiable conclusion that Uganda repeatedly and egregiously transgressed both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, illegally used force and violated the rules of international humani¬tarian law.
8.    Crucially and for very cogent reasons, the Court has rejected, under both Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and customary interna¬tional law, Uganda’s contention that it acted in self-defence in using mili¬tary force in the Congo. Uganda argued, inter alia, that the Congo was responsible for the armed attacks by various rebel groups and was there¬fore guilty of aggression under the conditions set forth in the Definition of Aggression of 1974 (XXIX) in Article 3, paragraph (g), which pro¬vides that:
“Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.”
The Court rejected the contention, observing that: Uganda never claimed that it had been the victim of an armed attack by the armed forces of the DRC; the “armed attacks” to which reference was made came rather from the ADF; there was no satisfactory proof of the involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the Government of the DRC; and the attacks did not emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC, or on behalf of the DRC, within the meaning of Article 3 (g) of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974 on the Definition of Aggression. The Court concluded that, on the basis of the evidence before it, even if the series of deplorable attacks could be regarded as cumulative in character, they still remained non-attributable to the DRC.
9. This finding is also consistent with the jurisprudence of the Court. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Court stressed the need to recognize a distinction between cases of armed attack and “other less grave forms” of the use of force Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 101, para. 191). This distinction was reaffirmed by the Court in 2003 in the case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). According to the Court, it is necessary to distinguish between a State’s massive support for armed groups, including deliberately allowing them access to its territory, and a State’s enabling groups of this type to act against another State. Only the first hypothesis could be characterized as an “armed attack” within the mean¬ing of Article 51 of the Charter, thus justifying a unilateral response. Although the second would engage the international responsibility of the State concerned, it constitutes no more than a “breach of the peace”, enabling the Security Council to take action pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, without, however, creating an entitlement to unilateral response based on self-defence. In other words, if a State is powerless to put an end to the armed activities of rebel groups despite the fact that it opposes them, that is not tantamount to use of armed force by that State, but a threat to the peace which calls for action by the Security Council. In my opinion, this interpretation is consistent with Article 51 of the Charter and represents the existing law.
10.    However, according to the Declaration on Principles of Interna¬tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)):
“no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State”.
Uganda, in the course of the proceedings, acknowledged that it had sup¬ported one of the Congolese rebel movements, explaining, inter alia, that it gave “just enough” military support to the movement to help Uganda achieve its objectives of driving out Sudanese and Chadian forces from the Congo and of taking over the airfields between Gbadolite and the Ugandan border and that its support was not directed at the overthrow of the President of the Congo. The Court notes that even if Uganda’s activities were in support of its perceived security needs, it necessarily still violated the principles of international law.
11.    Another issue that was pleaded before the Court relates to perma¬nent sovereignty over natural resources. The Court’s acknowledgment of the customary law character of General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, is not without significance, for, although the Court has decided that it is the Hague Regulations of 1907 as well as the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 which lay down the rules according to which Uganda’s conduct must be judged, resolution 1803 (XVII), it should be recalled, confirmed the “right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources”. It makes clear that such resources should be exploited “in the interest of . . . the well-being of the people of the State concerned”. These rights and interests remain in effect at all times, including during armed conflict and during occupation. The Security Council in resolution 1291 (2000) reaffirmed the sovereignty of the DRC over its natural resources, and noted with concern reports of the illegal exploitation of the country’s assets and the potential consequences of these actions on the security conditions and continuation of hostilities. Accordingly, in my view, the exploitation of the natural resources of a State by the forces of occupation contravenes the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as well as the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Moreover, both the
DRC and Uganda are parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981, which stipulates that:
“All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.” (Art. 21, para. 1; emphasis added.)
12. It is noteworthy that the findings of the Court, a judicial organ, are in the main in tandem with determinations made earlier by the Security Council in its resolutions on this dispute. In its resolution 1234 (1999) the Council implicitly considered the Congo, not Uganda, to be in a situation of self-defence. In that resolution, the Council not only recalled the inher¬ent right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, but also deplored the continuing fighting and the presence of forces of foreign States in the DRC in a manner incon¬sistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter, and called upon those States to bring to an end the presence of uninvited forces. In its resolution 1291 (2000) the Council called for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Congo in accordance with the Lusaka Cease¬fire Agreement (1999). The Council also called on all parties to the con¬flict in the DRC to protect human rights and respect international humanitarian law and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. Acting under Chapter VII of the Char¬ter the Council, in resolution 1304 (2000), confirmed that Uganda and Rwanda had violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and demanded that they withdraw all their forces from the DRC without further delay, and called on all parties to the conflict to protect human rights and respect international humanitarian law.
13. On the other hand, the Court has found the DRC to have been in breach of its obligations to Uganda under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 because of its maltreatment of Ugandan diplomats and other individuals. In other words, the Congo, even when acting in self-defence,
“is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations:
(b) To respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents.” (Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supple¬ment No. 10, United Nations doc. A/56/10 (2001), Draft Art. 50, para. 2 (b) and Commentary.)
Thus the findings of the Court have been carefully considered and reasoned. Had Uganda respected its obligations under the United Nations Charter not to resort to force in its disputes — political or otherwise — with the DRC, its obligations under the OAU Charter to settle its dis¬putes by peaceful means, its obligations under international human rights instruments and international humanitarian law to respect the human rights and dignity of Congolese citizens and not to treat the civilian population inhumanely during its military incursion, and had the UPDF respected its obligation not to exploit the natural wealth and resources of the territory under occupation, the ensuing human tragedy could have been prevented or at least not aggravated.
14.    If Uganda, above all, had respected the fundamental and custom¬ary law principle of pacta sunt servanda — requiring a State to comply with its obligations under a treaty — the tragedy so vividly put before the Court would not, at least, have been compounded. Observance of treaty obligations is not only moral, but serves an important role in maintaining peace and security between neighbouring States and in preventing mili¬tary conflicts between them. Respect for this Judgment should contribute to putting an end to this tragedy.
15.    It is, inter alia, against this background that I have voted in favour of the Judgment.
(Signed) Abdul G. KOROMA.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE PARRA-ARANGUREN
Time-limits on Uganda’s violation of international law by its military actions in DRC territory — Sudan’s role — Uganda’s assistance to former irregular forces — Uganda not an occupying Power in Kibali-Ituri district — Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 not applicable to Uganda’s military presence in Kibali-Ituri district.
1. My vote in favour of the Judgment does not mean that I agree with all the findings of its operative part nor that I concur with each and every part of the reasoning followed by the majority of the Court in reaching its conclusions.
I
2.    In paragraph 345 (1) of the operative part of the Judgment, the Court
“Finds that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo . . . violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention.”
3.    I agree that the Republic of Uganda (hereinafter referred to as “Uganda”) violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention by engaging in military activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter referred to as the “DRC”) between 7 and 8 August 1998 and 10 July 1999, for the reasons explained in the Judgment; but I disagree with the finding that the violation continued from 10 July 1999 until 2 June 2003, when Ugandan troops withdrew from the DRC territory, because in my opinion the DRC consented during this period to their presence in its territory, not retroactively but under the terms and conditions prescribed in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 10 July 1999, the Kampala Dis-engagement Plan of 8 April 2000, the Harare Disengagement Plan of 6 December 2000 and the Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002, as amended in the Dar es Salaam Agreement of 10 February 2003.
4.    The Judgment states that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement does not refer to “consent” (para. 95) and that it goes beyond the mere ordering of the Parties to cease hostilities, providing a framework to facilitate the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces to a stable and secure envi¬ronment, but carrying no implication as to the Ugandan military presence having been accepted as lawful (para. 97). It also explains:
“The Agreement took as its starting point the realities on the ground. Among those realities were the major Ugandan military deployment across vast areas of the DRC and the massive loss of life over the preceding months. The arrangements made at Lusaka, to progress towards withdrawal of foreign forces and an eventual peace, with security for all concerned, were directed at these factors on the ground and at the realities of the unstable political and security situa¬tion. The provisions of the Lusaka Agreement thus represented an agreed modus operandi for the parties. They stipulated how the parties should move forward. They did not purport to qualify the Ugandan military presence in legal terms. In accepting this modus operandi the DRC did not ‘consent’ to the presence of Ugandan troops. It simply concurred that there should be a process to end that reality in an orderly fashion. The DRC was willing to proceed from the situation on the ground as it existed and in the manner agreed as most likely to secure the result of a withdrawal of foreign troops in a stable environment. But it did not thereby recognize the situation on the ground as legal, either before the Lusaka Agreement or in the period that would pass until the fulfilment of its terms.” (Judgment, para. 99.)
5.    The Judgment adds in paragraph 101 :
“This conclusion as to the effect of the Lusaka Agreement upon the legality of the presence of Ugandan troops on Congolese terri¬tory did not change with the revisions to the timetable that became necessary. The Kampala Disengagement Plan of 8 April 2000 and the Harare Disengagement Plan of 6 December 2000 provided for new schedules for withdrawal, it having become apparent that the original schedule in the Annex to the Lusaka Agreement was unreal¬istic. While the status of Ugandan troops remained unchanged, the delay in relation to the D-Day plus 180 days envisaged in the Lusaka Agreement likewise did not change the legal status of the presence of Uganda, all parties having agreed to these delays to the withdrawal calendar.”
6.    In respect to the Luanda Agreement the Judgment states that none of its elements
“purport generally to determine that Ugandan forces had been legally present on the territory of the DRC. The Luanda Agreement revised the modus operandi for achieving the withdrawal of Ugandan forces in a stable security situation. It was now agreed — without reference to whether or not Ugandan forces had been present in the area when the agreement was signed, and to whether any such pres¬ence was lawful — that their presence on Mount Ruwenzori should be authorized, if need be, after the withdrawal elsewhere had been completed until appropriate security mechanisms had been put in place. The Court observes that this reflects the acknowledgment by both Parties of Uganda’s security needs in the area, without pro¬nouncing upon the legality of prior Ugandan military actions there or elsewhere.” (Para. 104.)
7.    Therefore, the majority of the Court understands that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement did not change the legal status of the presence of Uganda, i.e., in violation of international law, but at the same time it considers that Uganda was under an obligation to respect the timetable agreed upon, as revised in the Kampala Disengagement Plan of 8 April 2000, the Harare Disengagement Plan of 6 December 2000 and the Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002.
8.    This interpretation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the Kam¬pala Disengagement Plan, the Harare Disengagement Plan and the Luanda Agreement creates an impossible legal situation for Uganda. On the one hand, if Uganda complied with its treaty obligations and remained in the territory of the DRC until the expiration of the timetables agreed upon, Uganda would be in violation of international law because the legal status of its presence had not been changed, the status of its military forces in the DRC being a violation of international law. On the other hand, if Uganda chose not to violate international law as a consequence of its military presence in the DRC, and therefore withdrew its troops from the territory of the DRC otherwise than in accordance with the timetables agreed upon, Uganda would have violated its treaty obliga¬tions, thereby also being in violation of international law.
9.    This reasoning is, in my opinion, persuasive enough not to accept the very peculiar interpretation advanced in the Judgment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the Kampala Disengagement Plan, the Harare Dis¬engagement Plan and the Luanda Agreement. Moreover, an examination of the terms of these instruments leads to a different conclusion.
10.    The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 July 1999 among the Republic of Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Namibia, the Republic of Rwanda, the Republic of Uganda, the Republic of Zimbabwe, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC).
11.    In my opinion, the DRC consented in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agree¬ment to the presence in its territory not only of Ugandan troops but of all foreign forces, as evidenced in the following provisions:
(a) Article III, paragraph 12, prescribes that “[t]he final withdrawal of
all foreign forces from the national territory of the DRC shall be carried out in accordance with the Calendar in Annex ‘B’ of this Agreement and a withdrawal schedule to be prepared by the UN, the OAU and the JMC”, i.e., the Joint Military Commission to be created as stipulated in Chapter 7 of Annex “A”;
(b)    Chapter 4 of Annex “A”, number 4.1, reiterates that “[t]he final orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the national territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo shall be in accordance with Annex ‘B’ of this Agreement”, and number 4.2 indicates that “[t]he Joint Military Commission/OAU and UN shall draw up a definitive schedule for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of Congo” ;
(c)    Chapter 8, Article 8.1, contemplates that a force should be consti¬tuted, facilitated and deployed in the DRC by the United Nations in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity with the man¬date, among others, to schedule and supervise the withdrawal of all foreign forces (Art. 8.2.1); and
(d)    Chapter 11, Article 11.4, stipulates:
“All forces shall be restricted to the declared and recorded loca¬tions and all movements shall be authorised by the JMC, OAU and UN mechanisms. All forces shall remain in the declared and recorded locations until:
(a) in the case of foreign forces, withdrawal has started in accord¬ance with JMC/OAU, UN withdrawal schedule;
(e) Annex “B”, number 17 indicates “180 days from the formal signing of the Ceasefire” as the deadline for the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
12. The Kampala Disengagement Plan (“Plan for the Disengagement and Redeployment of Forces in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in Accordance with the Lusaka Agreement”) was agreed on 8 April 2000 by all the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. It included stipu¬lations providing that
“During the process of Disengagement and Redeployment of the forces, in order to establish a cessation of hostilities, no Party shall threaten or use force against another Party, and under no circum¬stances shall any armed forces of any Party enter into or stay within the territory controlled by any other Party without the authorization of the JMC and MONUC.” (Art. 1, para. 2 (a).)
“The Parties shall comply with the cessation of hostilities in accord¬ance with Articles 1 and 3 of the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement. Each Party shall ensure that all personnel and organizations with military capability under its control or within territory under its con¬trol, including armed civilian groups (illegally armed), Armed Groups controlled by or in the pay of one or other Party comply with this Plan.” (Art. 1, para. 2 (d).)
“Whilst reserving the right to self-defence, within defended posi¬tions, the Parties shall strictly avoid committing any reprisals, counter-attacks, or any unilateral actions, in response to violations of this Plan by another Party. The Parties are to report all alleged violations of the provisions of this Plan to HQ MONUC and the JMC.” (Art. 2, para. 5.)
13. This last provision is remarkable in reserving the right of self- defence not only to the signatory States (the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe) but also to the rebel movements Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (NLC). Therefore it is not possible to accept the explanation given by the DRC in its letter of 6 May 2005 to the Court that the sole effect of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was to suspend “the Congo’s power to exercise its right of self-defence by repelling the armies of the occupying States by force”; the right of self-defence being also expressly admitted in Article 2, paragraph 5, of the Harare Disengagement Plan.
14.    Moreover, the Kampala Disengagement Plan stipulated that the Dis¬engagement obligation assumed by the parties was based on the assump¬tion that a ceasefire existed, in order to facilitate the immediate deploy¬ment of MONUC, Phase 2 (Art. 3, para. 7); that “[a] total Cessation of Hostilities by all Parties” was included among the prerequisites to be met before an effective disengagement could take place (Art. 3, para. 8 (a)); and that the Ceasefire Zone was divided in four areas, as detailed in the map attached as Appendix 2 (Art. 14).
15.    Some time later, on 6 December 2000, the Harare Disengagement Plan laid down the Sub Plans for Disengagement and Redeployment specifying the obligations in respect to Area A where the MCL, UPDF and FAC and their allies had declared to be present.
16.    Therefore, in my opinion the presence of Ugandan troops in Congolese territory was consented to by the DRC in the terms stipulated in the Kampala and Harare Disengagement Plans.
17.    The Luanda Agreement came into force upon its signing, on 6 Sep¬tember 2002, and was entitled “Agreement between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of The Congo and the Republic of Uganda on withdrawal of Ugandan Troops from the Democratic Republic of The
Congo, Cooperation and Normalisation of Relations between the Two Countries”.
18. Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Luanda Agreement stipulates: “The Parties agree that the Ugandan troops shall remain on the slopes of Mt. Ruwenzori until the Parties put in place security . . . including train¬ing and coordinated patrol of the common border.”
19.    The DRC therefore expressly consented in Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Luanda Agreement to the presence of Ugandan troops on the slopes of Mt. Ruwenzori. In my opinion, the DRC also consented to their presence in the places from which they were to be withdrawn in accordance with the detailed plan stipulated in Annex A, Article 8, of the Luanda Agreement, with special reference to Beni and Gbadolite (D-5 days), Bunia (the withdrawal of troops to begin on D-70 days, and to be completed by D-100 days). Moreover this consent is expressed again in the Amendment signed at Dar es Salaam on 10 February 2003 extending the withdrawal from Bunia, D-38, to 20 March 2003, this date ultimately being extended to the end of May 2003. Consequently, the presence of Ugandan troops in Congolese territory as provided in the Luanda Agree¬ment and in its Amendment of Dar es Salaam cannot be considered a violation of conventional and customary international law.
20.    For the reasons set out above, it is my opinion that the DRC con¬sented to the presence of Ugandan troops in its territory from 10 July 1999 until 2 June 2003, under the terms and conditions prescribed in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 10 July 1999, the Kampala Disengage¬ment Plan of 8 April 2000, the Harare Disengagement Plan of 6 Decem-ber 2000, and the Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002, as amended in the Dar es Salaam Amendment of 10 February 2003. Therefore, Uganda’s military presence in the DRC during this period did not vio¬late the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention.
II
21.    Paragraph 130 of the Judgment states
“that it has not been presented with evidence that can safely be relied on in a court of law to prove that there was an agreement between the DRC and the Sudan to participate in or support military action against Uganda; or that any action by the Sudan (of itself factually uncertain) was of such a character as to justify Uganda’s claim that it was acting in self-defence”.
22.    In this respect I wish to make reference to the statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda arrest warrants, dated 14 October 2005, because it is in the public domain and the Court may ascertain its terms. The statement announces that the pre-trial Chamber II of the Interna¬tional Criminal Court has unsealed five warrants of arrest in the Uganda situation, because it considered there to be sufficient evidence that the concerned persons have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes; it is recalled therein that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has killed, abducted, enslaved and raped the people of northern Uganda for 19 years, that more than 50 missions were made to Uganda, in small groups of two or three, to investigate the situation, and that among other facts, it was established that Joseph Kony is the absolute leader of the LRA and that he directs all of the LRA operations from his bases in the Sudan.
III
23.    In paragraph 345 (1) of the operative part of the Judgment the Court
“Finds that the Republic of Uganda … by actively extending mili¬tary, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention.”
24.    It is to be observed that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement stipu¬lated the importance of the solution of the internal conflict in the DRC by inter-Congolese dialogue. The Government of the DRC, the Rally for the Congolese Democracy (RCD), the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), the political opposition, the civil society, the Congo¬lese Rally for Democracy/Movement of Liberation (RCD-NL), the Congolese Rally for Democratic/National (RDC/N) and the Mai Mai decided, on 16 December 2002 in Pretoria, to put in place a govern¬ment of national unity, aiming at national reconciliation. A calendar was set forth but it was not complied with, political reconciliation only being implemented through the installation of a new national government, including leaders of the three armed rebel organizations and Congolese society; the military forces of these three rebel groups were fully inte¬grated into the national army and democratic elections were to be held within two years.
25.    While I accept the principles of international law enunciated in General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) mentioned in paragraph 162 of the Judgment, they do not, in my view, apply to the present case. As a consequence of the dialogue among the parties, a new national government was installed on 1 July 2003 in the DRC with par¬ticipation of the leaders of the rebel forces, which were integrated into the Congolese army; this reconciliation, in my opinion, exonerates Uganda from any possible international responsibility arising out of the assistance it gave in the past to the Rally for the Congolese Democracy (RCD) and to the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC).
26. A similar situation took place in the Congo not very long ago, when in May 1997 the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFGL), with the support of Uganda and Rwanda, over¬threw the legal Head of State of the former Zaire, Marshal Mobutu Ssese Seko, taking control of the country under the direction of Laurent-Desire Kabila. I wonder whether Uganda would have been condemned for this assistance had the Court been requested by the DRC to make such a declaration after Laurent-Desire Kabila legally assumed the Presidency of the country.
IV
27.    In paragraph 345 (1) of the operative part of the Judgment the Court
“Finds that the Republic of Uganda … by occupying Ituri . . . violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention.”
28.    The majority of the Court maintains that customary international law is reflected in the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 (hereinafter “the Hague Regulations of 1907”) (Judgment, paras. 172 and 217). This statement is noteworthy because occupying Powers have not always complied with the Hague Regulations of 1907.
29.    The Judgment considers applicable Article 42 of the Hague Regu¬lations of 1907 providing that
“A territory is considered as being occupied when it is actually under the authority of the hostile army.
The occupation extends only to the regions where this authority is established and capable of being asserted.”
30.    The Court therefore examines whether the requirements of Article 42 are met in the present case, stressing that it must satisfy itself that Ugandan armed forces in the DRC were not only stationed in particular locations but that they had substituted their own authority for that of the Congolese Government (Judgment, para. 173).
31.    In this respect paragraph 175 of the Judgment states:
“It is not disputed between the Parties that General Kazini, commander of the Ugandan forces in the DRC, created the new ‘province of Kibali-Ituri’ in June 1999 and appointed Ms Adele Lot- sove as its Governor. Various sources of evidence attest to this fact, in particular a letter from General Kazini dated 18 June 1999, in which he appoints Ms Adele Lotsove as ‘provisional Governor’ and gives suggestions with regard to questions of administration of the new province. This is also supported by material from the Porter Commission. The Court further notes that the Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2001/128 of 12 February 2001) states that, according to MONUC military observers, the UPDF was in effective control in Bunia (capital of Ituri district).”
32.    These facts are not disputed by Uganda and the majority of the Court concludes from them that the conduct of General Kazini “is clear evidence of the fact that Uganda established and exercised authority in Ituri as an occupying Power” (Judgment, para. 176).
33.    In my opinion, this conclusion is not acceptable. It is true that General Kazini, Commander of the Ugandan forces in the DRC, appointed Ms Adele Lotsove as “provisional Governor” in charge of the newly created province of Kibali-Ituri in June 1999, giving her sugges¬tions with regard to questions of the administration of the province. However, this fact does not prove that either General Kazini or the appointed Governor were in a position to exercise, and in fact did exer¬cise, actual authority in the whole province of Kibali-Ituri. It is also true that the UPDF was in control in Bunia (capital of Kibali-Ituri district), but control over Bunia does not imply effective control over the whole province of Kibali-Ituri, just as control over the capital (Kinsasha) by the Government of the DRC does not inevitably mean that it actually con¬trols the whole territory of the country.
34.    Therefore, in my opinion, the elements advanced in the Judgment do not prove that Uganda established and exercised actual authority in the whole province of Kibali-Ituri, as required in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907.
35.    In addition, it may be observed that the elements advanced by the DRC to prove Uganda’s actual control of the whole of Kibali-Ituri province are not conclusive, for the following reasons:
(a) The DRC’s Application instituting proceedings against Rwanda, filed in the Registry on 28 May 2002, which is a document in the public domain, states in paragraph 5 of the section entitled State¬ment of Facts, under the heading “Armed Aggression”:
“5. Since 2 August 1995, Rwandan troops have occupied a sig¬nificant part of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, notably in the provinces of Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu, Katanga, Kasai Oriental, Kasai Occidental, and Maniema and in Orientale Province, committing atrocities of all kinds there with total impunity.” (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002), Application I. Statement of Facts; A. Armed Aggression, p. 7.)
36. Consequently, in this statement “against interest” the DRC main¬tains that Rwanda occupied Orientale province from August 1995 until the end of May 2002, the date of its new Application to the Court, and Orientale province included the territories of what was to become Kibali- Ituri province in 1999. Therefore, the DRC considered Rwanda as the occupying Power of those territories, including the territories of Kibali- Ituri, and gave no indication in its Application that the occupation by Rwanda came to an end after the creation of Kibali-Ituri province.
(b) The special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002 to December 2003, prepared by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and distributed on 16 July 2004 (hereinafter the “2004 MONUC report”) dedicates the following special paragraph to the role of Rwanda:
“On 6 January 2003, RCD-Goma, a Congolese rebel movement supported by Rwanda, announced an alliance with UPC. Rwanda had become involved in the Ituri crisis much earlier, however. The Chief of Staff of the Rwandan army, James Kabarebe Kagunda, was reportedly the biggest advocate of Rwandan support to Hema militia and was in contact with Chief Kawa, who negotiated the arms supplies in June 2002. Rwanda reportedly supplied arms by airdrop to the UPC camps located in Mandro, Tchomia, Bule, Bulukwa and Dhego and sent military experts to train Hema mili¬tias, including child soldiers. Moreover, some UPC elements (esti-mated at 150) went for training in Rwanda from September to December 2002. On 31 December 2002, Thomas Lubanga visited Kigali for the first time. Kigali also facilitated the transport to Ituri of PRA elements, earlier trained in Rwanda, and used some Kin- yarwanda-speaking Congolese to organize this support. One ex- UPDF sector Commander of Ituri, Colonel Muzora, who had left the Ugandan army to join the Rwandan forces, was seen by several witnesses in the UPC camps, mainly to orient the newcomers from Rwanda. Practically all witnesses interviewed by MONUC believe that Rwandan nationals occupied posts in UPC military commands. MONUC obtained testimonies about adults and children being trained in Rwanda and being sent through Goma, in 2002 and 2003, to fight in Ituri with UPC. It also appears that, when Thomas Lubanga and other high-ranking UPC officers fled from Ituri in March 2003, they were evacuated by air to Rwanda. Arms and ammunition were then supplied from Rwanda to UPC by air before UPC retook Bunia in May 2003. On 11 and 12 May 2003, two air¬craft landed at Dhego — not far from Mongbwalu — from Rwanda, with grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and ammunition.
The first of the aircraft was also carrying back Lubanga and Bosco from Kigali.” (Special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002- December 2003 prepared by the United Nations Organization Mis¬sion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 16 July 2004, para. 29.)
37. The 2004 MONUC report describes the role of the pre-transitional Government of Kinshasa in the following terms:
“Until 2002, the pre-transition Government in Kinshasa was hardly involved in Ituri. Its first delegation arrived in Bunia in August 2002, after a visit to Kampala. During a second visit, on 29 August 2002, the Minister for Human Rights, Ntumba Lwaba, was abducted by Hema militia and freed only after three days in exchange for the release of Lubanga and several UPC members who had been arrested in Kampala and transferred to Kinshasa. Early in 2002, the involvement of the Kinshasa Government centred on mili¬tary assistance that it provided to RCD-ML in Beni. Kinshasa sent trainers, weapons and also some military elements, allegedly amount-ing to four battalions, in support of APC, which reportedly was sending weapon supplies from Beni to Lendu militia. FAC and APC were also named by eyewitnesses and victims as parties in some attacks on Hema villages. It is alleged that, in the last three months of 2002, some military supplies may also have been sent directly to the Lendu militia, notably to Rethy, in Djugu territory.” (Special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003 prepared by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 16 July 2004, para. 30.)
38. In respect to the Transitional Government of Kinshasa, the 2004 MONUC report informs:
“The political initiative of the Transitional Government to calm the tension in Ituri has focused on the deployment of some judicial and police personnel and sending official delegations. There have also been a number of press statements. Apart from the delivery of a humanitarian aid shipment early in 2004, humanitarian aid from the Government to the Ituri victims has been negligible. More concrete actions and active engagement would be needed to find a solution to the ongoing crisis. It was planned that the first brigade of the new national army would be deployed in Ituri before June 2004. How¬ever, there are no guarantees that these troops will receive regular payments and supplies.” (Special report on the events in Ituri, Janu¬ary 2002-December 2003 prepared by the United Nations Organiza¬tion Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 16 July 2004, para. 31.)
39.    Additionally, the 2004 MONUC report states that other rebel groups were acting in Kibali-Ituri province from 1998 to 2003. Annex I lists the following as armed and political groups involved in the Ituri con¬flict: (a) Ituri armed groups: Union des patriotes congolais (UPC); Parti pour l’unite et la sauvegarde de l’integrite du Congo (PUSIC); Forces populaires pour la democratie au Congo (FPDC); Forces armees du peuple congolais (FAPC); Front nationaliste integrationniste (FNI); Front de resistance patriotique de I’lturi (FRPI); Front pour l’integra- tion et la paix en Ituri (FIPI); (b) Regional Political Groups: Mouve- ment de liberation du Congo (MLC); Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD); RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement de liberation (RCD-K/ ML); RCD-Nationale (RCD-N).
40.    The 2004 MONUC report also describes the activities of Ugandan troops in the province of Kibali-Ituri but does not state that Ugandan forces actually controlled or were capable to exercise actual authority in the totality of its territory.
41.    Consequently, as the reliability of the 2004 MONUC report is “unchallenged” by the DRC, it does not support the conclusion that Uganda’s authority was actually exercised in the whole territory of Kibali-Ituri province, as would be required by the 1907 Hague Regula¬tions in order for Uganda to be considered its occupying Power. On the contrary, the 2004 MONUC report acknowledges that Rwanda as well as many rebel groups played an important role in the tragedy experienced in Kibali-Ituri province.
(c) As evidence of the occupation by Uganda of Kibali-Ituri province, the DRC has also cited Article 2, paragraph 3, of the 2002 Luanda Agreement, stating that the parties agree “[t]o work closely together in order to expedite the pacification of the DRC territories currently under . . . Uganda[n] control and the normalization of the situation along the common border”. However, the sentence quoted by the DRC does not indicate that Uganda controlled the whole of Kibali- Ituri province but rather some Congolese territories, and for this reason it does not demonstrate that Uganda was the occupying Power in Kibali-Ituri province.
42.    The above considerations, in my opinion, demonstrate that Uganda was not an occupying Power of the whole of Kibali-Ituri province but of some parts of it and at different times, as Uganda itself acknowledges. Therefore, it is for the DRC in the second phase of the present proceed¬ings to demonstrate in respect of each one of the illegal acts violating human rights and humanitarian law, and each one of the illegal acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources it complains of, that it was committed by Uganda or in an area under Uganda’s occupation at the time.
43. Additionally it is to be observed that rebel groups existed in the province of Kibali-Ituri before May 1997, when Marshal Mobutu Ssese Seko governed the former Zaire; they continued to exist after President Larent-Desire Kabila came to power and for this reason the DRC expressly consented to the presence of Ugandan troops in its territory. The Court itself acknowledges the inability of the DRC to control events along its border (Judgment, paras. 135, 301). Rebel groups were also present during Uganda’s military actions in the region and continue to be present even after the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the terri¬tory of the DRC on 2 June 2003, notwithstanding the intensive efforts of the Government of the DRC, with strong help from the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), employing more that 15,000 soldiers, as is a matter of public knowledge.
V
44.    As indicated above, the majority of the Court concluded that Uganda was an occupying Power of Kibali-Ituri province and that for this reason it
“was under an obligation, according to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, to take all the measures in its power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in the occu¬pied area, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the DRC. This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence by any third party.” (Judgment, para. 178.)
45.    Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 states:
“When the legally constituted authority has actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures within his power to restore and, as far as possible, to insure public order and life, respecting the laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented.”
46.    Consequently, application of Article 43 is conditional on the fact that “legally constituted authority actually passed into the hands of the occupant”. It is not clear to me how the majority of the Court came to the conclusion that this requirement was met, because no explanation in this respect is given in the Judgment.
47.    Moreover, the obligation imposed upon the occupying Power by Article 43 is not an obligation of result. An occupying Power is not in violation of Article 43 for failing to effectively restore public order and life in the occupied territory, since it is only under the obligation to “take all measures within his power to restore and as far as possible, to insure public order and life”. It is an open question whether the nature of this obligation has been duly taken into account in the Judgment.
48.    Furthermore, when dealing with the occupation of the province of Kibali-Ituri by Uganda, the majority of the Court rarely takes into account the province’s geographical characteristics in order to determine whether Uganda complied with its obligation of due diligence under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907; but they were considered to exonerate the DRC for its failure to prevent cross-border actions of anti-Ugandan rebel forces, as may be observed in the examination of Uganda’s first counter-claim.
(Signed) Gonzalo PARRA-ARANGUREN.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KOOIJMANS
General context of the dispute — Chronic instability in the region — Inter¬connection between bilateral dispute and overall crisis — Function of judicial dispute settlement — Importance of balanced appraisal of concerns and inter¬ests of litigants — Judgment insufficiently reflects complexity of situation.
Ugandan military actions after 7 August 1998 only justifiable under right of self-defence — No involvement ofDRC Government in armed actions by Ugan¬dan rebel groups — Actions thus not attributable to DRC — Right of self- defence not conditional upon armed attack by State — Uganda entitled to self- defence against armed irregulars — Standard of necessity and proportionality no longer met after 1 September 1998.
Belligerent occupation in invaded areas other than Ituri district — DRC ren¬dered incapable ofexercising authority by invasion — Uganda occupying Power in all invaded areas until Lusaka Agreement — Status of Congolese rebel move¬ments after Lusaka — Effect on status of Uganda as occupying Power.
Occupation no violation ofprinciple of non-use of force — Conceptual dis¬tinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
Provisional measures addressed to both Parties — No evidence of violation by Uganda provided by DRC — Court’s finding in operative part not appropriate.
First counter-claim — Duty of vigilance and burden ofproof— No evidence of efforts by Zaire Government to control rebel groups in relevant period.
1. Although I have voted in favour of most of the findings of the Court as reflected in the dispositif, I nevertheless feel constrained to make the following remarks. My main difficulty with the present Judgment is a certain lack of balance in the description of the dispute and of the rele¬vant facts even if the conclusions drawn are in my view in general legally correct. I will therefore start with a number of general remarks and sub¬sequently deal with certain legal issues with regard to which I would have preferred a different approach.
A. GENERAL REMARKS
2. In an article entitled “Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations”, the author writes:
“[T]o explain the intervention of one State into the affairs of another is rarely simple or uncontroversial … To maintain objec¬tivity in the face of confusing and contradictory evidence is particu¬larly difficult . . . Moreover, the results are likely to be tentative, partial and complex, and therefore less than totally satisfying. One is more likely to end with a ‘thick description’ of a complex episode than a ‘scientific’ explanation of a discrete social event.”
3.    These cautious words of a social scientist are of limited use for a court ofjustice which has to evaluate the legality of certain specific activi¬ties which have been put before it. The task of a judicial body does not allow it to conclude with a “thick description” of a complex episode but compels it to come to a clear and unequivocal determination of the legal consequences of acts committed during that “complex episode”.
4.    However, in order to make its legal assessments and conclusions comprehensible and thereby acceptable to litigant States whose leaders are no trained lawyers (even though they may be assisted by legal pro¬fessionals), but are the main actors in the process of implementing the judgment, a court should make clear in its reasoning that it is fully aware of the wider context and the complexity of the issues involved. A judg¬ment which is not seen as logical and fair in its historical, political and social dimensions runs the risk of being one compliance with which will be difficult for the parties.
5.    The Parties to the present dispute share a hapless post-decoloniza¬tion history. They have been in the grip of merciless dictatorships which elicited violent resistance and armed rebellions. The overthrow of these dictatorships (in Uganda in 1986 and the Congo in 1997) did not bring internal stability; armed groups, either loyal to the previous regime or pursuing goals of their own and operating from remote parts of their own territory or from abroad continued to threaten the new leadership. In this respect the Parties shared the plight which seems to have become endemic in much of the African continent: regimes under constant threat from armed movements often operating from the territory of neighbouring States, whose Governments sometimes support such movements but often merely tolerate them since they do not have the means to control or repel them. The latter case is one where a Government lacks power and conse¬quently fails to exercise effectively its territorial authority; in short, there is a partial failure of State authority and such failure is badly concealed by the formal performance of State functions on the international level. Commitments entered into by Governments unable to implement them are unworthy of reliance from the very start and hardly contribute to the creation of more stability.
6. Under such circumstances, the ruling powers may feel left to their own resources. In order to fight the armed movements operating from abroad, usually by carrying out hit and run tactics, they often engage in a kind of hot pursuit onto neighbouring territory since diplomatic demarches have no effect. They may, moreover, lack all confidence in the good intentions of the neighbour Government in spite of its commit¬ments and this may, in turn, induce them to support opposition move¬ments seeking to overthrow that “untrustworthy” Government.
7.    And so the circle is closed and we find ourselves confronted with a pattern which is so typical for post-Cold War Africa: Governments, har¬assed by armed rebel movements often operating from foreign territory, trying to improve their security by meddling in the affairs of neighbour¬ing States; Governments, moreover, which have sometimes come to power through external intervention themselves but which, once in power, turn against their former supporters in order to become master in their own house and to strengthen their grip on the internal situation.
8.    Needless to say, such chronic instability and the ensuing incessant practice of unrestrained violence lead to immense human suffering. The human disaster in Rwanda in 1994 is an extreme example, genocidal in dimension, of a much more general pattern of gross violations of human rights by warring factions and authorities trying to remain in power.
9.    The organized international community has thus far been unable to provide structural assistance, necessary to strengthen State institutions, and has thus failed to lay the basis for an improved security system in the region. It has mainly limited itself to monitoring the situation, providing a sometimes robust, but more often impotent, peace-keeping assistance in war-stricken areas, and to furnishing humanitarian assistance.
10.    It is within this framework that the dispute before the Court must be placed. It is not necessary to describe in detail the crisis as it developed since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda nor to demonstrate how an increasing number of States, in the Great Lakes region and even beyond, became involved. These events have been well documented in various articles and in a great number of reports from United Nations agencies and non¬governmental organizations . Suffice it to say that the Congo’s eastern border area, a “line of political instability on which the future of central Africa may well hinge” (as it was aptly called by David Shearer), occupied a central place in the crisis. The overall picture is moreover obfuscated by the fact that, apart from the Governments involved, an even greater number of insurgent movements, sometimes controlled by Governments but more often with shifting alliances, determined and determine the situation on the ground.
11.    Is it possible to extract from this tangled web one element, to iso¬late it, to subject it to legal analysis and to arrive at a legal assessment as to its consequences for the relations between only two of the parties involved? A court mandated by its Statute to decide disputes between States whenever it has jurisdiction to do so cannot refrain from carrying out that mandate on the ground that its judgment would only cover one dispute which is indissolubly linked to the overall conflict. The system of international judicial dispute settlement is premised on the existence of a series of bilateral inter-State disputes, artificial as this sometimes may be, as became clear, for example, in the Legality of the Use of Force cases (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia versus ten individual Member States of NATO).
12.    In a slightly different context (different in that the dispute before the Court was said to represent “a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem” between the Parties) the Court stated that “no provi¬sion of the Statute or Rules contemplates that the Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute has other aspects, however important”. In the present case the latter part of the sentence could be paraphrased as “merely because that dispute is intricately linked to a much wider problem which involves other parties as well”. The Court went on to say that
“never has the view been put forward that, because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal question at issue between them . . . ; if the Court were, contrary to its settled jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would impose a far-reaching
Gerard Prunier, “Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-1999)”, African Affairs, Vol. 103/412, pp. 359-383; John P. Clark’s article, cited in footnote 1; David Shearer, “Africa’s Great War”, Survival, Vol. 41 (1999), pp. 89-106. See also the following reports of the International Crisis Group: “North Kivu, into the Quagmire?” (15 August 1998); “Congo at War, a Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict” (17 November 1998); “How Kabila Lost His Way” (21 May 1999); “Africa’s Seven-Nation War” (21 May 1999); “The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (20 August 1999).
and unwarranted restriction upon the role of the Court in the peace¬ful solution of international disputes” (United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 20, para. 37; emphasis added).
13.    The last part of this quotation illustrates the important place assigned by the Charter to the Court in the context of the peaceful settlement of disputes, as is clear from Article 36, paragraph 3, in Chapter VI on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. The concept of peaceful dispute settlement is premised on the condition that the parties to a dis¬pute find their particular position and their specific concerns reflected in the settlement suggested to or imposed upon them. That settlement must acknowledge those concerns, even if it fails to satisfy the parties’ demands or even censures their conduct.
14.    I regret that the Judgment of the Court in my view falls short of meeting the standard just mentioned. It inadequately reflects the struc¬tural instability and insecurity in the region, the overall pattern of law¬lessness and disorder and the reprehensible behaviour of all parties involved. A reading of the Judgment cannot fail to leave the impression that the dispute is first and foremost a dispute between two neighbouring States about the use of force and the ensuing excesses, perpetrated by one of them. A two-dimensional picture may correctly depict the object shown but it lacks depth and therefore does not reflect reality in full.
15. It is true that in paragraph 26 the Court states that it is aware of the complexity of the situation which has prevailed in the Great Lakes region and that the instability in the DRC has had negative security implications for Uganda and other neighbouring States.
It is also true that in paragraph 221 the Court observes that the actions of the various Parties in the complex conflict have contributed to the immense suffering faced by the Congolese population.
But in my view this awareness is insufficiently reflected in the Court’s consideration of the various claims of the Parties. I will try to demon¬strate this in the sections of this opinion dealing with the right of self- defence as claimed by Uganda (see B below), Uganda’s first counter¬claim (see E below) and Uganda’s breach of its obligations under the Order on provisional measures (see D below).
B. USE OF FORCE AND SELF-DEFENCE
16. I am in full agreement with the Court that, as from the beginning of August 1998, Uganda could, for the presence of its forces on Congo¬lese territory, no longer rely on the consent given by the DRC and that its military activities from that time on thus can only be considered in the light of the right of self-defence (Judgment, para. 106).
17.    In the preceding months the initially warm relations between the Presidents of the DRC and Uganda had soured. In that same period the frequency and intensity of attacks by Ugandan rebel movements oper¬ating from Congolese territory had increased. In less than two months five attacks of a serious nature, in which a considerable number of civilians were killed or abducted, had taken place (Judgment, para. 132). A reoccurrence of the chronic instability of the pre-1997 period was, in particular after the outbreak of a rebellion against President Kabila on 2 August, certainly not beyond the realm of possibility.
18.    Uganda chose to react by stepping up its military activities on the Congolese side of the border. During the month of August the UPDF successively took the towns and airports of Beni, Bunia and Watsa, “all in close proximity to the border”. I fully agree with the Court when it states that these actions were of a different nature from previous opera¬tions along the common border under the informal bilateral agreement (Judgment, para. 110). They were military assaults which could only be justified under the law of self-defence.
19.    Uganda has claimed that the Congolese authorities were actively supporting the Ugandan rebels in carrying out their attacks but the Court has not been able to find “satisfactory proof of the involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the Government of the DRC”. It thus found that these attacks could not be attributed to the DRC and I cannot fault this finding. (Judgment, para. 146.)
20.    The Court consequently finds that “[f]or all these reasons . . . the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of the right of self-defence by Uganda against the DRC were not present”. Then follows, however, a sentence which is not altogether clear:
“Accordingly, the Court has no need to respond to the con¬tentions of the Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of self- defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces.” (Judgment, para. 147.)
21.    Presumably, the Court refers here to the exchange of arguments between the Parties whether the threshold, which the Court had pre¬viously determined as appropriate in characterizing support of activities by irregular bands as an attack by the “supporting” State (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 104, para. 195), was still in conformity with contemporary international law.
In the oral pleadings counsel for Uganda contended that
“armed attacks by armed bands whose existence is tolerated by the territorial sovereign generate legal responsibility and therefore con¬stitute armed attacks for the purpose of Article 5l. And thus, there is a separate, a super-added standard of responsibility, according to which a failure to control the activities of armed bands, creates a susceptibility to action in self-defence by neighbouring States.” (CR 2005/7, p. 30, para. 80.)
The DRC for its part denied that the mere acknowledgment that armed groups were present on its territory was tantamount to support.
“To assimilate mere tolerance by the territorial sovereign of armed groups on its territory with an armed attack clearly runs counter to the most established principles in such matters. That position, which consists in considerably lowering the threshold required for the establishment of aggression, obviously finds no support in the Nicaragua Judgment.” (CR 2005/12, p. 26, para. 6.)
22.    The Court does not deem it necessary at this point to deal with these contentions since it has found that the attacks by the rebels “did not emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC or on behalf ofthe DRC, within the sense of Article 3 (g) of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the definition of aggression adopted on 14 December 1974” (Judgment, para. 146; emphasis added). By drawing this conclusion, the Court, however, implicitly rejects Uganda’s argument that mere tolerance of irregulars “creates a susceptibility to action in self- defence by neighbouring States”.
23.    It deserves mentioning, however, that the Court deals in more explicit detail with this issue when considering Uganda’s first counter¬claim with regard to the period 1994-1997. The Court there says that it “cannot conclude that the absence of action by Zaire’s Government against the rebel groups in the border area is tantamount to ‘tolerating’ or ‘acquiescing’ in their activities” and that “[t]hus the part of Uganda’s first counter-claim alleging Congolese responsibility for tolerating the rebel groups prior to May 1997 cannot be upheld.” (Judgment, para. 301).
24. I agree that in general it cannot be said that a mere failure to con¬trol the activities of armed bands present on a State’s territory is by itself tantamount to an act which can be attributed to that State, even though I do not share the Court’s finding with regard to the first counter-claim.
But I fail to understand why the Court said explicitly there what it only said implicitly with regard to the DRC’s first claim, notwithstanding that Uganda raised that very same argument when it contested that claim.
25.    What is more important, however, is that the Court refrains from taking a position with regard to the question whether the threshold set out in the Nicaragua Judgment is still in conformity with contemporary international law in spite of the fact that that threshold has been subject to increasingly severe criticism ever since it was established in 1986. The Court thus has missed a chance to fine-tune the position it took 20 years ago in spite of the explicit invitation by one of the Parties to do so.
26.    But the sentence quoted in paragraph 20 calls for another com¬ment. Even if one assumes (as I am inclined to do) that mere failure to control the activities of armed bands cannot in itself be attributed to the territorial State as an unlawful act, that in my view does not necessarily mean that the victim State is under such circumstances not entitled to exercise the right of self-defence under Article 51. The Court only deals with the question whether Uganda was entitled to act in self-defence against the DRC and replies in the negative since the activities of the rebel movements could not be attributed to the DRC. By doing so, the Court does not answer the question as to the kind of action a victim State is entitled to take if the armed operation by irregulars, “because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 103, para. 195) but no involvement of the “host Govern¬ment” can be proved.
27.    The Court seems to take the view that Uganda would have only been entitled to self-defence against the DRC since the right of self- defence is conditional on an attack being attributable, either directly or indirectly, to a State. This would be in line with what the Court said in its Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004: “Article 51 of the Charter thus recog¬nizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State” (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 194, para. 139; emphasis added).
28.    By implicitly sticking to that position, the Court seems to ignore or even to deny the legal relevance of the question referred to at the end of paragraph 26.
But, as I already pointed out in my separate opinion to the 2004 Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Article 51 merely
“conditions the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence on a previous armed attack without saying that this armed attack must come from another State even if this has been the generally accepted interpretation for more than 50 years” (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 230, para. 35).
I also observed that this interpretation no longer seems to be shared by the Security Council, since in resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) it recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence with¬out making any reference to an armed attack by a State. In these resolu¬tions the Council called acts of international terrorism, without any further qualification and without ascribing them to a particular State, a threat to international peace and security.
29.    If the activities of armed bands present on a State’s territory can¬not be attributed to that State, the victim State is not the object of an armed attack by it. But if the attacks by the irregulars would, because of their scale and effects, have had to be classified as an armed attack had they been carried out by regular armed forces, there is nothing in the language of Article 51 of the Charter that prevents the victim State from exercising its inherent right of self-defence.
30.    When dealing with the first counter-claim in paragraph 301 of the Judgment, the Court describes a phenomenon which in present-day inter¬national relations has unfortunately become as familiar as terrorism, viz. the almost complete absence of government authority in the whole or part of the territory of a State. If armed attacks are carried out by irregu¬lar bands from such territory against a neighbouring State, they are still armed attacks even if they cannot be attributed to the territorial State. It would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to self- defence merely because there is no attacker State, and the Charter does not so require. “Just as Utopia is entitled to exercise self-defence against an armed attack by Arcadia, it is equally empowered to defend itself against armed bands or terrorists operating from within the Arcadian territory”, as Professor Yoram Dinstein puts it .
31.    Whether such reaction by the attacked State should be called self- defence or an act under the state of necessity  or be given a separate name, for example “extra-territorial law enforcement”, as suggested by Dinstein himself, is a matter which is not relevant for the present pur¬pose. The lawfulness of the conduct of the attacked State must be put to the same test as that applied in the case of a claim of self-defence against a State: does the armed action by the irregulars amount to an armed attack and, if so, is the armed action by the attacked State in conformity with the requirements of necessity and proportionality.
32.    As for the first question, I am of the view that the series of attacks which were carried out from June till the beginning of August 1998, and which are enumerated in paragraph 132 of the Judgment, can be said to have amounted to an armed attack in the sense of Article 51, thus entitling Uganda to the exercise of self-defence. Although Uganda, during the proceedings, persistently claimed that the DRC was directly or indirectly involved in these attacks, the finding that this allegation cannot be substantiated and that these attacks are therefore not attribu¬table to the DRC has no direct legal relevance for the question whether Uganda is entitled to exercise its right of self-defence.
33.    The next question therefore is: was this right of self-defence exer¬cised in conformity with the rules of international law?
During the month of August 1998 Ugandan military forces seized a number of towns and airports in an area contiguous to the border-zone where Uganda had previously operated with the consent of and, accord¬ing to the Protocol of April 1998, in co-operation with the DRC.
Taking into account the increased instability and the possibility of a return to the undesirable conditions of the late Mobutu period, I do not find these actions unnecessary or disproportionate to the purpose of repelling the persistent attacks of the Ugandan rebel movements.
34.    It was only when Uganda acted upon the invitation of Rwanda and sent a battalion to occupy the airport of Kisangani — located at a considerable distance from the border area — on 1 September 1998 that it grossly overstepped the limits set by customary international law for the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence.
Not by any stretch of the imagination can this action or any of the subsequent attacks against a great number of Congolese towns and mili¬tary bases be considered as having been necessitated by the protection of Uganda’s security interests. These actions moreover were grossly dispro¬portionate to the professed aim of securing Uganda’s border from armed attacks by anti-Ugandan rebel movements.
35.    I therefore fully share the Court’s final conclusion that Uganda’s military intervention was of such a magnitude and duration that it must be considered a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter (Judgment, para. 165).
indirectly involved in the attacks by the rebel movements and thus con¬cluding that Uganda was not entitled to self-defence. In the circum¬stances of the case and in view of its complexity, a further legal analysis of Uganda’s position, and the rights ensuing therefrom, would in my view have been appropriate.
Thus the Court has forgone a precious opportunity to provide clarifi¬cation on a number of issues which are of great importance for present- day international society but still are largely obscure from a legal point of view.
C. BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
36.    The Court is of the view that Uganda must be considered as the occupying Power, in the sense of the jus in bello, in Ituri district. It further concludes that it has not been provided with evidence to show that authority as occupying Power was exercised by Ugandan armed forces in any areas other than in Ituri district (Judgment, paras. 176 and 177).
37.    Although I have no difficulty with the Court’s finding with regard to Ituri district, I have some doubts in respect of the Court’s reasoning leading to the conclusion that Uganda was not in the position of an occupying Power in other areas invaded by the UDPF.
38.    Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides that:
“territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.
The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”
To all appearances this definition is based on factual criteria. However, as Professor Adam Roberts aptly remarks: “The core meaning of the term is obvious enough; but as usually happens with abstract concepts, its frontiers are less clear.”
39.    The reasons for this lack of clarity may in the first place be of a factual nature. The situation on the ground is often confused and the parties involved may present conflicting pictures of this situation. In the present case, however, the Parties agree to a remarkably great extent on the localities taken by the UPDF in the relevant period. They differ, how¬ever, considerably on the question whether the places where Ugandan troops were present, were actually under the authority of Uganda. This is mainly a factual issue.
40.    The lack of clarity may, however, also be due to non-factual con¬siderations. As one author points out: “‘[o]ccupation’ has. . . acquired a pejorative connotation, and as a result, occupants would tend to prefer euphemistic titles to portray their position”  . This author further observes that at the time of the adoption of the Hague Regulations it was gener¬ally assumed that, upon gaining control, the occupant would establish its authority over the occupied territory by introducing some kind of direct and therefore easily identifiable administration. In a period when war or the use of force as such was not legally objectionable, the notion of occu¬pation as a term of art was not held in disrepute either. And thus the establishment of an administrative system by the occupant was seen as quite normal.
41.    Partly as a result of the outlawing of war, that practice has become the exception rather than the rule. Occupants feel more and more inclined to make use of arrangements where authority is said to be exercised by transitional governments or rebel movements or where the occupant simply refrains from establishing an administrative system.
“In these cases, the occupants would tend not to acknowledge the applicability of the law of occupation to their own or their surro¬gate’s activities, and when using surrogate institutions, would deny any international responsibility for the latter’s actions.”
42.    In the present case, the Court was confronted with both these fac¬tual and non-factual issues. Uganda denied its responsibility under the law of occupation firstly on the ground that its troops were too thinly spread to be able to exercise authority. It argued secondly that actual authority was vested in the Congolese rebel movements, which carried out virtually all administrative functions.
43.    The Court has deemed it its task
“to satisfy itself that the Ugandan armed forces in the DRC were not only stationed in particular locations but also that they had sub¬stituted their own authority for that of the Congolese Government” (Judgment, para. 173; emphasis added).
44.    It is in particular this element of “substitution of the occupant’s authority for that of the territorial power” which leads in my opinion to an unwarranted narrowing of the criteria of the law of belligerent occu¬pation as these have been interpreted in customary law since 1907.
45.    Article 41 of the “Oxford Manual” adopted in 1880 by the Institut de droit international already stated:
“Territory is regarded as occupied when, as the consequence of invasion by hostile forces, the State to which it belongs has ceased, in fact, to exercise its authority therein, and the invading State is alone in a position to maintain order there. The limits within which this state of affairs exists determine the extent and duration of the occupation.” (Emphasis added.)
It is noteworthy that these criteria have remained virtually unaltered. In modern national manuals on the law of armed conflict these criteria are expressed in similar terms; they are, firstly, that
“military occupation presupposes a hostile invasion, resisted or un- resisted, as a result of which the invader has rendered the invaded government incapable of exercising its authority, and [secondly] that the invader is in a position to substitute its own authority for that of the former government” .
46.    In the present case the first criterion is certainly met; even if the actual authority of the DRC Government in the north-eastern part of the country was already decidedly weak before the invasion by the UPDF, that Government indisputably was rendered incapable of exercising the authority it still had as a result of that invasion. By occupying the nerve centres of governmental authority — which in the specific geographical circumstances were the airports and military bases — the UPDF effec¬tively barred the DRC from exercising its authority over the territories concerned.
47.    The Court, without explicitly mentioning this criterion, never¬theless seems to assume that it has been met. It concentrates, however, on the second criterion, the actual exercise of authority by the Ugandan armed forces and concludes that it has not been provided with “any spe¬cific evidence . . . that authority was exercised by [them] in any areas other than in Ituri district”. It seems to adopt the view that in these areas authority was exercised by the rebel movements which cannot be con¬sidered to have been controlled by Uganda. (Judgment, para. 177.)
48.    The Court in my view did not give sufficient consideration to the fact that it was the Ugandan armed invasion which enabled the Congo¬lese rebel movements to bring the north-eastern provinces under their control. Had there been no invasion, the central Government would have been in a far better position to resist these rebel movements. Uganda’s invasion was therefore crucial for the situation as it developed after the outbreak of the civil war. As the decisive factor in the elimination of the
DRC’s authority in the invaded area, Uganda actually replaced it with its own authority.
49.    I am, therefore, of the opinion that it is irrelevant from a legal point of view whether it exercised this authority directly or left much of it to local forces or local authorities. As long as it effectively occupied the locations which the DRC Government would have needed to re-establish its authority, Uganda had effective, and thus factual, authority. Its argu¬ment that it cannot be considered to have been an effective occupying Power, in view of the limited number of its troops, cannot therefore be upheld 9.
50.    As long as Uganda maintained its hold on these locations, it remained the effective authority and thus the occupying Power, until a new state of affairs developed. Such a new state of affairs was effected by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 10 July 1999. In normal circum¬stances, a ceasefire agreement as such does not change the legal situation, at least as long as the occupying Power remains in control. But the Lusaka Agreement is, as the Court states,
“more than a mere ceasefire agreement, in that it lays down various ‘principles’ (Art. III) which cover both the internal situation within the DRC and its relations with its neighbours” (Judgment, para. 97).
51.    The Lusaka Agreement laid the foundation for the re-establish¬ment of an integrated Congolese State structure. For this purpose the status of the two most important rebel movements — the MLC and the RCD — now called the “armed opposition”, was modified; they became formal participants in the open national dialogue (Art. III, para. 19). This new position was reflected in their signing of the agreement as separate parties per the attached list.
52.    In my opinion the “upgraded” status of the two rebel movements directly affected Uganda’s position as occupying Power. These move-
9 See also Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, 7th ed., 1962, p. 435 :
“When the legitimate sovereign is prevented from exercising his powers, and the occupant, being able to assert his authority, actually establishes an administration over a territory, it matters not with what means, and in what ways, his authority is exercised.” (Emphasis added.)
See also H. P. Gasser in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, 1995, p. 243:
“Even if the stated strategic goal of an invasion of foreign territory is not to gain control of the area or its inhabitants, but ‘merely’ to secure against attacks on the invader’s own territory close to the border, the invading power still bears responsi¬bility for the parts of the territory actually controlled. Similarly, neither the claimed short duration of the occupation nor the absence of military administration for the occupied territory makes any difference.” (Emphasis added.)
ments had become — in the formulation of Chapter VI — the two parties who, together with the central Government, had primary responsibility for the re-establishment of an integrated State administration, as spelled out in paragraph 2 of Chapter VI.
53.    The Lusaka Agreement certainly did not automatically bring to an end Uganda’s status as occupying Power since that status is based on control in fact. The recognition of the formal status of the RCD and MLC cannot, however, be disregarded.
After Lusaka, territorial authority could no longer be seen as vested exclusively in the central Government but as being shared with “armed opposition” movements which had been recognized as part of the national authority.
54.    Only in those places where it remained in full and effective control, like Ituri district, did Uganda retain its status as occupying Power and in this respect I share the Court’s view that Uganda occupied Ituri district until the date its troops withdrew. As for the other areas where it had carried out its military activities, Uganda should, however, be considered as the occupying Power from the date when it seized the various locations until the signing of the Lusaka Agreement. Even if it retained its military grip on the airports and other strategic locations, it can, as a result of the arrangements made in the Lusaka Agreement, no longer be said to have substituted itself for or replaced the authority of the territorial govern¬ment since under the terms of the Agreement that authority was also exercised by the rebel movements.
55.    Whereas my disagreement with the way in which the Court inter¬preted the criteria for the applicability of the law of belligerent occupa¬tion is to a certain extent merely technical (although not without legal consequences), I have more substantive reservations as to the way in which the phenomenon of “occupation” is dealt with in the dispositif.
56.    In the first paragraph of the operative part the Court finds that Uganda, by engaging in military activities against the DRC on the lat- ter’s territory, by occupying Ituri and by supporting the irregular forces having operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-use of force and the principle of non-intervention. In my view, the occupation of Ituri should not have been characterized in a direct sense as a violation of the principle of the non-use of force.
57.    The law on belli1g0erent occupation was originally set up as a “balancing mechanism”  between the interests of the ousted sovereign and the occupying Power. The latter’s obligation as temporary authority to restore and ensure public order while respecting the laws in force (Art. 43, Hague Regulations) and its powers with respect to property (Arts. 48 ff.) reflect this balancing mechanism. It was only in 1949 that the rules on occupation were extended in the Fourth Geneva Convention by adding a number of provisions regarding the treatment of the popula¬tion of occupied territory.
58.    In their interrelationship the rules on occupation form an impor¬tant part of the jus in bello or international humanitarian law. The main purpose of that law is to protect persons caught up in conflict, even if it does take into account the interests of the belligerent parties. It does not differentiate between belligerents. In particular, no distinction is made in the jus in bello between an occupation resulting from a lawful use of force and one which is the result of aggression. The latter issue is decided by application of the jus ad bellum, the law on the use of force, which attributes responsibility for the commission of the acts of which the occu-pation is the result.
59.    In the present case, the Court has found that Uganda has violated its obligation under the principle of the non-use of force, since its military activities do not constitute self-defence. It thus has breached its obliga¬tions under the jus ad bellum. The Court has also found that Uganda has violated its obligations under the jus in bello, in particular in regard to the district of Ituri, the occupation of which was the outcome of its illegal use of force.
60.    It goes without saying that the outcome of an unlawful act is tainted with illegality. The occupation resulting from an illegal use of force betrays its origin but the rules governing its regime do not charac¬terize the origin of the result as lawful or unlawful.
61.    In his report for the Centennial of the First Hague Peace Confer¬ence Professor Christopher Greenwood has dealt with the implications of the fact that nowadays the jus in bello exists “within a framework of international law which significantly restricts the right of States to resort to force”. He continues by saying that the full implications of the rela¬tionship between the contemporary jus ad bellum and jus in bello have yet to be determined .
62.    Earlier I drew attention to the fact that the reluctance of Govern¬ments to declare the law of belligerent occupation applicable may be due to the impression that “occupation” has become almost synonymous with aggression and oppression.
63.    I am aware that this impression is lent credibility by Article 3 of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the Definition of Aggres¬sion, which under (a) qualifies as an act of aggression: “The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such inva¬sion or attack …” (Emphasis added.)
This resolution, as important as it may be from a legal point of view, does not in all its terms reflect customary law. The reference to milita1r2y occupation as an act of aggression is in my opinion less than felicitous12.
64. Professor Greenwood says that “[t]he law of belligerent occupation has had a poor record of compliance for most of the 20th century”. In his view the principal problem is not one of a deficiency in the law but rather the reluctance of States to admit that the law applies at all13. I regret that in the first paragraph of the dispositifthe Court may have contributed to this reluctance on the part of belligerent parties to declare the law of occupation applicable.
D. PROVISIONAL MEASURES
66.    In its fifth submission the DRC requested the Court to declare that Uganda had violated the Court’s Order on provisional measures of 1 July 2000. In paragraph 7 of the dispositif the Court acceded to this request.
For a number of reasons I do not find the Court’s reasoning in support of this ruling to be cogent.
67.    The provisional measures indicated by the Court in its Order of 1 July 2000 were three in number and were addressed to both Parties. The Parties were first called upon to prevent and refrain from any action, in particular armed action, which might prejudice the rights of the other Party or might aggravate or extend the dispute. They were further ordered to take all measures to comply with their obligations under inter¬national law and with Security Council resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000. Finally, they were instructed to take all measures necessary to ensure full respect within the zone of conflict for human rights and for international humanitarian law.
68.    It deserves mentioning that, whereas the Applicant requested the Court to indicate provisional measures addressed to Uganda, the Court decided proprio motu to indicate measures for both Parties, as there existed a serious risk of events occurring which might aggravate or extend the dispute or make it more difficult to resolve (I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 21, para. 44).
12    See B. Broms, “The Definition of Aggression”; Recueil des cours, Vol. 154 (1977), p. 348 :
“[I]t could be argued in view of the way in which the paragraph has been construed that the military occupation or the annexation presupposes the existence of an act of aggression in the form of an invasion or attack and that it would therefore not have been necessary to include them separately in this paragraph.”
13    Op. cit., pp. 218-219.
69.    During the written and oral proceedings hardly any attention was paid by the Parties to the Order of 1 July 2000. The DRC’s submissions in its Reply, dated 29 May 2002, made no reference to it. The request for a ruling that Uganda had violated the provisions of the Order appeared for the first time in the final submissions.
70.    In paragraph 264 of the Judgment the Court notes “that the DRC put forward no specific evidence demonstrating that after July 2000 Uganda committed acts in violation of each of the three provisional measures indicated by the Court”.
71.    This observation would have sufficed to dismiss the DRC’s sub¬mission, just as the Court did in respect of a similar submission in its Judgment in the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening). There the Court stated that it was for Cameroon to show that Nigeria acted in violation of the provisional measures indicated in the Order of 15 March 1996 but that Cameroon had not established the facts which it bore the burden of proving (I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 453, paras. 321-322). In this respect the Court relied on its earlier statement that it is
“the litigant seeking to establish a fact who bears the burden of proving it; and in cases where evidence may not be forthcoming, a submission may in the judgment be rejected as unproved” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 437, para. 101).
72.    In the present case, however, the Court does not do so because it has already found (in its consideration of the DRC’s second claim) that Uganda is responsible for acts in violation of human rights and interna¬tional humanitarian law throughout the period when Ugandan troops were present in the DRC, including the period subsequent to the issuance of the Order on provisional measures.
The Court therefore concludes that Uganda did not comply with that Order.
73.    In paragraph 265 the Court notes that the provisional measures were addressed to both Parties and that its finding as to Uganda’s non- compliance is “without prejudice to the question as to whether the DRC did not also fail to comply with the provisional measures indicated by the Court”.
74.    In view of the fact that the Court deemed it necessary to recall that the purpose of these provisional measures was to protect the rights of either of the Parties pending the determination of the merits (para. 263) the formulation chosen by the Court seems to indicate an aware¬ness that this purpose has been respected neither by Uganda nor by the DRC even though the latter question was not raised by Uganda and was thus not for the Court to decide.
75.    In these circumstances it would in my view have been judicially sound not to include in the dispositif a finding that Uganda did not comply with the Order on provisional measures.
I have no doubt whatsoever that Uganda breached its obligations under the Order. This is sufficiently demonstrated in the part of the Judg¬ment dealing with the DRC’s second submission and the Court’s finding on that submission. But the Court is also “painfully aware” that many atrocities have been committed by other parties as well (Judgment, para. 221).
76.    In short, in view of the fact that the DRC has not provided any specific evidence of Uganda’s violation of the Order and taking into account the purpose of provisional measures being the protection of the legal interests of either party, I sincerely regret that the Court has decided to include in the dispositif of the Judgment the finding that one of them has violated the Order of 1 July 2000, in particular since the Court in no way excludes that such violation has also been committed by the other Party.
77.    There is no need for the Court to decide on each and every submis¬sion presented by the Parties. In the present case, for example, the dispositif does not deal with the Congolese requests for cessation and for guarantees and assurances, which only have been considered in the reasoning. Paragraphs 264 and 265 of the Judgment were sufficient to make clear the Court’s position in respect of the DRC’s submission on provisional measures.
78.    The Court’s decision to include a finding in the dispositifis in my view an illustration of the lack of balance I have referred to earlier. For these reasons — and not because I disagree with the finding itself — I felt constrained to vote against paragraph 7 of the dispositif.
E. THE FIRST COUNTER-CLAIM
79.    I share the Court’s view that it is useful to divide Uganda’s first counter-claim into three periods. I agree with the Court that the counter¬claim is without merit as regards the second and the third period. The following comments thus relate only to the period prior to May 1997 and only to the merits of that part of the counter-claim.
80.    In paragraphs 298 and 299 of the Judgment the Court concludes that Uganda has not produced satisfactory evidence that Zaire (as the DRC was then called) actually supported the Ugandan rebel movements which were active on Zairean territory. I have no difficulty with the Court’s view on that matter.
81. In paragraph 300 of the Judgment the Court deals with the ques¬tion whether Zaire had acted in conformity with its duty of vigilance, which in its words is “a different issue”. In this respect the Court takes note of Uganda’s argument that the rebel groups were able to operate “unimpeded” in the border area because of the almost complete absence of central government presence or authority in the region during Presi¬dent Mobutu’s 32-year term in office. The Court continues by saying that neither Zaire nor Uganda was in a position to put an end to the activities of the anti-Ugandan and anti-Zairean rebel movements operating in the area. Then it finds that, in the light of the evidence before it, it cannot, however, conclude that the absence of action of Zaire’s Government is tantamount to “tolerating” or “acquiescing” in their activities and that, consequently, this part of Uganda’s counter-claim cannot be upheld.
82. But surely it is not Uganda that has to provide evidence that Zaire was in a position to exercise control over its borders and thus to take action. Nor was counsel for the DRC persuasive when he argued that Uganda itself recognized “the impossibility of effectively policing” the common border. It is for the State under a duty of vigilance to show what efforts it has made to fulfil that duty and what difficulties it has met. In my view the DRC has only been successful in sufficiently substantiating an “almost complete absence” of government presence or authority for the period from October 1996 to May 1997, the time of the first civil war. But I have found no evidence in the case file nor in relevant reports that the Government in Kinshasa was not in a position to exercise its authority in the eastern part of the country for the whole of the relevant period and thus was unable to discharge its duty of vigilance before October 1996; the DRC has not even tried to provide such evidence.
83. I therefore fail to understand the factual ground for the Court’s conclusion that “the part of Uganda’s first counter-claim alleging Con¬golese responsibility for tolerating the rebel groups prior to May 1997 cannot be upheld” (Judgment, para. 301). In my view the logical conclu¬sion would have been that the DRC has failed to provide evidence that it took credible measures to prevent rebel movements from carrying out transborder attacks or was unable to do so and that the first part of the counter-claim thus must be upheld.
84. Let me add that factual circumstances, such as geographical con¬ditions (mountainous terrain) may explain a lack of result but can never justify inadequate efforts or the failure to make efforts.
(Signed) P. H. KOOIJMANS.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ELARABY
Agreement with the findings of the Court — Treatment by the Court of the prohibition of the use of force — Failure to address the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s claim of aggression — Centrality of this claim to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s case — Prohibition of aggression in international law — General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) — Authority of the Court to determine whether there has been a violation of the prohibition of aggression — Clear instance ofaggression in the factsfound to be established by the Court — Relevance of the Court’s dicta in Nicaragua — Importance of consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence.
1.    My vote in favour of the Judgment reflects my support for its con¬clusions. I do however deem it appropriate to place on record certain considerations which I find absent in the Judgment. While I fully concur with the Court’s findings that there were grave violations of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations, I believe the Court should have explicitly upheld the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s claim that such unlawful use of force amounted to aggression.
2.    The issues arising in this case are manifold and complex, touching upon some of the most sensitive questions of international law. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has alleged that Uganda violated Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. It claims that armed activities of Uganda constitute a breach of this general pro¬hibition of the use of force. It alleges furthermore that these armed activi¬ties constitute aggression.
3.    At each stage of the current proceedings, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has emphasized the gravity of the use of force exercised by Uganda in breach of its obligations under international law. In its Appli¬cation initiating proceedings in the instant case, the Democratic Republic of the Congo alleges that:
“this Application instituting proceedings against the Government of the Republic of Uganda, on account of acts of armed aggression per¬petrated by Uganda on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, [is] in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.
Such armed aggression by Ugandan troops on Congolese territory has involved inter alia violation of sovereignty and territorial integ¬rity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, violations of interna¬tional humanitarian law and massive human rights violations.
By the present Application the Democratic Republic of the Congo seeks to secure the cessation of the acts of aggression directed against it, which constitute a serious threat to peace and security in central Africa in general and in the Great Lakes Region in par¬ticular.” (Application of the DRC, p. 5.)
4.    Furthermore, in its Memorial, the Democratic Republic of the Congo declares:
“Because all direct means of settling the dispute have failed, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is asking the Court to fulfil its role as guarantor of law, justice and peace and to condemn Uganda for the policy of aggression it has conducted against the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2 August 1998.” (Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MDRC), p. 6, para. 0.10.)
In its Memorial, the Applicant elaborates upon this, declaring that “the gravity of the violation of the prohibition of the use of force” is such as to make it “characterizable as aggression” (MDRC, pp. 176-179, paras. 4.40-4.50). In its submissions, the Democratic Republic of the Congo asks the Court to find “the principle of non-use of force in inter-national relations, including the prohibition of aggression” (MDRC, p. 273, para. 1) amongst the principles of international law violated by Uganda.
5.    In its Reply to the Counter-Memorial of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo once again emphasizes its claim of Ugandan aggression:
“[t]he wording [of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Application] shows very clearly what the essential subject-matter of the Applica¬tion is: the principle of Ugandan aggression. The details of that aggression, including the looting of natural resources and associated atrocities, are not considered in isolation, as separate acts.” (Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RDRC), p. 11, para. 1.16.)
In its presentation of the military intervention of Uganda, the Demo¬cratic Republic of the Congo states:
“[g]iven the gravity of the Ugandan military intervention, the DRC concluded that it was faced with real aggression within the meaning of the definition given to this term by the General Assembly of the United Nations” (RDRC, p. 60, para. 2.01).
6.    In the course of the oral pleadings, the Democratic Republic of the Congo reiterated its claim and referred to Ugandan military activi¬ties towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo and cited General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the definition of aggression.
7.    The activities alleged of Uganda generally — and especially the form and nature of its use of force — are extremely serious in nature. The Court holds that:
“The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and duration that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.” (Judgment, para. 165.)
8. Thus while the Court uses exceptionally strong language to empha¬size the gravity of the use of force in this case, it fails to consider the additional claim of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that such acts, on account of their very seriousness as well as their specific characteris¬tics, constitute aggression. Aggression is the core and the very essence of the use of force prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. As the Preamble of the Definition of Aggression states, “aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force”.
9.    In view of the submissions of the Applicant, and the gravity of the violations recognized by the Court, I feel it is incumbent upon the Court to respond to the serious allegation put forward by the Democratic Republic of the Congo that the activities of Uganda also constitute aggression as prohibited under international law.
10.    Aggression is not a novel concept in international law. In the after¬math of the Second World War, the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that “to initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole” (Judg¬ment of 1 October 1946, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November-1 October 1946, Vol. 1, p. 186). The founding of the United Nations was a land¬mark and a turning point in the outlawing of the use of force. The Char¬ter of the United Nations lays down, in Article 2, paragraph 4, a general prohibition on “the threat and use of force” in States’ international rela¬tions. Article 39 confers upon the Security Council the authority to make a determination of the “existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” in order to make recommendations and take action under other provisions of Chapter VII for the maintenance of international peace and security.
including the Court as “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations” (Art. 92, Charter of the United Nations). Although the term’s use in political and popular discourse is often highly charged, it nevertheless remains that aggression is a legal concept with legal connotations and legal consequences, matters which fall clearly within the remit of the Court, particularly when the circumstances of a case coming before the Court call for a decision thereon. There is now general recognition that, as Judge Lachs wrote in the Lockerbie cases,
“the dividing line between political and legal disputes is blurred, as law becomes ever more frequently an integral part of international controversies” (Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Locker¬bie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Meas¬ures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 27; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jama- hiriya v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 139).
12.    The General Assembly and its subsidiary organs worked for many years to achieve an appropriate and effective definition of what consti¬tutes aggression. The culmination of such efforts came with the adoption of the General Assembly Declaration on the Definition of Aggression (resolution 3314 (XXIX)). This resolution sets out a general definition of the term in Article 1, while also citing a non-exhaustive list of situations which amount to aggression in Article 3. Although this definition is not without its problems and at the time certain Member States had reserva¬tions about certain aspects thereof, it was nonetheless adopted without a vote by the General Assembly of the United Nations and marks a note¬worthy success in achieving by consensus a definition of aggression.
13.    The definition does not claim to be either completely exhaustive or authoritative. Yet it does offer an invaluable guide to the scope of aggres¬sion and an elucidation of the meaning of this term in international rela¬tions. As the Preamble of the Declaration emphasizes,
“the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to have the effect of deterring a potential aggressor, would simplify the determination of acts of aggression and the implementation of measures to sup¬press them and would also facilitate the protection of the rights and lawful interests of, and the rendering of assistance to, the victim”.
14.    The Preamble to the Definition of Aggression in resolution 3314 (XXIX) also aptly clarifies that aggression “must be considered in the light of all the circumstances of each particular case”. It is to this con¬sideration that I now turn. Examining the activities by Uganda against the Democratic Republic of the Congo found to have taken place in the current case, it is, in my view, clear that such activities amount to aggres¬sion. They fall clearly within the scope of Article 1 of the definition:
“[a]ggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sov¬ereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition”.
15. In the Nicaragua case, aggression was considered by the Court in the context of an armed attack possibly giving rise to self-defence under cus¬tomary international law. Although the Court found in that case that no such armed attack had been proven, the Court held that
“[t]his description contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Defi¬nition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary international law” (Mili¬tary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicara¬gua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 103, para. 195).
16. The gravity of the factual circumstances and context of the present case dwarfs that of the Nicaragua case. The acknowledgment by the Court of the customary international law status of the definition of aggression is of considerable importance to the instant case and in par¬ticular to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s claim that Uganda has violated the prohibition of aggression in international law. Indeed the definition of aggression applies a fortiori to the situation at hand: the full force of the Charter provisions are applicable; the nature and form of the activities under consideration fall far more clearly within the scope of the definition; the evidence before the Court is more complete and both Parties have been present at all stages of the proceedings.
17. These factors, allied with the central position of this claim within the Application and the pleadings of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, require the Court to adhere to its judicial responsibility to adju¬dicate on a normative basis. The Court’s dicta on this point are of a broader significance as they establish a normative test which should be operational across the board. The same yardstick should be used in every case to gauge the unlawful use of force by any State. Article 38 (b) of the Statute mandates the Court to apply “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”. By dint of its dicta in the Nicara¬gua case, the Court should, in my view, have embarked on a determina-tion as to whether the egregious use of force by Uganda falls within the customary rule of international law as embodied in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX).
18. Thus it was my expectation that the Court’s dicta in the Nicaragua case, even if construed as obiter would be followed in the instant case by qualifying the grave use of force by Uganda as amounting to aggression. Rarely if ever has the Court been asked to pronounce upon a situation where such grave violations of the prohibition of the use of force have been committed. This makes it all the more important for the Court to consider the question carefully and — in the light of its dicta in the Nica¬ragua case — to respond positively to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s allegation that Ugandan armed activities against and on its territory amount to aggression and constitute a breach of its obligations under international law.
19. The consistency of the Court’s dicta and holdings should be observed and maintained. It is appropriate to point out that the consist¬ency of the case law practice and jurisprudence of the Court is not con¬fined to the dispositif of the judgments. Shabtai Rosenne noted that there is “general desire for consistency and stability in the Court’s case-law when the Court is dealing with legal issues which have been before it in previous cases” (The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920¬1996, Vol. III, Procedure, 1997, p. 1610).
The Court has emphasized this point in the case concerning the Continental Shelf by noting that
“the justice of which equity is an emanation, is not abstract justice but justice according to the rule of law; which is to say that its appli¬cation should display consistency and a degree of predictability; even though it looks with particularity to the peculiar circumstances of an instant case, it also looks beyond it to principles of more general application” (Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 39, para. 45).
As a general rule, such consistency has hitherto been maintained. On this point, Judge Shahabuddeen remarked, the Court’s “jurisprudence has developed in the direction of a strong tendency to adhere closely to pre¬vious holdings” (Precedent in the World Court, 1996, p. 238).
20. As remarked at the outset, I concur with the Court’s findings in the present case, including its finding relating to the use of force. I am unable, however, to appreciate any compelling reason for the Court to refrain from finding that Uganda’s actions did indeed amount to aggres¬sion. The International Court of Justice has not been conceived as a penal court, yet its dicta have wide-ranging effects in the international community’s quest to deter potential aggressors and to overcome the cul¬ture of impunity. Given the centrality of the claim of aggression to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Application as well as the serious¬ness of the violation of the use of force in the present case and the broader importance of repressing aggression in international relations, I have appended this separate opinion to respond fully to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s submission on this point.
(Signed) Nabil ELARABY.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SIMMA
The Court should have called the Ugandan invasion of a large part of the DRC s territory an act of aggression — The Court should not have avoided dealing with the issue of self-defence against large-scale cross-boundary armed attacks by non-State actors but rather it should have taken the opportunity to clarify a matter to the confused state of which it has itself contributed — Against the background of current attempts to deprive certain persons of the protection due to them under international humanitarian and human rights law, the Court should have found that the private persons maltreated at Kinshasa Airport in August 1998 did enjoy such protection, and that Uganda would have had standing to raise a claim in their regard irrespective of their nationality.
1. Let me emphasize at the outset that I agree with everything the Court is saying in its Judgment. Rather, what I am concerned about are certain issues on which the Court decided to say nothing. The first two matters in this regard fall within the ambit of the use of force in the con¬text of the claims of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the third issue concerns the applicability of international humanitarian and human rights law to a certain part of Uganda’s second counter-claim.
call a spade a spade? If there ever was a military activity before the Court that deserves to be qualified as an act of aggression, it is the Ugandan invasion of the DRC. Compared to its scale and impact, the military adventures the Court had to deal with in earlier cases, as in Corfu Chan¬nel, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua or Oil Platforms, border on the insignificant.
3. It is true that the United Nations Security Council, despite adopting a whole series of resolutions on the situation in the Great Lakes region (cf. paragraph 150 of the Judgment) has never gone as far as expressly qualifying the Ugandan invasion as an act of aggression, even though it must appear as a textbook example of the first one of the definitions of “this most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force” laid down in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). The Council will have had its own — political — reasons for refraining from such a deter¬mination. But the Court, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, does not have to follow that course. Its very raison d’etre is to arrive at decisions based on law and nothing but the law, keeping the political context of the cases before it in mind, of course, but not desist¬ing from stating what is manifest out of regard for such non-legal con¬siderations. This is the division of labour between the Court and the political organs of the United Nations envisaged by the Charter!
2. SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST LARGE-SCALE ARMED ATTACKS BY NON-STATE
ACTORS
4. I am in agreement with the Court’s finding in paragraph 146 of the Judgment that the “armed attacks” to which Uganda referred when claiming to have acted in self-defence against the DRC were perpetrated not by the Congolese armed forces but rather by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), that is, from a rebel group operating against Uganda from Congolese territory. The Court stated that Uganda could provide no satisfactory proof that would have sustained its allegation that these attacks emanated from armed bands or regulars sent by or on behalf of the DRC. Thus these attacks are not attributable to the DRC.
5. The Court, however, then finds, that for these reasons the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of a right to self-defence by Uganda against the DRC were not present (Judgment, para. 147). Accordingly, the Court continues, it has no need to respond to the contentions of the Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary interna¬tional law provides for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces (Judgment, para. 147).
6.    Thus, the reasoning on which the Judgment relies in its findings on the first submission by the DRC appears to be as follows:
—    since the submission of the DRC requests the Court (only) to find that it was Uganda’s use of force against the DRC which constituted an act of aggression, and
—    since the Court does not consider that the military activities carried out from Congolese territory onto the territory of the Respondent by anti-Ugandan rebel forces are attributable to the DRC,
—    and since therefore Uganda’s claim that its use of force against the DRC was justified as an exercise of self-defence, cannot be upheld,
it suffices for the Court to find Uganda in breach of the prohibition of the use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in general inter¬national law. The Applicant, the Court appears to say, has not asked for anything beyond that. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Court to deal with the legal qualification of either the cross-boundary military activities of the anti-Ugandan groups as such, or of the Ugandan countermeasures against these hostile acts.
7.    What thus remains unanswered by the Court is the question whether, even if not attributable to the DRC, such activities could have been repelled by Uganda through engaging these groups also on Congolese territory, if necessary, provided that the rebel attacks were of a scale suf¬ficient to reach the threshold of an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
8.    Like Judge Kooijmans in paragraphs 25 ff. of his separate opinion, I submit that the Court should have taken the opportunity presented by the present case to clarify the state of the law on a highly controversial matter which is marked by great controversy and confusion — not the least because it was the Court itself that has substantially contributed to this confusion by its Nicaragua Judgment of two decades ago. With Judge Kooijmans, I regret that the Court “thus has missed a chance to fine-tune the position it took 20 years ago in spite of the explicit invita¬tion by one of the Parties to do so” (separate opinion of Judge Kooij- mans, para. 25).
9.    From the Nicaragua case onwards the Court has made several pro¬nouncements on questions of use of force and self-defence which are problematic less for the things they say than for the questions they leave open, prominently among them the issue of self-defence against armed attacks by no n-State actors.
10.    The most recent — and most pertinent — statement in this context is to be found in the (extremely succinct) discussion by the Court in its Wall Opinion of the Israeli argument that the separation barrier under construction was a measure wholly consistent with the right of States to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advi¬sory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 194, para. 138). To this argument the Court replied that Article 51 recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of an armed attack by one State against another. Since Israel did not claim that the attacks against it were imputable to a foreign State, however, Article 51 of the Charter had no relevance in the case of the wall (ibid., para. 139).
11. Such a restrictive reading of Article 51 might well have reflected the state, or rather the prevailing interpretation, of the international law on self-defence for a long time. However, in the light of more recent developments not only in State practice but also with regard to accom¬panying opinio juris, it ought urgently to be reconsidered, also by the Court. As is well known, these developments were triggered by the terror¬ist attacks of September 11, in the wake of which claims that Article 51 also covers defensive measures against terrorist groups have been received far more favourably by the international community than other extensive re-readings of the relevant Charter provisions, particularly the “Bush doctrine” justifying the pre-emptive use of force . Security Council reso¬lutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) cannot but be read as affirmations of the view that large-scale attacks by non-State actors can qualify as “armed attacks” within the meaning of Article 51.
12.    In his separate opinion, Judge Kooijmans points to the fact that the almost complete absence of governmental authority in the whole or part of the territory of certain States has unfortunately become a phenomenon as familiar as international terrorism (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 30). I fully agree with his conclusions that, if armed attacks are carried out by irregular forces from such territory against a neighbouring State, these activities are still armed attacks even if they cannot be attributed to the territorial State, and, further, that it “would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to self- defence merely because there is no attacker State and the Charter does not so require” (ibid.) .
13.    I also subscribe to Judge Kooijmans’s opinion that the lawfulness of the conduct of the attacked State in the face of such an armed attack by a non-State group must be put to the same test as that applied in the case of a claim of self-defence against a State, namely, does the scale of the armed action by the irregulars amount to an armed attack and, if so, is the defensive action by the attacked State in conformity with the requirements of necessity and proportionality? (Separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 31.)
14.    In applying this test to the military activities of Uganda on Con¬golese territory from August 1998 onwards, Judge Kooijmans concludes — and I agree — that, while the activities that Uganda conducted in August in an area contiguous to the border may still be regarded as keep¬ing within these limits, the stepping up of Ugandan military operations starting with the occupation of the Kisangani airport and continuing thereafter, leading the Ugandan forces far into the interior of the DRC, assumed a magnitude and duration that could not possibly be justified any longer by reliance on any right of self-defence. Thus, at this point, our view meets with, and shares, the Court’s final conclusion that Uganda’s military intervention constitutes “a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter” (Judgment, para. 165).
15.    What I wanted to demonstrate with the preceding reasoning is that the Court could well have afforded to approach the question of the use of armed force on a large scale by non-State actors in a realistic vein, instead of avoiding it altogether by a sleight of hand, and still arrive at the same convincing result. By the unnecessarily cautious way in which it handles this matter, as well as by dodging the issue of “aggression”, the Court creates the impression that it somehow feels uncomfortable being confronted with certain questions of utmost importance in contemporary international relations.
3. THE MALTREATMENT OF PERSONS AT NDJILI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
16. My third observation relates to the maltreatment inflicted on certain persons by Congolese soldiers at Ndjili International Airport in Kinshasa in August 1998.
In its second counter-claim, Uganda alleged, inter alia, that by mal¬treating certain individuals other than Ugandan diplomats when they attempted to leave the country following the outbreak of the armed con¬flict, the DRC violated its obligations under the “international minimal standard relating to the treatment of foreign nationals lawfully on State territory”, as well as “universally recognized standards of human rights concerning the security of the human person” (Counter-Memorial of Uganda (CMU), paras. 405-407). The Court concluded in paragraph 333 of its Judgment that in presenting this part of the counter-claim Uganda was attempting to exercise its right to diplomatic protection with regard to its nationals. It followed that Uganda would need to meet the condi¬tions necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection as recognized in general international law, that is, the requirement of Ugandan national¬ity of the individuals concerned and the prior exhaustion of local remedies. The Court observed that no specific documentation could be found in the case file identifying the persons as Ugandan nationals. The Court thus decided that, this condition not being met, the part of Uganda’s counter-claim under consideration here was inadmissible. It thus upheld the objection of the DRC to this effect (Judgment, para. 345 (11)).
17. My vote in favour of this part of the Judgment only extends to the inadmissibility of Uganda’s claim to diplomatic protection, since I agree with the Court’s finding that the preconditions for a claim of diplomatic protection by Uganda were not met. I am of the view, however, that the Court’s reasoning should not have finished at this point. Rather, the Court should have recognized that the victims of the attacks at the Ndjili International Airport remained legally protected against such maltreat¬ment irrespective of their nationality, by other branches of international law, namely international human rights and, particularly, international humanitarian law. In its Judgment the Court has made a laudable effort to apply the rules developed in these fields to the situation of persons of varying nationality and status finding themselves in the war zones, in as comprehensive a manner as possible. The only group of people that remains unprotected by the legal shield thus devised by the Court are the 17 unfortunate individuals encountering the fury of the Congolese soldiers at the airport in Kinshasa.
18. I have to admit that the way in which Uganda presented and argued the part of its second counter-claim devoted to this group struck me as somewhat careless, both with regard to the evidence that Uganda mustered and to the quality of its legal reasoning. Such superficiality might stem from the attempts of more or less desperate counsel to find issues out of which they think they could construe what to them might look like a professionally acceptable counter-claim , instead of genuine concern for the fate of the persons concerned.
19.    Be this as it may, I will take the opportunity of Uganda’s claim concerning the events at the airport further to develop the thesis pre¬sented at the outset, namely that it would have been possible for the Court in its Judgment to embrace the situation in which these individuals found themselves, on the basis of international humanitarian and human rights law, and that no legal void existed in their regard. The reader might ask himself why I should give so much attention to an incident which happened more than seven years ago, whose gravity must certainly pale beside the unspeakable atrocities committed in the war in the Congo. I will be very clear: I consider that legal arguments clarifying that in situ¬ations like the one before us no gaps exist in the law that would deprive the affected persons of any legal protection, have, unfortunately, never been as important as at present, in the face of certain recent deplorable developments.
20.    Let me, first, turn to the relevance of international humanitarian law to the incident at Ndjili International Airport.
To begin with, the fact that the airport was not a site of major hostili¬ties in the armed conflict between the DRC and Uganda does not present a barrier to the application of international humanitarian law to the events which happened there. There are two reasons for this.
21.    First, the key issue in finding whether international humanitarian law should apply also in peaceful areas of the territory of a belligerent State is whether those areas are somehow connected to the conflict. This was indeed the case with Ndjili International Airport because the indi¬viduals maltreated there found themselves in a situation of evacuation from armed conflict. The Note of Protest sent by the Embassy of Uganda to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRC on 21 August 1998 — which the Court considers reliable evidence in paragraph 339 of its Judg¬ment — states that individuals and Ugandan diplomats were at Ndjili International Airport in the context of an evacuation (CMU, Ann. 23). This evacuation was necessary due to the armed conflict taking place in the DRC. Therefore, the events at the airport were factually connected to the armed conflict. The airport was not a random peaceful location com¬pletely unconnected to that conflict. Quite the contrary, it was the point of departure for an evacuation rendered necessary precisely by the armed conflict. During that evacuation, the airport became the scene of violence by Congolese forces against the evacuees.
22. Article 80 (1) of the Rules of Court states that: “A counter-claim may be presented provided that it is directly connected with the subject- matter of the claim of the other party and that it comes within the juris¬diction of the Court.” (Emphasis added.) In its Order of 29 November 2001, the Court found the second counter-claim admissible under the
Article 80 “direct connection” test, stating that “each Party holds the other responsible for various acts of oppression allegedly accompanying an illegal use offorce; . . . these are facts of the same nature, and . . . the Parties’ claims form part of the same factual complex” (para. 40; empha¬sis added). Therefore the Court had already determined, in its Order under Article 80, that the events at the airport formed part of the “same factual complex” as the armed conflict which constitutes the basis of the main claim. Hence, international humanitarian law should apply to the counter-claim as it does to the main claim.
23. Second, the application of international humanitarian law to the events at the airport would be consistent with the understanding of the scope of international humanitarian law developed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the Appeals Chamber stated:
“Armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between . . . such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessa¬tion of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law con¬tinues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.” (No. IT-94-1, Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the defence motion for inter¬locutory appeal on jurisdiction, para. 70 (2 October 1995); emphasis added.)
The Appeals Chamber also noted that “the temporal and geographical scope of both internal and international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of hostilities” (ibid., para. 67). Later in the same case, a Trial Chamber analysed the phrase “when committed in armed conflict”, which qualifies the unlawful acts set out in Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY, and concluded that “it is not necessary that the acts occur in the heat of battle” (Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgment, para. 632 (7 May 1997)). Simi¬larly, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY has stated that “there does not have to be actual combat activities in a particular location for the norms of international humanitarian law to be applicable” (Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, & Landzo, No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 185 (16 November 1998)).
24. I turn, next, to the substantive rules of international humanitarian law applicable to the persons in question. The provision which first comes to mind is Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. According to Article 4, persons who “at a given moment and in any man¬ner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals” are considered “protected persons” under the Convention. If the individuals maltreated by the DRC at Ndjili International Airport were considered protected persons under Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the behaviour of the Congolese soldiers would have violated several provisions of that Convention, including Article 27 (requiring that protected persons “shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity”), Article 32 (prohibiting the infliction of physical suffering on protected persons), Article 33 (prohibiting reprisals against protected persons and their property), and Article 36 (requiring that evacuations of protected persons be carried out safely).
25. However, the qualification of the 17 individuals at the airport as “protected persons” within the meaning of Article 4 meets with great difficulties. As I stated above, Uganda was not able to prove that these persons were its own nationals; in fact we have no information what¬soever as to their nationality. In this regard, Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that:
“Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.”
The individuals under consideration might have been nationals of a neutral State or those of a co-belligerent (like Rwanda), and we do not know whether their home State maintained normal diplomatic rela¬tions with the DRC at the time of the incident. Against this factual background — or rather, the lack thereof — it would not have been possible for the Court to regard them as “protected persons”.
26. But this is not the end of the matter. The gap thus left by Geneva Convention Article 4 has in the meantime been — deliberately — closed by Article 75 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This provision enshrines the fundamental guarantees of interna¬tional humanitarian law and reads in pertinent part as follows:
“1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol, persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treat¬ment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided by this Article . . .
2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents :
(a)    violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular:
(iii) corporal punishment;
(b)    outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, …”
The Commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross to Article 75 specifically notes that this provision was meant to provide pro¬tection to individuals who, by virtue of the exceptions listed in Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, did not qualify as “protected per¬sons”. Thus, the Commentary makes clear that Article 75 provides pro¬tection to both nationals of States not parties to the conflict and natio¬nals of allied States, even if their home State happened to have normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they find them- selves . The Commentary emphasizes that “[i]f. . . there were . . . cases in which the status of . . . protected person were denied to certain indi¬viduals, the protection of Article 75 must be applied to them as a mini¬mum”  .
27. The conclusion just arrived at has been confirmed recently in an Opinion of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) established by the Council of Europe . This Opinion was prepared to answer the question whether the new challenges posed by international terrorism, and the claims made by the United States in the wake of September 11 to the effect that the United States could deny certain persons the protection of the Geneva Conventions because they were “enemy unlawful combatants”, rendered necessary a further development of international humanitarian law. According to the Venice Commission, Article 75 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, as well as common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions (on which infra)
“are based on the assumption that nationals of States which are not
Parties to the conflict or nationals of co-belligerent States do not need the full protection of GC IV since they are normally even better protected by the rules on diplomatic protection. Should, however, diplomatic protection not be (properly) exercised on behalf of such third party nationals, International Humanitarian Law provides for protection under Article 75 P I and common Article 3 so that such persons do not remain without certain minimum rights.”
Thus, also according to the Venice Commission, there is “in respect of these matters … no legal void in international law” .
28.    Further, it can safely be concluded that the fundamental guaran¬tees enshrined in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I are also embodied in customary international law .
29.    Attention must also be drawn to Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions, which defines certain rules to be applied in armed conflicts of a non-international character. As the Court stated in the Nicaragua case:
“There is no doubt that, in the event of international armed con¬flicts, these rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to international conflicts; and they are rules which, in the Court’s opinion, reflect what the Court in 1949 called ‘elementary considerations of human¬ity’ (Corfu Channel, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22 . . .).” (Mili¬tary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicara¬gua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 114, para. 218.) As such, the Court in Nicaragua found these rules applicable to the inter¬national dispute before it. The same is valid in the present case. In this regard, the decision of the Tadic Appeals Chamber discussed above is also of note. In relation to common Article 3, it stated that “the rules contained in Article 3 also apply outside the narrow geographical context of the actual theatre of combat operations” (Prosecutor v. Tadic, Deci¬sion of the Appeals Chamber on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, para. 69; see supra, para. 23).
30.    In addition to constituting breaches of international humanitarian law, the maltreatment of the persons in question at Ndjili International Airport was also in violation of international human rights law. In para¬graph 216 of its Judgment, the Court recalls its finding in the Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, according to which “the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict . . .” (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 178, para. 106). In its Advisory Opinion, the Court continued:
“As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitar¬ian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law.” (Ibid.)
In my view, the maltreatment of the individuals at the airport falls under the third category of the situations mentioned: it is a matter of both international humanitarian and international human rights law.
31. Applying international human rights law to the individuals mal¬treated by the DRC at Ndjili International Airport, the conduct of the DRC would violate provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984, to all of which both the DRC and Uganda are parties. Specifically, under the International Covenant on Civil and Politi¬cal Rights, the conduct of the DRC would violate Article 7 (“No one shall be subjected to . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun¬ishment”), Article 9, paragraph 1 (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or deten¬tion. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law”), Article 10, paragraph 1 (“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human per¬son”), and Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2 (“1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement… 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own”).
Under the African Charter, the conduct of the DRC would violate Article 4 (“Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for .. . the integrity of his person. No one may be arbi¬trarily deprived of this right”), Article 5 (“Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited”), Article 6 (“Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained”), as well as Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2 (“1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a State provided he abides by the law. 2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country . . .”). Finally, although the conduct of the DRC at Ndjili International Airport did not rise to the level of torture, it was never¬theless in violation of Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Torture which reads as follows:
“Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”
32.    The jurisdiction of the Court being firmly established, there remains the issue of standing to raise violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in the case of persons who may not have the nationality of the claimant State. In the present case, regarding Uganda’s counter¬claim, the issue does not present itself in a technical sense because Uganda has not actually pleaded a violation of either of these branches of international law in relation to the persons in question. But if Uganda had chosen to raise these violations before the Court, it would undoubtedly have had standing to bring such claims.
33.    As to international humanitarian law, Uganda would have had standing because, as the Court emphasized in its Advisory Opinion on the Wall:
“Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, a provision common to the four Geneva Conventions, provides that ‘The High Contract¬ing Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.’ It follows from that provision that every State party to that Convention, whether or not it is a party to a specific conflict, is under an obligation to ensure that the require-ments of the instruments in question are complied with.” (I.C.J. Reports 2004, pp. 199-200, para. 158.)
The Court concluded that given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, there is an obligation on all States parties to the Convention to respect and ensure respect for violations of the international humanitarian law codified in the Convention (ibid., p. 200, paras. 158-159). The same reasoning is applicable in the instant case.
There cannot be any doubt that the obligation (not only to respect but also) to ensure respect for international humanitarian law applies to the obligations enshrined both in common Article 3 and in Protocol I Addi¬tional to the Geneva Conventions.
34.    The ICRC Commentary to common Article 1 of the Conventions arrives at the same result in its analysis of the obligation to respect and to ensure respect, where it is stated that:
“in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations [under the Convention], the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and should, endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention. The proper working of the system of protection provided by the Convention demands in fact that the Contracting Parties should not be content merely to apply its provisions them¬selves, but should do everything in their power to ensure that the humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied universally.”
Thus, regardless of whether the maltreated individuals were Ugandans or not, Uganda had the right — indeed the duty — to raise the violations of international humanitarian law committed against the private persons at the airport. The implementation of a State party’s international legal duty to ensure respect by another State party for the obligations arising under humanitarian treaties by way of raising it before the International Court of Justice is certainly one of the most constructive avenues in this regard.
35.    As to the question of standing of a claimant State for violations of human rights committed against persons which might or might not possess the nationality of that State, the jurisdiction of the Court not being at issue, the contemporary law of State responsibility provides a positive answer as well. The International Law Commission’s 2001 draft on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides not only for the invocation of responsibility by an injured State (which quality Uganda would possess if it had been able to establish the Ugandan nationality of the individuals at the airport) but also for the possibility that such responsibility can be invoked by a State other than an injured State. In this regard, Article 48 of the draft reads as follows :
“Article 48
Invocation of Responsibility by a State Other than an Injured State
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if:
(a)    The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or
(b)    The obligation breached is owed to the international commu¬nity as a whole.
2.    Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from the responsible State:
(a)    Cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in accordance with article 30; and
(b)    Performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.
3.    The requirements for the invocation of responsibility by an injured State under articles 43, 44 and 45 apply to an invocation of responsibility by a State entitled to do so under paragraph 1.”
The obligations deriving from the human rights treaties cited above and breached by the DRC are instances par excellence of obligations that are owed to a group of States including Uganda, and are established for the protection of a collective interest of the States parties to the Covenant.
36. With regard to the customary requirement of the exhaustion of local remedies, this condition only applies if effective remedies are avail¬able in the first place (cf. ILC Article 44 (b) and the commentary thereto). In view of the circumstances of the airport incident and, more generally, of the political situation prevailing in the DRC at the time of the Ugandan invasion, I tend to agree with the Ugandan argument that attempts by the victims of that incident to seek justice in the Congolese courts would have remained futile (cf. paragraph 317 of the Judgment). Hence, no obstacle would have stood in the way for Uganda to raise the violation of human rights of the persons maltreated at Ndjili Inter-national Airport, even if these individuals did not possess its nationality.
37. In summary of this issue, Uganda would have had standing to bring, and the Court would have had jurisdiction to decide upon a claim both under international humanitarian law and international human rights law for the maltreatment of the individuals at the airport, irrespec¬tive of the nationality of these individuals. The specific construction of the rights and obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as the relevant provisions of Protocol I Additional to this Convention not only entitles every State party to raise these violations but even cre¬ates an obligation to ensure respect for the humanitarian law in question. The rules of the international law of State responsibility lead to an analo¬gous result as concerns the violations of human rights of the persons con¬cerned by the Congolese soldiers. Uganda chose the avenue of diplomatic protection and failed. A reminder by the Court of the applicability of international humanitarian and human rights law standards and of Uganda’s standing to raise violations of the obligations deriving from these standards by the DRC would, in my view, not have gone ultra petita partium.
38.    Let me conclude with a more general observation on the commu¬nity interest underlying international humanitarian and human rights law. I feel compelled to do so because of the notable hesitation and weak¬ness with which such community interest is currently manifesting itself vis-a-vis the ongoing attempts to dismantle important elements of these branches of international law in the proclaimed “war” on international terrorism.
39.    As against such undue restraint it is to be remembered that at least the core of the obligations deriving from the rules of international humani¬tarian and human rights law are valid erga omnes. According to the Commentary of the ICRC to Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Conven¬tion, “[t]he spirit which inspires the Geneva Conventions naturally makes it desirable that they should be applicable ‘erga omnes’, since they may be regarded as the codification of accepted principles” . In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons the Court stated that “a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ . . .”, that they are “to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 257, para. 79). Similarly, in the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court affirmed that the rules of international humanitarian law “incorporate obligations which are essentially of an erga omnes character” (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 199, para. 157).
40.    As the Court indicated in the Barcelona Traction case, obligations erga omnes are by their very nature “the concern of all States” and, “[i]n view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection” (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33). In the same vein, the International Law Commission has stated in the Commentaries to its Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts that there are certain rights in the protection of which, by reason of their importance, “all States have a legal interest . . .” (A/56/10 at p. 278)13.
41. If the international community allowed such interest to erode in the face not only of violations of obligations erga omnes but of outright attempts to do away with these fundamental duties, and in their place to open black holes in the law in which human beings may be “disappeared” and deprived of any legal protection whatsoever for indefinite periods of time, then international law, for me, would become much less worthwhile.
(Signed) Bruno SIMMA.
13 Concerning the specific question of standing in case of breaches of obligations erga omnes the Institute of International Law, in a resolution on the topic of obligations of this nature adopted at its Krakow Session of 2005, accepted the following provisions:
“Article 3
In the event of there being a jurisdictional link between a State alleged to have committed a breach of an obligation erga omnes and a State to which the obligation is owed, the latter State has standing to bring a claim to the International Court of Justice or other international judicial institution in relation to a dispute concerning compliance with that obligation.
Article 4
The International Court of Justice or other international judicial institution should give a State to which an obligation erga omnes is owed the possibility to participate in proceedings pending before the Court or that institution and relating to that obli¬gation. Specific rules should govern this participation.”
DECLARATION OF JUDGE TOMKA
[English Original Text] Duty of vigilance — Toleration by Zaire on its territory of activities of rebel groups against Uganda in 1994-1997 period — Duty of Uganda to prosecute those who have committed grave breaches of international humanitarian law — Self-defence and the prohibition of the use of force: order of their consideration.
Having voted in favour of the dispositif, with the exception of its paragraph 9, I wish to clarify my position on several issues in relation to the Judgment.
I. DUTY OF VIGILANCE — FAILURE TO TAKE ACTION
1. The Court rejected the first counter-claim of the Republic of Uganda (paragraph 9 of the dispositif). When voting on this paragraph, I was faced with a dilemma. I concur with the views of the Court concerning the counter-claim relating to the second period, from May 1997 until 2 August 1998, and to the third period, following 2 August 1998 (see para-graphs 302-304 of the Judgment). However, my position regarding the first period, from 1994 until May 1997, is — in respect of one of its aspects — different from that of the majority. I agree with the majority, that “Uganda has not produced sufficient evidence to show that the Zair¬ean authorities were involved in providing political and military support for specific attacks against Ugandan territory” (para. 298). But, to my regret, I cannot subscribe to the reasoning and conclusion of the majority that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has not breached its duty of vigilance during the period 1994-1997 by tolerating Ugandan rebel movements’ use of the DRC’s territory to launch attacks on Uganda (paras. 300-301). As the Court observes, “[t]he DRC recognized that anti-Ugandan groups operated on the territory of the DRC from at least 1986” (para. 300). It is not disputed that in the period relevant for this part of Uganda’s claim (1994-May 1997), the anti-Ugandan rebel move¬ments used the territory of the then Zaire to launch attacks against Uganda and its population who were victims of these attacks. Zaire was well aware of the situation.
2. Sovereignty of a State does not involve only rights but also obliga¬tions of a territorial State. The State has an obligation not only to protect its own people, but also to avoid harming its neighbours. This Court, in the Corfu Channel case, confirmed the “general and well-recognized prin¬ciple” according to which every State has the “obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States” (Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22).
3.    In accordance with the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, provisions which are declaratory of customary rules, “every State has the duty to refrain from . . . acquiescing in organised activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts [i.e. acts of civil strife or terrorist acts] when the acts involve a threat or use of force”; and, “no State shall . . . tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State” (A/RES/2625 (XXV)).
4.    The duty of vigilance required Zaire to exert all good efforts in order to prevent its territory from being used to the detriment of Uganda. Whether Zaire complied with such a duty should be determined on the basis of Zaire’s conduct. The geomorphological features or size of the ter¬ritory does not relieve a State of its duty of vigilance nor render it less strict. Nor does the absence of central governmental presence in certain areas of a State’s territory set aside the duty of vigilance for a State in relation to those areas. Otherwise such absence, coupled with the attacks originating in that territory would have justified the neighbouring State, victim of attack, to step in and to put an end to the attacks.
The duty of vigilance is an obligation of conduct, not an obligation of result. It may happen that despite all good efforts of a State, which has a duty of vigilance, the neighbouring State will nevertheless suffer harm. The occurrence of harm does not necessarily prove that the duty of vigi¬lance was breached. But its occurrence creates the presumption that the obligation of vigilance has not been complied with. In such a case it would be for the State which has the duty of vigilance (i.e., the DRC in the present case) to demonstrate that it exerted all good efforts to prevent its territory from being misused for launching attacks against its neigh¬bour in order to rebut such a presumption.
5.    The DRC has not provided the Court with credible information on any such bona fide effort. Therefore, I am unable to concur with the view of the majority that the absence of action by Zaire’s Government against the rebel groups in the border area is not tantamount to “tolerating” or “acquiescing” in their activities (para. 301). I am convinced that justice would have been done if the DRC were found responsible for Zaire’s toleration of the activities of (anti-Ugandan) rebel groups from its terri¬tory against Uganda, in the first period up to May 1997, that is, for its own failure to comply with its obligation of vigilance.
6.    The Court’s finding in paragraph 9 of the dispositif concerns Uganda’s first counter-claim in toto. Although I concur with the majority with respect to the major part of the first counter-claim, nevertheless I cannot agree with its finding with respect to one of the elements of the counter-claim. That is sufficient, in my view, for upholding the counter¬claim. So, at the end, I felt to be left with no other choice than to vote against paragraph 9 of the dispositif. Needless to say that what I consider to be a breach by the Democratic Republic of the Congo of its duty of vigilance cannot be compared to the magnitude of Uganda’s breach of the prohibition of the use of force.
II. GRAVE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW — OBLIGATION TO PROSECUTE
7.    The Court has found that Uganda has breached its obligations under international humanitarian law (paragraph 3 of the dispositif). When considering the allegation of breaches of international humanitar¬ian law obligations by the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF), the Court, being convinced that they were committed, qualifies these breaches as grave (see paragraphs 207 and 208).
8.    The Court has also determined the legal consequences of Uganda’s breaches of its international legal obligations, including the obligations under international humanitarian law (see the dispositif, paragraph 6, and also paragraphs 251-261). In doing that, the Court took as a point of departure the fourth final submission of the DRC (see paragraphs 25 and 252) and determined these consequences under the general rules of inter¬national law on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.
9.    Nevertheless, since grave breaches of international humanitarian law were committed, there is another legal consequence which has not been raised by the DRC and on which the Court remains silent. That consequence is provided for in international humanitarian law. There should be no doubt that Uganda, as party to both the Geneva Conven¬tions of 1949 and the Additional Protocol I of 1977 remains under the obligation to bring those persons who have committed these grave breaches before its own courts (Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and Article 85 of the Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions).
consent by the DRC to Uganda’s military presence on the former’s terri¬tory, the consideration of self-defence precedes that of the prohibition of the use of force. One may consider that order understandable since if, according to Article 51 of the Charter,
“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”,
then a lawful exercise of the right to self-defence cannot constitute a breach of any relevant article of the United Nations Charter (in concreto, Art. 2, para. 4), and there would be no point in analysing the latter. Only once the Court concludes that “the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of a right of self-defence by Uganda . . . were not present” (para. 147), is it incumbent upon it to consider, and to make findings on, the prohibition of the use of force (paras. 148 et seq.).
11.    The prohibition on the use of force cannot be read without having regard to the Charter provisions on self-defence. The provisions on self- defence, in fact, delineate the scope of rules prohibiting the use of force. If a measure in question constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence, it necessarily falls outside the ambit of the prohibition. In other words, the prohibition of the use of force is not applicable to the use of force in law¬fully exercised self-defence.
12.    The order in which the Court considers self-defence and the pro¬hibition of the use of force in the present case is thus different from that in which it considered them in the case concerning Military and Para¬military Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 98-106, paras. 187-201; and pp. 118-123, paras. 227-238), although it does not lead to different conclusions.
(Signed) Peter TOMKA.
DECLARATION OF JUDGE AD HOC VERHOEVEN [Translation] “Declaratory” judgment: legality, limits— “Declaratory” judgment: Order indicating provisional measures, obligation of cessation, assurances and guaran¬tees of non-repetition — Illegal use offorce: consequences.
1.    As witnessed by my votes on the various elements of the dispositif of the Judgment, I essentially concur in the conclusions reached by the Court. Nevertheless, it is easily understandable in a complex case, where the facts are sometimes difficult to ascertain, that some misgiving might be felt as to certain grounds for decision, or at least that markedly dif¬ferent reasoning might have been preferred on certain points. There is no need to dwell on this. It is enough that agreement prevails on the disposi- tif and the essential grounds underlying it. This notwithstanding, I think it useful to raise a few points concerning several questions which, while not addressed very explicitly in the Judgment, are not so removed from it as to render them inappropriate for discussion, even briefly, in this declaration.
2.    The first question concerns the so-called “declaratory” nature of a decision; this was underscored more than once by the Applicant, which elsewhere characterized the decision as being one “of principle”. These qualifiers are not very illuminating in themselves, given the multitude of meanings ascribed to the words used in them. The gist of the principal claim can nevertheless be readily grasped. It aims at holding the Respon¬dent responsible for the instances of wrongful use of force attributable to it, but the claim separates the finding of a violation of law from repara¬tion for the ensuing injury. Thus, it is only in a subsequent phase of the proceedings, once there has been a finding of unlawful conduct, that the Court is called upon to decide the form and extent of the reparation, fail¬ing agreement thereon between the parties. It is not certain that the term “declaratory” — which appears nowhere in the Judgment — adequately reflects this separation. In essence, there is however no doubt as to the latter’s legality. This is clearly shown by, for example, the Court’s Judg¬ment in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 149, para. 292 (15)), even though, for reasons otherwise left unexplained, the Court did not grant the interim award which had been sought in that case (ibid., p. 143, para. 285). In the present proceedings, the Respondent is moreover hardly in a position to attack the propriety of severing the two elements, since its counter-claims
are presented in like fashion.
In an international community, where, more than elsewhere, nego¬tiated solutions are to be preferred to those imposed by third parties, even independent and impartial ones, it is understandable that the Court should not be disinclined to rule initially solely on the “principle” of the lawfulness of the acts or conduct complained of. This does not however mean that the parties are free to make selective use of the Court as they please. True, they are not required to have recourse to the Court; but, if they do submit to it, they cannot disregard its fundamental characteris¬tics. In this regard the present case offers a glimpse of the constraints — or at least some of them — by which the Parties are bound when they thus seek to sever the finding of responsibility per se from its concrete implications. The fact that the Court does not rule on this point does not mean that its Judgment is devoid of significance in this regard.
(a) The first constraint stems from the existence of facts — given legal characterization — without which there is no cause of action on the claim and beyond the scope of which a judicial decision is not vested with the authority of res judicata. In the case concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), the Court declined to make “a declaration of principle that Iceland is under an obligation to make compensation to the Federal Republic [of Ger¬many] in respect of all unlawful acts of interference with fishing ves¬sels of the Federal Republic” (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 204, para. 74) alleged to have been harassed by Icelandic coastal patrol boats seek¬ing to prevent them from conducting their fishing activities in a maritime area which had been declared exclusive. The reason for the Court’s refusal is not entirely clear. In a case primarily involving a disputed delimitation, the main ground for decision appears how¬ever to have been that the Court had no knowledge of the injurious acts, in the absence of which a decision ordering reparation, even one in principle, would be meaningless. Thus, the Court needed only to hold that the disputed extension of a zone from which the Ice¬landic authorities sought to bar foreign vessels was not enforceable against the Applicant, implicitly referring the question of reparation for the alleged damage to a fresh Application — not to a subsequent phase of the proceedings initiated by the original Application.
In the present case the existence of the injuries is beyond doubt. What is distinctive here however is that the Court has treated them by category, as it were, without ruling on each injurious “incident”. It is difficult to see how the Court could have proceeded otherwise, given the multiplicity of injuries and the circumstances in which they arose. The authority of its decision as res judicata is not, in prin¬ciple, affected by this, nor is that authority more circumscribed than that of a traditional interim judgment deferring the final determina¬tion of reparation owed to a later time. In reality, the form and amount of reparation will not be the only questions to be decided by the Court if the Parties fail to agree on them; it will also be for the Court to establish, in regard to those “incidents” falling within the category on which the Court has ruled, the causal nexus between an injury suffered and an act by the Respondent engaging its responsi¬bility.
(b) It is also my view that a request to defer the decision on reparation should not be granted in the absence of persuasive reasons. It would be out of keeping with the dignity and true interest of the Court for it to allow proceedings to be severed when there is no objective jus¬tification for it. There is no difficulty with the Congo’s principal claim and Uganda’s first counter-claim in this respect. It is easy to see why the Applicant, owing to the long conflict between the Parties and its consequences, should seek a finding of responsibility on the part of the Respondent, which it accuses of serious violation of the prohibition on the use of force, without waiting to gather all the evidence needed for a decision on reparation. Uganda’s second counter-claim is however much more questionable from this per¬spective. Given that the violations of law alleged therein are specific and limited, it is difficult to discern what could have prevented the Respondent from furnishing to the Court, without further delay, the information required for a decision on reparation. Admittedly, how¬ever, there are no real drawbacks to deferring that decision in the present case and the seeming discrimination in the treatment of the Parties could have been deemed undesirable. This is why I thought it unnecessary to part company with the other Members of the Court on this point.
That said, in my view the oral proceedings confirmed that the second counter-claim bore only a very weak connection with the object and purpose of the principal claim. Thus, when the Court turned to ruling on the admissibility of that counter-claim, I was of the opinion that it failed to satisfy the connection requirement laid down in Article 80 of the Rules of Court. The Court held the claim admissible however and it appears undeniable that the acts of which the Applicant is accused, as described in the Judgment, were breaches of international law.
3. Whether or not a claim confined to seeking a judgment on the legal¬ity of conduct or of an act can be admitted is another question. In my opinion, it cannot be. In a dispute over the respective rights of an appli¬cant and respondent, the effectiveness of the judgment would be largely vitiated and the role of the Court distorted if it were to be forbidden to pronounce, with a view to effectively resolving the dispute between the parties, upon the juridical consequences of the legal violation it has found.
The present case raises no difficulty on this point since the Applicant is essentially seeking reparation for injuries which it sees as the result of legal violations for which it holds the Respondent responsible. Yet it is true that the Applicant asserts no claim in respect of what it deems to be the consequences of the violation of the Order imposing provisional measures on the Parties. Should the Court therefore have confined itself to holding that this part of the Application was inadmissible? That undoubtedly is going too far. The essential raison d’etre of provisional measures being less to protect the rights of the parties than to safeguard the “effectiveness” of the decision to be rendered by the Court in their regard, non-compliance with those measures is in effect a challenge to the authority of the Court. It is therefore understandable that the Court should condemn, even proprio motu where appropriate, violations of ordered measures evidenced by acts within its cognizance, without thereby calling into question the general rule referred to above.
For the same reason, I do not believe admissible an application con¬fined to seeking, in addition to a finding of illegality, a ruling that there is an obligation to cease and desist from it. Such a ruling would be inde¬pendent of the finding of illegality only if there existed a right to persist in a violation, and that would seem preposterous. It does not matter whether or not the State concerned undertakes to put an end to the violation, because it obviously cannot unilaterally renounce its obligations. This is most certainly not the same as seeking guarantees to this end; that is beyond the scope of a “declaratory” judgment strictly speaking. But a court cannot order such guarantees unless they have been requested, which is not the case here; further, they can only be ordered if they are in keeping with the intrinsic limits on a judicial function which is fundamen¬tally that of “stating” the law and which accordingly does not include the power to order future measures deemed helpful in maintaining the security or protecting the interests of the prevailing party.
4. The Court refers in point 3 of the dispositif to the obligation to “respect and ensure respect for human rights and international humani¬tarian law” in Ituri district, occupied by the Respondent. This obligation cannot be denied, even though some uncertainty might endure as to the exact meaning of the expression “ensure respect for”. The scope of the obligation nevertheless extends well beyond the needs of the “occupa¬tion” in the technical sense of the term. This goes without saying for the obligation to “respect” international humanitarian law and human rights, but it is also true of the obligation to “ensure respect” for them, as is clear from, for example, the four Geneva Conventions (1949) and the first Additional Protocol to them (1977). Thus, point 3 of the dispositif cannot be interpreted as relieving the Respondent of any duty of vigi¬lance in areas where its troops are present but which are not “occupied” by them within the meaning of the jus in bello. This is so even where the use of force is in accordance with the jus ad bellum, because the lawful¬ness or unlawfulness of the use of arms is extraneous to the fundamental requirements of protection of persons from which international humani¬tarian law and human rights draw their inspiration. But this holds par¬ticularly true when a State uses force in violation of the jus ad bellum, because it must assume responsibility for the consequences of the unrest and chaos unleashed, as in the present case, by its military intervention.
5. In point 5 of the dispositif the Court “finds” that Uganda is under an obligation to make reparation to the Congo for the injury caused, referring to the damage resulting from the violations of law found in points 1, 3 and 4 of the dispositif. There is nothing out of the ordinary about this per se. And it is clearly elementary that unilateral use of force, when illegal, engages the responsibility of the author. At the time when there were essentially no restrictions on the use of force, it was under¬standable that war reparations should by nature escape the rules of responsibility. However, ever since the Charter of the United Nations clearly banned the use of force, it is difficult to see how a State having used armed force otherwise than in self-defence can elude its obligation to make reparation for the injury it has caused. It must be stressed that this injury comprises all the damage deriving from the violation of the prohibition on the use of force, regardless of whether it stems from acts or practices which in themselves comply with the rules of the law of war. It may be that breach of these rules augments the responsibility deriving from the violation of the jus ad bellum; be that as it may, compliance with the jus in bello is never sufficient to release a party from the obliga¬tion to make good all consequences of its violation of the jus ad bellum. Where occupation is unlawful because it results from the use of force otherwise than in self-defence, the occupying State bears an obligation, for example, to make reparation for all ensuing damage, even if it has acted in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) and with the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention (1907). Contrary to the suggestion by the Respondent, an occupant enjoys no right or prerogative under those Regulations by which it can avoid responsibility in respect of an occupation established in violation of the jus ad bellum. This is one of the basic consequences of the contemporary prohibition on the use of force. It does not follow that a State legally using force may breach the jus in bello; the only point is that a State unlawfully using force cannot plead compliance with the jus in bello to avoid having to make reparation for the injury resulting from its military actions.
As basic as it is, this application of the law of responsibility can on occasion give rise to difficulties. Some are technical. For example, in the context of an armed conflict the causal connection between the injury and the violation of the law will often be difficult to prove, at least under the standards traditionally applied for this purpose. Others are more fundamental. There can, for instance, be some injustice in requiring a people, particularly a (very) poor one, to pay a debt, possibly a (very) heavy one, born of the errant conduct of leaders over whom it had little, or no, hold. The concern is one of long standing and is justified. It will no doubt require international law one day to establish the conditions and limits governing payment of State debts. Alone, it offers no basis for call¬ing into question the principle that a State having unlawfully used force must make reparation for all the consequences of its “wrongdoing”.
(Signed) Joe VERHOEVEN.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC KATEKA
Disagreement with the Judgment on its key findings — Treatment of evidence not even-handed — Decision on Respondent’s defences of consent and self- defence mistaken — Kisangani events — Serious accusations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law need higher standard of proof — Reliance on United Nations reports concerning alleged exploitation of DRC s natural resources — Ruling on violation of provisional measures unnecessary — Unjustified treatment of Uganda’s counter-claims.
1. I find myself in disagreement with the Court’s Judgment on key aspects on the use of force, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and the alleged unlawful exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources. With regret, I am therefore constrained to vote against several of the operative clauses of the dispositif. Before explaining my reasons for disagreeing with parts of the Judgment, I wish to comment on some evidentiary issues and on the background to the case.
I. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND BACKGROUND TO THE CASE
2.    The Court enjoys freedom and flexibility with regard to the con¬sideration of evidence. In this case, as the Court acknowledges, both Parties have presented it with a vast amount of evidentiary materials. It has therefore to assess the probative value of the documents and eliminate from further consideration those it deems unreliable. This is not an easy task, as it calls for choice. In this exercise of choice, a judge is guided by an “inner conviction” (inevitably influenced by one’s background and experience), which should prick the conscience so that one lives up to the requirement of Article 20 of the Court’s Statute. As judge ad hoc, I am mindful of the words of Judge Lauterpacht that I am bound to exercise my function impartially and conscientiously while also discharging the special obligation to endeavour to ensure, so far as is reasonable, that argument in favour of the Party that appointed me “is reflected — though not necessarily accepted — in [this] dissenting opinion” (Applica¬tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 409, para. 6).
3.    In my view, the Court has not been even-handed in its treatment of the materials submitted by the two Parties. For example, the Court terms as “a bundle of news reports of variable reliability” (Judgment, para. 136), which the Court does not find weighty and convincing. This is evidence adduced by Uganda to establish the Sudan’s involvement in aiding anti- Ugandan elements in the DRC. This is a whole set of over 140 docu¬ments, which is published in Volume IV of the DRC’s Reply. Earlier, in paragraph 68 of the Judgment, the Court regards as “an interested source” and rejects evidence proffered by the DRC from the same vol¬ume in the context of the Kitona airborne operation. This being the case, one would expect the Court to regard it as a case of “statement against interest” and treat favourably the documents from the same volume that Uganda relies upon.
4.    The volume in question is a collection by the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN). The sources for the information include United Nations agencies, NGOs and other international organizations and media reports. One would have expected this Office for the Coordi¬nation of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) affiliated network to be given more credence than it gets, especially when the press information is “wholly consistent and concordant as to the main facts and circum¬stances of the case” (United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 10, para. 13).
But the Court excludes this large amount of materials noting that it lacks corroboration. This is in spite of the fact that the information about the Sudan, that is in this volume, is from different media from all over the world.
5.    A further illustration of the unequal treatment of the Parties is depicted when the Court cites an ICG report of August 1998 that the Court acknowledges as “independent”. The report, according to the Court, does seem to suggest some Sudanese support for the ADF’s activi¬ties (ADF is a virulent anti-Ugandan rebel group). The Court goes on to quote the report: “It also implies that this was not a matter of Congolese policy, but rather a reflection of its inability to control events along its border.” (Judgment, para. 135.) This theme of the DRC’s inability recurs throughout the Judgment. The Court does not examine this report any further to see if the DRC can be held responsible for the unlawful use of force against Uganda. But the Court holds Uganda internationally responsible for unlawful exploitation of the DRC’s resources in spite of the Court’s finding that it was not governmental policy of Uganda to do so (Judgment, paras. 242 and 250).
6. The Court continues with its tendency to discount evidence in favour of Uganda when it dismisses a key report as of no relevance to Uganda’s case. This is in connection with Uganda’s contention of incor¬poration into Kabila’s army of thousands of ex-FAR and Interahamwe genocidaires in May 1998. A United States Department report, which is also set aside by the Court, condemned the DRC’s recruitment and train¬ing of former perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. By declaring the report as irrelevant, the Court seems to be unaware of the fourth objec¬tive of Uganda’s High Command document that states: “To prevent the genocidal elements, namely, the Interahamwe, and ex-FAR, which have been launching attacks on the people of Uganda from the DRC, from continuing to do so.” (Judgment, para. 109.)
7.    In short, “the Court has chosen to depreciate [Uganda’s evidence], to omit any consequential statement of the law”, to paraphrase Judge Schwebel’s words in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case (Mili¬tary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 272, para. 16). To this end, more examples can be quoted to illustrate how the Court has dealt unevenly with the Parties. The Court, in one part of the Judgment (para. 132), is satisfied that the evidence does show a series of attacks occurring within the relevant time frame against Uganda. However, the Court observes that these facts are not denied by the DRC, but its position is that the ADF alone was responsible for the events.
8.    At the start of its substantive consideration of the Parties’ conten¬tions, the Court expresses its awareness of the complex and tragic situa¬tion which has long prevailed in the Great Lakes region. The Court notes, however, that its task is to respond, on the basis of international law, to the particular legal dispute brought before it. The Court con¬cludes, “[a]s it interprets and applies the law, it will be mindful of context, but its task cannot go beyond that” (Judgment, para. 26).
9.    However, the task of the Court cannot be in a vacuum. The existing realities must be taken into consideration. In this particular case, the realities include the genocide that happened in Rwanda in 1994. The effects of this genocide still reverberate in the region to this day. One of the root causes of this crisis has been ethnicity, which was exploited by the colonialists during colonial times. An additional factor is the terrible history of unscrupulous dictators — all of whom had support from abroad. In the case of the DRC, it has led to the land of Patrice Lumumba not to experience peace for most of the time since indepen¬dence. It is only now that there is hope for such peace.
occupying Ituri and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having operated on the territory of the DRC.
11.    This omnibus clause creates confusion by mixing up jus ad bellum with jus in bello. A finding on Uganda engaging in military activities against the DRC should have been separated from that of occupation. I am of the opinion that the finding on occupation has been invoked by the Court to justify its findings of violations of human rights and inter¬national humanitarian law.
12.    In this regard, it bears recalling that the first of the DRC’s final submissions requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
“1. That the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military and paramilitary activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo . . . has violated .. . the principle of non-use of force in inter¬national relations, including the prohibition of aggression . . .” (Judgment, para. 25.)
The Court has not found Uganda responsible for aggression against the DRC. It has reached a finding short of aggression by using the language of “extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregu¬lar forces . . .” (para. 1 of the dispositif). This phraseology evokes the memory of the dictum in the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States ofAmerica) (Mer¬its, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14). The dictum left open the defi¬nition of “armed attack” as applied in the Charter of the United Nations and under customary international law.
13.    In this regard, it has been stated thus “that actions by irregulars can constitute an armed attack” is not challenged, and
“the controversy centres on the degree of state involvement that is necessary to make the actions attributable to the state and to justify action in self-defence in particular cases” (Christine Gray, Interna¬tional Law and the Use of Force, 2000, p. 97).
Given the controversy that still persists, I am of the view that the Court should have taken the opportunity to clarify the question of the use of force in self-defence. This is more so in view of the fact that irregular forces lie at the heart of the dispute between the Parties in this case.
14.    Following the Nicaragua Judgment, the Court was criticized for stating in its dictum that the provision of weapons and logistical support to private groups did not amount to an armed attack. The gist of the
Court’s language in the present case has the same effect as that in the Nicaragua Judgment (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14). In this respect, some publicists contend that the use of force below the threshold of an “armed attack” is covered by the general principle of non-intervention (B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations — A Commentary, 2nd ed., 2002).
15.    In the context of irregulars, others such as Sir Robert Jennings hold the view that the provision of arms and logistical support amount to armed attack. “Accordingly, it seems to me that to say that the provision of arms, coupled with ‘logistical or other support’ is not armed attack is going much too far.” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 543; dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings.) This is the meaning I put to the words of the Court in the first paragraph of the dispositif. However, I apply them — see below — to the deeds of the DRC in support of anti-Uganda insurgents.
16.    In its analysis of the question of the use of force, the Court has not put much weight to Uganda’s two arguments for circumstances preclud¬ing wrongfulness, namely, consent and self-defence. As a result of this, the Court has arrived, in my view, at a mistaken conclusion that Uganda has violated the principle of non-use of force by engaging in military activities against the DRC. An examination of Uganda’s arguments below reveals the contrary.
17.    Uganda contends that its armed forces were present in the DRC from May 1997 to August 1998 and from July 1999 to June 2003 with the consent of the DRC, pursuant to oral agreements with President Laurent-Desire Kabila in May and December 1997, the bilateral Proto¬col of April 1998, the multilateral Lusaka Agreement of July 1999 and the bilateral Luanda Agreement of September 2002. For the period not covered by the DRC’s consent, i.e., from mid-September 1998 to mid- July 1999, Uganda contends that its military forces in the Congo during this ten-month period were there pursuant to the lawful exercise of the right to self-defence.
18.    Concerning the defence of consent, I find myself in disagreement with the Court’s conclusion that the consent of the DRC was withdrawn at the Victoria Summit of 8 August 1998. The Court, in my view, has chosen the date of 8 August rather arbitrarily. For there could be several other dates such as (a) 2 August 1998 when the DRC claims that Uganda invaded it, beginning with a major operation at Kitona. But the Court has rightly concluded that it has not been established that Uganda participated in the attack at Kitona; (b) the date of 28 July 1998, when President Kabila issued a statement terminating the Rwandan military presence, “with effect from this Monday, 27 July 1998”. However, the Court has found that the presence of the Ugandan forces in the DRC did not become unlawful by virtue of President Kabila’s statement;
(c)    13 August 1998 when the United Nations Permanent Representative of the DRC told a press conference that Uganda had invaded the DRC;
(d)    11 September 1998 when Uganda invoked the right of self-defence, following the publication of its High Command document, which was implemented by operation “Safe Haven”.
19.    From the above dates, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the statements attributed to the various leaders of the DRC merely expressed complaints concerning the situation in the DRC. They were not meant to withdraw the consent for the continued presence of Ugan¬da’s military forces in the Congo. In this regard, it bears stressing that Uganda took the initiative leading to the Victoria Falls Summits I and II of August and September 1998, respectively. A communique addressed to the security concerns of the DRC and those of its neighbours was issued.
20.    Regrettably, as an indication of the persistent uneven treatment of the Parties, the Court has not given a correct interpretation to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 10 July 1999. For example, there is the Court’s misleading argument that the arrangements made at Lusaka addressed certain “realities on the ground” and represented “an agreed modus oper- andi” without the DRC consenting to the presence of Ugandan troops (Judgment, para. 99). This argument would seem to suggest that the parties to the Lusaka Agreement were merely dealing with a de facto situation of disarming rebels and withdrawing of foreign troops. How¬ever, as the Court acknowledges, the Agreement shows that it was more than a ceasefire agreement (Judgment, para. 97). It addresses the key aspect of the conflict by the parties to the Lusaka Agreement, recognizing that the root cause of the conflict was the use of Congolese territory by armed bands, seeking to destabilize or overthrow neighbouring Govern¬ments.
21.    In order to address the root cause of the conflict, Chapter 12 of Annex A provides that the Parties agreed
“(a) Not to arm, train, harbour on its territory, or render any form of support to subversive elements or armed opposition move¬ments for the purpose of destabilising the others;
(d) To address the problem of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo in accordance with the terms of the [Lusaka] Agreement.” (Counter-Memorial of Uganda (CMU), Vol. II, Ann. 45, Ann. A, Chap. 12.)
Even the Secretary-General of the United Nations recognized the problem of armed groups as particularly difficult and sensitive when he stated in a report that “[i]t lies at the core of the conflict in the subregion and undermines the security of all the States concerned” (CMU, Vol. III, Ann. 46, para. 21).
22.    Thus, while agreeing with the Court that the Lusaka Agreement did not have a retrospective effect, I do not share the Court’s view that the calendar for withdrawal (of foreign forces) and its relationship to the series of major events did not constitute consent by the Congo to the presence of Ugandan forces for at least 180 days from 10 July 1999 and beyond that time if the envisaged necessary major events did not occur. As counsel for Uganda argued during the oral pleadings, there is a link¬age between the disarmament of the armed groups and the subsequent withdrawal of armed forces of foreign States from the DRC. This is borne out by paragraph 12 of Annex B to the Ceasefire Agreement, where the timetable shows that the withdrawal of foreign forces would not occur until after a successful conclusion of the Congolese national dialogue (D-Day  + 90 days), the disarmament of armed groups (D-Day+120 days) and the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces (D-Day + 180 days) (CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 45, Ann. B). Indeed there was a delay in the implementation of the Agreement because the inter-Congo¬lese dialogue did not start as envisaged in the timetable.
23.    The Court, having reached a wrong interpretation, in my view, of the Lusaka Agreement, proceeds to state that the Luanda Agreement of September 2002, a bilateral agreement between the DRC and Uganda, alters the terms of the multilateral Lusaka Agreement. I am of the view that the other parties to the Lusaka Agreement (i.e., Angola, Namibia, Rwanda and Zimbabwe) would have objected if the bilateral alteration caused problems. The Luanda Agreement gave impetus to the stalled implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. I differ once again with the Court’s conclusion that the various treaties involving the DRC and Uganda did not constitute consent to the presence of Ugandan troops in the territory of the DRC after July 1999. “Lusaka” and more explicitly “Luanda” continued the validation in law of Uganda’s military presence in the DRC.
24.    As regards the right of self-defence, the Court has regrettably come to the conclusion that the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of this right by Uganda were not present. Accordingly, it refuses to respond to the Parties’ contentions as to whether and under what condi¬tions contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces. Equally, it holds that the preconditions for the exercise of self-defence do not exist in the circum¬stances of the present case. However, it finds it appropriate to observe in an obiter dictum that the taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometres from Uganda’s border would not seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks Uganda claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence, nor to be necessary to that end.
25.    The refusal by the Court to delve into the question of self-defence arises from its rejection of the evidence submitted by Uganda. The Court relies on the Porter Commission Report as the main evidence on this issue. The role of Brigadier-General James Kazini is central to the Court’s findings — on when operation “Safe Haven” commenced and on the question of the occupation of Ituri. Uganda’s argument of the alter¬native view concerning the armed bands is set aside.
26.    Thus it seems, in the interest of judicial economy, that the Court has excluded much of the evidence submitted by Uganda on the question of self-defence. This leads the Court to apply insufficient law to insuffi¬cient facts; hence the failure by the Court to discharge its judicial func¬tion in this respect. For example on the issue of the Sudan, the Court recognizes that an ICG independent report of August 1998 (“North Kivu into the Quagmire”) seems to suggest some Sudanese support for the ADF’s activities. However, the Court acknowledges that the report also implies that this was not a matter of Congolese policy, but rather a reflec¬tion of its inability to control events along its border. This is a rather surprising position of the Court. If the report implies the Sudan’s involve¬ment with the ADF, the Court should have examined it further and linked it to other reports for corroboration purposes. Instead the Court simply quotes the report as stating that the ADF was exploiting the incapacity of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) in controlling areas of North Kivu with neighbour Uganda.
27. The Court should have been alerted by the ICG report so as to take into account other corroborating reports of the Sudan’s support for anti-Uganda rebels. Such similar documents are another ICG report of 1999 (“How Kabila Lost His Way”), which the Court regards as not con¬stituting reliable evidence. No reason is given as to why the report is not reliable despite its stating that the DRC had effectively admitted the threat to Uganda’s security posed by the Sudan. Annex 108 of the DRC’s Reply quotes reports that indicate that the Sudan had been flying mili¬tary supplies from Juba to Kabila forces in Isiro and Dongo. The same reports refer to 4,000 Sudanese soldiers being engaged in the conflict. It is worth noting that Isiro is 320 km from Uganda’s borders with the DRC.
28. One could cite more examples about the Sudanese “connection” with the DRC and its destabilizing effect on Uganda. It suffices for one to cite the factor of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). In its Judgment, the Court refers to a Ugandan military intelligence report, which states that in August 1998 the Sudan airlifted insurgents from the WNBF and LRA to fight alongside Congolese forces against RPA and RCD rebels. The Court observes that, even were that proven, the Congo was entitled so to have acted. One is led to remark that it would be a strange concept of self-defence that would allow the airlifting of rebels to the DRC by the Sudan to murder civilians in either Rwanda or Uganda, which countries were in conflict with the DRC. And yet, the Court concludes that there was no tripartite conspiracy between the DRC, the Sudan and the anti- Uganda rebels.
29. As regards the LRA, I wish to underscore the inter-connectivity of the events in the Great Lakes region. The Sudan had been sponsoring the LRA that for nearly 20 years had caused massive and grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in northern Uganda. This has led the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to indict five leaders of the LRA for crimes against humanity. The Sudan was ferrying the LRA rebels to the DRC in order to create “another frontier” in its conflict with Uganda. It has also been said that Zaire’s attempt to evict Congolese Tutsi triggered the Congo crisis. These examples show that the situation in the DRC has an internal, regional and international dimension. Another dimension of the inter-connectivity of events in the region is that the Hima people are to be found in the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. The various pogroms in Rwanda and Burundi led to massive inflows of refugees into Uganda and Tan-zania in the 1960s. Hence instability in one country creates instability in another owing to the ethnic composition of the people. In this situa¬tion it is not easy to tell whether a person belongs to this or that ethnic group.
30.    In this regard, the Court fails to recognize the inter-connectivity of the conflict when it discounts a United States State Department state¬ment of October 1998, condemning the DRC’s recruitment and training of former perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. This lack of awareness by the Court displays itself by not reacting to Uganda’s complaints about the DRC’s conflation of Uganda and Rwanda in this case. Notwith-standing the fact that Uganda has shown several times in its argument its rejection of offers by Rwanda to participate in joint operations in the DRC, the Applicant in its pleadings, and the Court in its treatment of the evidence, have both unwittingly maintained the impression of not appre¬ciating that Rwanda and Uganda are two different States.
31.    As already stated, insurgent activity is at the heart of the conflict in the region. Even to this day, MONUC is still struggling in joint opera¬tions with the DRC to disarm the various rebel groups, both local and foreign (Reuters report of 11 November 2005 on an operation in North Kivu province). The DRC, in its Reply, acknowledges that anti-Ugandan armed groups have been operating from this territory for years: “As they had always done in the past, the forces of the ADF continued to seek refuge in Congolese territory.” (Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RDRC), Vol. I, para. 3.15.) As if this was right, the DRC argues that no one, and certainly not their Ugandan counterparts, have ever held the Congolese authorities responsible for any of these actions. This implies acquiescence on Uganda’s part.
32. However, Uganda had protested the massacres at Kichwamba Technical School of 8 June 1998 in which 33 students were killed and 106 abducted, an attack at Benyangule village on 26 June 1998 in which 11 persons were killed or wounded, the abduction of 19 seminarians at Kiburara on 5 July 1998 and an attack on Kasese town on 1 August 1998, in which three persons were killed. In spite of all this evidence of brutal and deadly attacks, the Court merely comments that “[t]he DRC does not deny that a number of attacks took place, but its position is that the ADF alone was responsible for them” (Judgment, para. 133). The Court concludes that there is no satisfactory proof of the involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect of the Government of the DRC:
“The attacks did not emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC or on behalf of the DRC, within the sense of Article 3 (g) of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the definition of aggression . . . The Court is of the view that, on the evidence before it, even if this series of deplorable attacks could be regarded as cumulative in character, they still remained non- attributable to the DRC.” (Judgment, para. 146.)
33. Here the Court seems to reconfirm its 1986 dictum in the Nicara¬gua case concerning insurgent activities and what amounts to an “armed attack”. The DRC, in its Reply already referred to, reasserts that the fact of simply tolerating or financing irregular forces is not sufficient to estab¬lish a full scale “armed attack”: “For this to be established,” the DRC argues,
“Uganda must prove that the DRC was ‘substantially involved’ in the acts of irregular forces and hence that the Congolese Govern¬ment had given specific instructions or directions to them or had actually controlled the performance of such acts” (RRDC, Vol. I, para. 3.135).
In its 1986 Nicaragua Judgment, the Court stated the following:
“The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been car¬ried out by regular armed forces.” (Military and Paramilitary Activi¬ties in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 103, para. 195.)
34. The Court has thus stuck to its limited interpretation of Article 3 (g) of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). By so doing, it is encouraging that impunity in that proof of the element of “substantial involvement”, which implies awareness and substantial participation, will be invoked — as the DRC has done in its pleadings in this case — by culprits to avoid responsibility for wrongful acts. We have already referred to the alternative view, which Uganda advanced in the context of self- defence. Even if the Court found that Uganda had not established the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of a right of self-defence, it should have found that military support by the DRC for anti-Uganda insurgents constitutes unlawful intervention. Instead of doing this, the Court finds that Uganda’s first counter-claim, by which Uganda con¬tends that, since 1994, it has been the victim of military operations and other destabilizing activities carried out by hostile armed groups based in the DRC, cannot be upheld.
35. Thus the effort of Zaire’s President Mobutu (cited in the counter¬claim) to overthrow President Museveni’s Government since 1994 — and even earlier since 1986 — is subversive activity, which not only consti¬tutes unlawful intervention in Uganda’s affairs, but also is cumulatively tantamount to an armed attack upon Uganda. In my view this, along with incessant rebel attacks in the post “Zaire era”, would entitle Uganda to exercise the right of self-defence.
36. In this regard, both the Applicant and the Court have advanced the argument of the DRC’s inability to rein in anti-Uganda rebels. In its conclusion on the part of Uganda’s first counter-claim, alleging Congo¬lese responsibility for tolerating the rebel movements prior to May 1997, the Court states:
“During the period under consideration both anti-Ugandan and anti-Zairean rebel groups operated in this area. Neither Zaire nor Uganda were in a position to put an end to their activities. However . . . the Court cannot conclude that the absence of action by Zaire’s Government against the rebel groups in the border area is tantamount to ‘tolerating’ or ‘acquiescing’ in their activities.” (Judg¬ment, para. 301.)
Here, it bears stating that the inability of the DRC to control anti- Uganda rebels operating from the Congo is contrary to the first principle enunciated in the Declaration on Friendly Relations and Co-operation (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970): “Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organi¬zation of irregular forces of armed forces of armed bands, including mer¬cenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.”
The same principle is found in the Corfu Channel case, where it is stated that it is “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its ter¬ritory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States” (Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22).
37. From the constant references in the Court’s Judgment to the DRC’s inability to control anti-Uganda rebels, one may be forgiven for getting the impression that the DRC was facing problems of controlling its territory, at least in the eastern part of its territory. Thus reasons of geography, incapacity or distance have been invoked to avoid attribution of responsibility to the DRC for violations of its obligations to its neigh¬bours, in particular Uganda. Here, a quote from the “Commentary” on the United Nations Charter is apt:
“A special situation arises, if a State is not reluctant but incapable of impeding acts of terrorism committed by making use of its terri¬tory. Although such terrorist acts are not attributable to the State, the State victim of the acts is not precluded from reacting by military means against the terrorists within the territory of the other State. Otherwise, a so-called failed State would turn out to be a safe haven for terrorists, certainly not what Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the Charter are aiming at.” (B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations— A Commentary, 2nd ed., 2002, Vol. I, p. 802, para. 36.)
38. The Court has concluded that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter does not allow the use of force to protect perceived security interests beyond the strict confines there laid down. It adds that other means are available to a concerned State, in which the role of the Security Council will be paramount. It has not elaborated as to whether Uganda was entitled to the use of force on a threshold below “armed attack”. Uganda had been calling for the United Nations Security Council to send a peacekeeping force to the DRC. It is not enough for the Court to refer
Uganda to the Security Council. It bears mentioning that many tragic situations have occurred on the African continent due to inaction by the Council.
39. Equally, the Court has accused Uganda of not reporting to the Security Council events that it had regarded as requiring it to react in self-defence. In this connection, I wish to quote from Judge Schwebel’s dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case:
“A State cannot be deprived, and cannot deprive itself, of its inherent right [nothing in the Charter shall impair that inherent right, including the requirement of reporting to the Security Council the measures taken] of individual or collective self-defence because of its failure to report measures taken in the exercise of that right to the Security Council.” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 377, para. 230.)
This reporting requirement has been abused by aggressor States to justify themselves that by reporting, they had complied with Article 51 of the Charter concerning self-defence. Hence this requirement should be handled with caution when it comes to issues of self-defence. In prac¬tice, in some cases, some States are not aware that they are required to report measures taken. While this is not an excuse, it should be regarded as an extenuating circumstance.
40.    I have voted in favour of the second operative clause of the dis- positifconcerning the events in Kisangani. My vote in favour is in respect of the hostilities between Ugandan and Rwandan military forces in Kisangani. The mere fighting violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. I cannot, however, in good conscience, pronounce myself on the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law because there were such violations by the many parties to the DRC conflict, including the DRC. In this regard, my voting in favour of the fifth and sixth operative paragraphs of the dispositif is only in respect of the events in Kisangani. As I state below, I disagree with the Court’s findings on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and the unlawful exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources and thus cannot support a general finding for the making of reparation to the DRC on these matters.
41.    I also agree with the Court on the admissibility of the DRC’s claims in relation to Uganda’s responsibility for the events in Kisangani. It is not necessary for Rwanda to be a party to this case in order for the Court to determine whether Uganda’s conduct violated rules of interna¬tional law. While the indispensable third party principle does not apply here, one must reiterate that the DRC’s conflation of Rwanda and Uganda is uncalled for.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
42. The Court has found that Uganda, by the conduct of its armed forces, which committed acts of killing, torture and other forms of abuses, failed to discriminate between civilian and military targets and to protect the civilian population, trained child soldiers, incited ethnic con¬flict and failed to take measures to end such conflict; as well as by its failure as the occupying Power to take measures to respect and ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the district of Ituri, violated its obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
43. I have voted against this over-arching finding which mixes up several issues. The finding contains serious accusations against Uganda. As such a higher standard of proof is required: “A charge of such excep¬tional gravity against a State would require a degree of certainty that has not been reached here.” (Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 17.) It would also seem pertinent to cite the observation by Judge Higgins in her separate opinion in the Oil Platforms case:
“Beyond a general agreement that the graver the charge the more confidence must there be in the evidence relied on, there is thus little to help parties appearing before the Court (who already will know they bear the burden of proof) as to what is likely to satisfy the Court.” (Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 234, para. 33.)
44. At the outset of considering this finding by the Court, it bears repeating that there were massive and egregious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the DRC. As already observed, the DRC itself is not absolved from blame. Various reports in the public domain state that vile crimes have been perpetrated in the DRC. Four million people have died since the conflict began there. As counsel for Uganda stated during the oral proceedings
“a . . . balanced picture . . . without angels and without demons. It is not a picture without victims, however, because both Uganda and
the DRC are victims. Victims yes, but entirely innocent, no, because there is no one in this picture who is totally without blame.” (CR 2005/6, p. 58.)
45. As evidence of the serious accusation against Uganda for the vio¬lation of human rights and international humanitarian law, the Court relies on the sixth MONUC report of February 2001 and the MONUC’s special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003 (doc. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004). The Court proceeds to state that the United Nations documents are corroborated by other credible sources of NGOs, such as the HRW’s report of July 2003, which is available at http://hrw. org/reports/2003/ituri0703. For its part, Uganda asserts that the reports are unreliable and partisan (cites ASADHO, a Congolese NGO as a case in point). Uganda makes the following arguments that (a) MONUC did not have a mission (on the ground) appropriate to investigations of a spe¬cifically legal character; (b) the MONUC report makes assumptions about the causes of the Hema-Lendu conflict, assumptions which have no historical basis; (c) Uganda finds it anomalous and open to serious ques¬tion the supposition that in Ituri Uganda forces should be associated with patterns of abuse when this did not occur in other regions. In my view, these are cogent reasons which the Court should have taken into serious consideration before reaching its finding that Uganda violated human rights and international humanitarian law in the DRC.
46.    I find it remarkable that the DRC accuses Uganda of carrying out a deliberate policy of terror. Wisely, the Court did not endorse this rather excessive charge. On the basis of the “clean hands” theory — the prin¬ciple that an unlawful action cannot serve as the basis of an action in law — the DRC should be debarred from raising such accusations.
47.    Having in mind the seriousness of the accusations levelled by the DRC, the Court should have been more cautious and demanded satis¬factory evidence before concluding that the UPDF killed, tortured, and committed other forms of inhumane treatment against the Congolese civilian population. Relying on reports of the Special Rapporteurs and MONUC reports is not advisable. As is known, on a number of occa¬sions, reports of the Special Rapporteurs of the Human Rights Commis¬sion have generated controversies of a political and legal nature. Instead of helping to find a solution to the situation in question, the reports were ignored by some of the addressees on the grounds that they lacked objec-tivity. In some cases, the writers of the United Nations reports have no access to the countries concerned. In other cases, they are ill-informed and thus end up writing speculative reports as will be illustrated in the next section of this opinion.
48.    In this regard, I am troubled by the Court’s finding that there is persuasive evidence that the UPDF incited ethnic conflicts and took no action to prevent such conflicts in the Ituri region. It is strange that Uganda, which had its military presence elsewhere in the DRC, should be accused of such a charge only in Ituri. Allegations against Uganda of inciting ethnic conflict between the Hema and Lendu are based on a mis¬taken view of the area in question where 18 different ethnic groups live side by side. Uganda acknowledges the long-standing rivalry between the Hema and Lendu. Such rivalry had led to massacres of civilians. Uganda stood to gain nothing by inciting ethnic conflict. As explained earlier, the spread of the different ethnic groups in the Great Lakes region is such that based on history and recent experience, it would be folly for any country to try to fan ethnic rivalry. It would boomerang.
49. From the United Nations reports, it seems that the rebel groups in the DRC are the ones that recruited child soldiers and ferried them to Uganda. For example, the RCD-ML is said to have halted its military recruitment campaign due to the growing protest of UNICEF and MONUC. Indeed, Uganda granted access to UNICEF to the children at Kyankwanzi (RDRC, Ann. 32, para. 85). Once again, in my view, there is no evidence to justify the Court’s conclusion that Uganda recruited child soldiers in the DRC.
IV. THE UNLAWFUL EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
50.    I have voted against the fourth operative clause of the dispositif that finds that Uganda violated obligations owed to the DRC under international law, by acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Con¬golese natural resources committed by members of the Ugandan armed forces in the territory of the DRC and by its failure to comply with its obligations as occupying Power in the Ituri district to prevent acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources.
51.    Counsel for the DRC stated during the oral pleadings that
“this is the very first time that the Court has been called upon to address the responsibilities of a State for the illegal exploitation of natural resources which are located in the territory of another State which it occupies” (CR 2005/5, p. 15).
Counsel for Uganda agreed with this observation. Hence given the nature and the gravity of the charge, a higher standard of proof is required on the part of the Applicant to prove that the Respondent committed these acts of plunder and pillage. The DRC cited various sources for its evi¬dence, including the United Nations Panel reports on the Illegal Exploi-tation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC. It also cited the Porter Commission, which was set up by the Government of Uganda to investigate allegations made in United Nations Panel reports, as confirming the accusation of unlawful exploitation of Congo¬lese natural resource.
52. There is a lot of doubt concerning the reliability of the United Nations Panel reports. Even the Porter Commission Report, on which the DRC and the Court rely for evidence on exploitation, criticized the methodology followed by the United Nations Panels. It states that “it would seem that the majority of evidence likely to be obtained by such a methodology [of flexible data collection] would be either hearsay, biased or pure gossip, all untested” (Porter Commission Report, p. 7). Thus the United Nations Panel report of 12 April 2001 cites “some sources” as saying that the Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda and the late President Kabila were shareholders in BCDI (Banque de commerce de developpe- ment et d’industrie, located in Kigali). The Panel then concludes in the same paragraph, “[b]ut this was not the case” (RDRC, Vol. III, Ann. 69, para. 29). In paragraph 52, the Panel report alleges that some members of President Museveni’s family were shareholders of DGLI (The Dara Great Lakes Industries, of which DARA Forest is a subsidiary). Then the Panel adds “although more investigation is needed” (ibid., Ann. 69, para. 52).
53. This is the type of gossip that emerges from these United Nations documents. Thus the Court was forced to rely on the Porter Commission Report, which according to the Court provides sufficient and convincing evidence. Here one must caution again over reliance on a single source as evidence to prove allegations, not only of unlawful exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources, but also of the use of force. In any case, the Porter Commission found that there was no Ugandan governmental policy to exploit the DRC’s natural resources. The Commission also found that individual soldiers engaged in commercial activities and looting were acting in a purely private capacity.
54. In this respect, I find myself in disagreement with the Court’s con¬clusion that Uganda is internationally responsible for the acts of exploi¬tation of the DRC’s natural resources and has violated its obligation of due diligence in regard to these acts, of failing to comply with its obliga¬tion as an occupying Power in Ituri. The Ugandan soldiers, who com¬mitted acts of looting, did so in violation of orders from the highest Ugandan authorities. In his radio message of 15 December 1998 to COs and all UPDF units in the DRC, President Museveni said the following:
“1. Ensure that there is no officer or man of our forces in Congo who engages in business.
2. Also report to me any other public servant whether currently based in Congo or not who tries to engage in business in Congo.” (Rejoinder of Uganda (RU), Vol. III, Ann. 31.)
Hence, in my view, individual acts of UPDF soldiers, committed in their private capacity and in violation of orders, cannot lead to attribution of wrongful acts. Paragraph 8 of the Commentary to Article 7 of the draft Articles of the International Law Commission 2001 distinguishes between unauthorized, but still “official” conduct, on the one hand and “private” conduct on the other.
55.    As noted earlier, the Court reached a finding of occupation in order to rationalize its finding on human rights and international humani¬tarian law. It has done the same in respect of the alleged unlawful exploi¬tation of the DRC’s natural resources. From this finding, it is easy to invoke jus in bello in order to engage Uganda’s international responsi¬bility for acts and omissions of Ugandan troops in the DRC. Uganda has argued that it did not control the rebel groups that were in charge of parts of eastern Congo in general and in Ituri in particular. Its limited military presence could not have made this possible. In any case, the Respondent just — as I do — does not find the contention of occupation to be proven.
56.    The Court has rightly, in my view, not accepted part of the DRC’s final submission on the violation of the Congo’s permanent sovereignty over its natural resources (PSNR) because this has not been proven. The PSNR concept is embodied in General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962. The PSNR was adopted in the era of decolonization and the assertion of the rights of newly independent States. It thus would be inappropriate to invoke this concept in a case involving two African countries. This remark is made without prejudice to the right of States to own and or dispose of their natural resources as they wish.
V. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
57. In its fourth submission, the DRC requests the Court to adjudge and declare that Uganda ceases all continuing internationally wrongful acts, adopt specific guarantees and assurances of non-repetition and make reparation for all injury caused. In this regard, I agree with the Court that there is no evidence of continuing illegal acts on the part of Uganda in the DRC. As such, there is no need for the Court to make any ruling on cessation. Uganda, as the DRC acknowledges, withdrew its troops from the DRC on 2 June 2003. There is therefore no need for spe¬cific guarantees and assurances of non-repetition. The Court has taken judicial notice of the Tripartite Agreement on Regional Security in the Great Lakes of 26 October 2004. This Agreement between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda provides for obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region and cessation of any support for armed groups or militias.
58. Concerning reparation, this could follow at a subsequent phase of the proceedings, if the Parties fail to reach agreement after negotiations.
VI. COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT’S ORDER ON PROVISIONAL MEASURES
59. The DRC requests the Court to adjudge and declare that Uganda has violated the Order of the Court on provisional measures of 1 July 2000 by not complying with the three provisional measures, namely, (a) refrain from armed action in the DRC; (b) compliance with obliga¬tions under international law, in particular the United Nations and OAU Charters and Security Council resolution 1304 (2000); and (c) respect within the zone of conflict for fundamental human rights and for the applicable provisions of humanitarian law.
60.    The Court notes that the DRC put forward no specific evidence demonstrating that after July 2000 Uganda committed acts in violation of each of the three provisional measures. However, the Court finds that Uganda has violated provisional measures concerning human rights and international humanitarian law through actions of Ugandan troops during the period of their presence in the DRC, including the period from 1 July 2000.
61.    The Court’s finding that Uganda did not comply with the Order of the Court on provisional measures of 1 July 2000 shows, as indicated earlier, lack of concern for the action taken, not in good faith, by the Applicant to raise this issue against the Respondent when the Applicant itself has committed grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Thus, I am constrained not to support the position of the Court on its finding. The Court, in my view, should not have dealt with the violation of the provisional measures. I have already referred to the “clean hands” theory, which I deem to be apt on this issue as well.
VII. COUNTER-CLAIMS
62.    Uganda’s first counter-claim relates to acts of aggression allegedly committed by the DRC. The second relates to attacks on Uganda’s dip¬lomatic premises and personnel in Kinshasa and on Ugandan nationals. The third counter-claim was ruled inadmissible by the Order of the Court of 29 November 2001.
63.    I agree with the Court’s reasoning, which rejects Uganda’s claim that the DRC is not entitled at the merits phase of the proceedings to raise objections to the admissibility to the counter-claims submitted by Uganda. In the Oil Platforms case the Court ruled that Iran was entitled to challenge “the ‘admissibility’ of the [United States’] counter-claim” on the merits (Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 210, para. 105).
64.    I have voted in favour of operative clause 8 of the dispositif by which the Court rejects objections of the DRC to the admissibility of the first counter-claim submitted by Uganda. Before proceeding with further consideration of this counter-claim, I wish to make a general comment on the way the Court has treated this claim of Uganda which is the Applicant in this context and the DRC is the Respondent. It is a matter of regret that the Court agrees with the DRC’s division of the first counter-claim into three periods. The Court invokes the excuse of “practical purposes” in agreeing to divide the counter-claim into three periods: (a) the Mobutu era, i.e., before May 1997; (b) the Kabila period, i.e., May 1997-August 1998; (c) the period after 2 August 1998.
65.    This “slicing” technique of the first counter-claim is to the dis¬advantage of Uganda because as the Applicant in this respect points out “the DRC is seeking to limit Uganda’s counter-claim”. Uganda main¬tains that Zaire and the DRC are not distinct entities and by virtue of the State continuity principle, it is precisely the same legal person, which is responsible for the acts complained of in the first counter-claim. The divi¬sion of the counter-claim makes it difficult to follow the reasoning of the Court. Admissibility issues are mixed with those of merits. It would have been better if the first counter-claim had been dealt with in its entirety, without dividing it into three periods.
66.    I have voted against paragraph 9 of the dispositif by which the Court finds that the first counter-claim submitted by Uganda cannot be upheld. I find myself in disagreement with the Court’s dismissal of the evidence submitted by Uganda — for the first period of the first counter¬claim — when it argues that evidence is of “limited probative value” when it is “neither relied on by the other Party nor corroborated by impartial, neutral sources” (Judgment, para. 298). This observation of the Court concerns President Museveni’s address to the Ugandan Parlia¬ment on 28 May 2000 entitled “Uganda’s Role in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. Evidence by the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) is regarded as “too general to support a claim of Congolese involvement . . .” (Judgment, p. 298). I do not share the Court’s charac¬terization and treatment of this evidence.
67.    In relation to the second period of the first counter-claim, the Court finds that Uganda has failed to provide conclusive evidence of actual support for anti-Ugandan rebel groups by the DRC. The Court notes, with approval, the improved relations between the two Parties. The Court should have remembered its earlier observation that “[t]he political climate between States does not alter their legal rights” (Judg¬ment, para. 294). The Court comments that this period is marked by clear action by the DRC against rebels. If it had accepted evidence by Uganda, it would have noted the “dual role” by the Congolese highest authorities of seeming to co-operate with Uganda while at the same time fraternizing with the Sudan and anti-Ugandan rebels.
68.    Regarding the second counter-claim, I have voted in favour of rejecting the DRC’s objection to the admissibility of the part of the claim relating to the breach of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (paragraph 10 of the dispositif). I agree with the Court’s reasoning in its interpretation of the Order of 29 November 2001.
69.    I have voted against operative paragraph 11 of the dispositif, which upholds the objection of the DRC to the admissibility of the part of the second counter-claim relating to the maltreatment of persons other than Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili Airport on 20 August 1998. The invo¬cation by Uganda of the international minimum standard relating to the treatment of foreign nationals is considered by the Court as an exercise of diplomatic protection. Thus according to the Court, Uganda would need to meet the conditions necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection, namely, the requirement of Ugandan nationality of the claimants and the prior exhaustion of local remedies. The Court avoids dealing with the issue of these persons on the grounds that it has not been established that they were Ugandan nationals. In my view, the Court should have invoked international humanitarian law to protect the rights of these persons. The Court would seem not to have given enough weight to violations of the rights of these persons at Ndjili Airport by the DRC.
70.    I voted in favour of operative paragraph 12, which finds that the DRC has violated obligations owed to Uganda under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations by Congo’s armed forces, maltreat¬ing Ugandan diplomats and other individuals at the embassy premises, maltreating Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili Airport, as well as its failure to provide the Ugandan Embassy and Ugandan diplomats with effective protection and failure to protect archives and property from seizure.
I also agree with the Court that it will only be at a subsequent phase, failing an agreement between the Parties, that the issue of reparation to Uganda will be settled by the Court.
(Signed) J. L. KATEKA.
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